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The	  aim	  of	  this	  research	  was	  to	  develop	  a	  behavioural	  paradigm	  capable	  of	  quantifying	  
action	   acquisition.	   It	   takes	   the	   form	   of	   a	   series	   of	   experiments	   in	   which	   human	  
participants	   learn	   to	   produce	   new	   actions	   with	   a	   joystick.	   Research	   questions	   were	  
focussed	  on	  the	  behavioural	  implications	  of	  Redgrave	  and	  Gurney’s	  (2006)	  theory	  that	  
dopamine	  neurons	  in	  the	  ventral	  midbrain	  play	  a	  pivotal	  role	  in	  the	  reinforcement	  and	  
reselection	  of	  motor	  output	  that	  is	  essential	  to	  action	  learning.	  The	  first	  study	  looked	  
at	   the	  effect	  of	  delayed	  audio	  and	  visual	   reinforcement	  on	  the	  ability	   to	   learn	  stable	  
hand	  positions.	  Delays	  of	  100	  ms	  were	  found	  to	  impair	  acquisition	  in	  both	  modalities.	  
This	   degree	   of	   temporal	   sensitivity	   supports	   the	   idea	   that	   dopamine	   neurons	   fire	   at	  
low	   latencies	   to	   reduce	   the	   reinforcement	   of	   non-­‐contiguous	   motor	   output.	   The	  
second	  study	  investigated	  the	  effect	  of	  delay	  on	  the	  learning	  of	  hand	  movements.	  The	  
movements	  produced	  during	  the	  delay	  period	  were	  analysed	  to	  address	  the	  question	  
of	  whether	  the	  quantity	  of	  non-­‐contingent	  output	  would	  impact	  on	  learning	  over	  and	  
above	  the	  mismatch	  in	  temporal	  alignment.	  The	  results	  revealed	  that	  this	  was	  not	  the	  
case,	  thus	  suggesting	  that	  timing	  is	  of	  primary	  importance	  to	  learning.	  The	  final	  study	  
utilised	   a	   task	   requiring	   more	   complex	   movements,	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   reduce	   the	  
contribution	   of	   high-­‐level,	   conscious,	   learning	   in	   favour	   of	   low-­‐level	   non-­‐declarative	  
learning.	  Performance	  was	  compared	  across	  conditions,	  which	  differed	  in	  the	  quantity	  
of	  spatial	   information	  provided.	  No	  evidence	  was	   found	  that	   the	  type	  of	  movements	  
produced	  during	   learning	   impacted	  on	   later	  performance,	   thus	   indicating	  a	   tendency	  
to	  use	  high-­‐level	  spatial	  guidance	  of	  movements.	  All	  findings	  are	  discussed	  in	  terms	  of	  
the	   value	  of	   the	   current	   paradigm	  and	   the	   extent	   to	  which	   they	   support	   the	   theory	  
that	  action	  learning	  is	  mediated	  by	  a	  time-­‐stamping	  mechanism	  in	  the	  midbrain.	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Chapter	  1:	  the	  discovery	  of	  novel	  actions	  
Redgrave	   and	   Gurney	   (2006)	   and	   Redgrave,	   Gurney	   and	   Reynolds	   (2008)	   offer	   an	  
alternative	   explanation	   to	   the	   prevailing	   theory	   (Schultz,	   Dayan	   &	  Montague,	   1997)	  
regarding	   the	   function	   of	   the	   phasic	   activity	   of	   midbrain	   dopamine	   neurons.	   They	  
argue	  that	  this	  activity	  does	  not	  serve	  as	  a	  reward	  prediction	  error	  signal,	  but	  is	  central	  
to	   the	   reinforcement	   and	   reselection	   of	   motor	   output	   and	   the	   discovery	   of	   novel	  
actions.	   If	   true,	   this	   dopaminergic	   activity	   could	   underpin	   some	   of	   the	   most	   basic	  
aspects	  of	   learning	  and	  behaviour	   including	  agency	  detection	  and	  action	  acquisition.	  
However,	   whilst	   the	   tools	   and	   methods	   for	   investigating	   the	   effects	   of	   reward	  
prediction	   are	   refined	   and	   clearly	   calibrated	   across	   the	   research	   community	   in	   the	  
form	   of	   operant	   chambers,	   shaping	   techniques	   and	   standardised	   schedules	   of	  
reinforcement,	   the	   most	   popular	   model	   for	   investigating	   action	   acquisition	   –	   lever	  
pressing	  –	  is	  limited	  to	  the	  extent	  it	  that	  it	  makes	  different	  levels	  of	  performance,	  and	  
therefore	  different	   stages	  of	   acquisition,	  difficult	   to	  quantify.	   The	  motivation	   for	   the	  
current	   research	   was	   to	   develop	   a	   behavioural	   paradigm,	   suitable	   for	   human	  
participants,	  that	  is	  capable	  of	  testing	  hypotheses	  derived	  from	  Redgrave	  and	  Gurney's	  
theory.	   The	   three	   chapters	   that	   follow	   chart	   the	   development	   of	   this	   paradigm,	   but	  
first	  this	  introduction	  attempts	  to	  situate	  the	  topic	  of	  action	  acquisition	  amongst	  other	  
similar	   fields	   in	   psychology,	   and	   then	   discusses	   possible	   neural	   correlates	   and	   the	  
implications	   of	   neural	   processes	   at	   the	   behavioural	   level	   and	   finally	   consideration	   is	  
given	   to	   some	   of	   the	   methodological	   requirements	   of	   a	   behavioural	   test	   of	   action	  
acquisition.	  	  
	  
Previous	  research	  into	  action	  acquisition	  
Thorndike:	  action	  acquisition	  in	  animals	  
Thorndike	  (1911)	  was	  a	  pioneer	  in	  the	  quantitative	  study	  of	   learning.	  He	  investigated	  
action	   acquisition	   using	   an	   escape	   paradigm	   whereby	   animals	   were	   repeatedly	  
exposed	   to	   situations	   in	  which	   a	  particular	   sequence	  of	  movements	  was	   required	   in	  
order	  to	  bring	  about	  a	  desirable	  consequence,	  namely	  escape	  from	  an	  enclosure.	  The	  
iterated	   nature	   of	   the	   task	   allowed	   Thorndike	   to	   record	   the	   change	   in	   an	   animal's	  
behaviour	  over	  successive	  trials,	  both	  qualitatively:	  by	  means	  of	  general	  observations,	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and	   quantitatively:	   by	   measuring	   the	   time	   between	   entry	   into	   the	   experimental	  
chamber	  and	  the	  point	  at	  which	  its	  escape	  was	  completed.	  	  In	  perhaps	  the	  best	  known	  
version	  of	  this	  task,	  a	  cat	  was	  enclosed	  in	  a	  puzzle-­‐box	  and	  its	  behaviour	  observed	  as	  it	  
learned,	   over	   successive	   trials,	   to	   escape	   by	   pressing	   a	   foot	   pedal	   linked	   to	   a	   door	  
release	  mechanism.	  Initially,	  the	  animal	  would	  produce	  the	  escape	  behaviours	  natural	  
to	  a	  cat	  in	  a	  confined	  space	  and,	  consequently,	  any	  depression	  of	  the	  foot	  pedal	  was	  a	  
mere	  by-­‐product	  of	  this.	  	  However,	  after	  many	  attempts,	  the	  normal	  escape	  response	  
of	  the	  cat	  was	  gradually	  reduced	  and	  behaviour	  consistent	  with	  lever	  depression	  was	  
increased.	  The	  cat’s	  behaviour	  in	  the	  context	  had	  apparently	  become	  more	  purposeful	  
and	   efficient.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   cat	   had	   added	   a	   new	   action	   to	   its	   behavioural	  
repertoire.	  	  
	  
Thorndike’s	   (1911)	   simple	   and	   intuitive	   account	   of	   the	   learning	   process	   was	   just	   as	  
influential	  as	  the	  paradigm	  he	  used	  to	  record	  it.	  He	  emphasised	  the	  animal's	  ability	  to	  
monitor	   the	   consequences	   of	   its	   own	   behaviour	   and	   observed	   that	   those	   responses	  
which	  do	  not	  result	  in	  positive	  outcomes	  are	  gradually	  "stamped	  out"	  whilst	  all	  those	  
resulting	  in	  reinforcement	  are	  gradually	  "stamped	  in"	  (p.74).	  He	  called	  this	  the	  law	  of	  
effect	  and	  explained	  it	  as	  follows:	  
	  
The	   Law	   of	   Effect	   is	   that:	   Of	   several	   responses	   made	   to	   the	   same	  
situation,	   those	   which	   are	   accompanied	   or	   closely	   followed	   by	  
satisfaction	  to	  the	  animal	  will,	  other	  things	  being	  equal,	  be	  more	  firmly	  
connected	  with	  the	  situation,	  so	  that,	  when	  it	  recurs,	  they	  will	  be	  more	  
likely	   to	   recur;	   those	   which	   are	   accompanied	   or	   closely	   followed	   by	  
discomfort	   to	   the	   animal	   will,	   other	   things	   being	   equal,	   have	   their	  
connections	  with	  that	  situation	  weakened,	  so	  that,	  when	  it	  recurs,	  they	  
will	   be	   less	   likely	   to	   occur.	   The	   greater	   the	   satisfaction	   or	   discomfort,	  
the	  greater	  the	  strengthening	  or	  weakening	  of	  the	  bond.	  (p.244).	  
	  
Although	  somewhat	  simplistic,	  Thorndike's	  law	  of	  effect	  retains	  the	  durability	  of	  other	  
process	   descriptions	   such	   as	   'survival	   of	   the	   fittest',	   not	   because	   it	   is	   a	   complete	  
explanation	  but	  because	  it	  provides	  a	  means	  of	  describing	  learning	  without	  reference	  
to	  the	  unknown	  mechanisms	  on	  which	  learning	  depends.	  It	  also	  offers	  a	  neat	  summary	  




For	  the	  current	  purposes,	  the	  term	  ‘action	  acquisition’	  is	  used	  to	  describe	  the	  type	  of	  
learning	  undertaken	  by	  Thorndike’s	  animal	  subjects	  and	  here	  this	  is	  treated	  as	  distinct	  
from	   action-­‐outcome	   learning	   (Dickinson	   &	   Balleine,	   2000).	   Typically,	   in	   action-­‐
outcome	  learning	  a	  stable	  sequence	  of	  movements	  has	  already	  been	  acquired	  and	  the	  
learning	   in	   question	   involves	   the	   connection	   of	   new	   effects	   with	   this	   set	   of	  
movements.	   Action	   acquisition,	   by	   contrast,	   is	   treated	   here	   as	   the	   reduction	   of	  
behavioural	   variance	   from	   an	   initially	   large	   set	   of	   varied	   movements	   to	   a	   smaller,	  
stable	  set	  of	  movements	  that	  reliably	  bring	  about	  a	  particular	  outcome.	  This	  does	  not	  
necessarily	   involve	   the	   animal	   learning	   new	   movements	   that	   it	   was	   previously	  
incapable	  of	  performing,	  rather	  it	  involves	  the	  animal	  discovering	  that	  a	  given	  chunk	  of	  
behaviour	  has	  reliable	  consequences	  such	  that	  this	  chunk	  is	  now	  treated	  differently	  to	  
the	  individual	  elements	  from	  which	  it	   is	  comprised.	  During	  this	  process,	  the	  animal	  is	  
therefore	   forced	   to	   solve	   a	   credit	   assignment	   problem	   (Barto,	   Sutton	   &	   Anderson,	  
1983;	   Minsky,	   1961),	   something	   that	   is	   less	   of	   an	   issue	   in	   action-­‐outcome	   learning	  
where	   the	   pre-­‐learned	   sequence	   of	   movements	   can	   potentially	   be	   dealt	   with	   as	   a	  
chunk.	  Despite	   the	  distinction	  drawn	  here,	  however,	   it	   is	  acknowledged	  that	   there	   is	  
much	  crossover	  between	  the	  two	  types	  of	  learning.	  
	  
Skinner:	  the	  maintenance	  of	  an	  action	  
With	   behaviourism,	   attention	   turned	   from	   action	   acquisition	   to	   the	   ways	   in	   which	  
behaviour	   could	   be	   recorded	   and	   manipulated.	   This	   is	   exemplified	   by	   Ferster	   and	  
Skinner	   (1957)	   who	   developed	   a	   technique	   to	   investigate	   the	   effect	   that	   different	  
timings,	   magnitudes	   and	   probabilities	   of	   reinforcement	   could	   have	   on	   an	   animal’s	  
responses;	  they	  termed	  the	  technique	  operant	  conditioning.	  In	  a	  typical	  experiment,	  a	  
rat	   or	   a	   pigeon	   would	   be	   placed	   inside	   a	   small	   cage	   or	   box	   (an	   operant	   chamber)	  
containing	  one	  or	  more	  levers.	  	  Depression	  of	  a	  lever	  would	  be	  reinforced	  by	  delivery	  
of	   food	   into	   a	   hopper.	   	   By	   varying	   the	   timing,	   quantity	   or	   likelihood	   of	   food	   being	  
delivered,	  the	  rate	  at	  which	  the	  animal	  responded	  with	  depressions	  of	  the	  lever	  could	  
be	  changed.	  Thus,	  psychologists	  had	  a	  means	  of	  distilling	  some	  of	  the	  complexities	  of	  
learning	  down	  to	  discrete	  responses	  on	  a	  lever	  operandum.	  
	  
Operant	   conditioning	   owes	   much	   to	   the	   work	   of	   Thorndike;	   however,	   it	   would	   be	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wrong	  to	  think	  of	  it	  as	  a	  simple	  refinement	  of	  his	  work.	  Thorndike’s	  escape	  paradigm	  
was	  designed	  to	  investigate	  the	  acquisition	  of	  new	  actions	  and	  therefore	  experiments	  
utilising	   this	  paradigm	  continue	  only	  until	   the	  point	  at	  which	   the	   relevant	  action	  has	  
been	  fully	  learned.	  Operant	  conditioning,	  by	  contrast,	  was	  designed	  to	  investigate	  how	  
reinforcement	  can	  change	  the	  rate	  at	  which	  animals	  produce	  fully	  formed	  (previously	  
learned)	  actions.	  The	  relationship	  between	  the	  two	  approaches	  is	  explained	  by	  Skinner	  
(1969)	  as	  follows:	  
	  
By	   thoroughly	   adapting	   the	   rat	   to	   the	   box	   before	   the	   lever	   is	   made	  
available,	   most	   of	   the	   competing	   behaviour	   can	   be	   “stamped	   out”	  
before	  the	  response	  to	  be	  learned	  is	  ever	  emitted.	  Thorndike’s	  learning	  
curve,	   showing	   the	   gradual	   disappearance	   of	   unsuccessful	   behaviour,	  
then	  vanishes.	  In	  its	  place	  we	  are	  left	  with	  a	  conspicuous	  change	  in	  the	  
successful	  response	  itself:	  an	  immediate,	  often	  quite	  abrupt,	  increase	  in	  
rate.	  (pp.6-­‐7).	  
	  
In	  other	  words,	  Skinner’s	  primary	  aim	  when	  employing	  operant	  conditioning	  was	  not	  
to	   investigate	   how	   a	   rat	   learns	   to	   press	   a	   lever,	   but	   instead	   to	   record	   how	   the	  
probability	  of	  a	  fully	  formed	  lever-­‐press	  response	  changes	  over	  time.	  	  	  
	  
The	  obvious	  question	  for	  anyone	  interested	  in	  action	  acquisition,	  is	  how	  do	  the	  animal	  
subjects	   acquire	   the	   lever	   pressing	   (or	   key	   pecking)	   actions	   in	   the	   first	   place?	   To	  
Skinner,	   the	   acquisition	   phase	   was	   essentially	   an	   obstacle	   to	   measuring	   rate	   of	  
response	   (Lattal	   &	   Gleeson,	   1990)	   and	   he	   developed	   a	   technique	   for	   quickly	  
transforming	  simple	  components	  of	  an	  animal’s	  behaviour	  into	  more	  elaborate	  actions	  
and	  sequences	  of	  actions:	  a	  process	  known	  as	  shaping.	  	  From	  an	  experimental	  point	  of	  
view,	   this	   avoids	   the	   need	   for	   a	   protracted	   period	  whereby	   the	   animal	   acquires	   the	  
behaviour	   automatically.	   However,	   whilst	   it	   is	   easy	   to	   appreciate	   that	   researchers	  
might	   want	   to	   skip	   straight	   to	   the	   process	   of	   interest,	   it	   is	   hard	   to	   escape	   the	  
impression	  that	  Skinner’s	  efficient	  techniques	  for	   investigating	   learning	  have	  resulted	  
in	  questions	  of	  acquisition	  being	  left	  relatively	  ignored	  (Peterson,	  2004).	  	  
	  
What	  is	  learnt	  during	  action	  acquisition?	  	  
A	  somewhat	  confusing	  aspect	  of	  the	  study	  of	  action	  acquisition	  is	  the	  question	  of	  what	  
constitutes	  an	  action.	  Redgrave	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  define	  action	  acquisition	  as	  “discovering	  a	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movement	   that	   has	   a	   predicted	   outcome"	   (p.331).	   The	   animals	   in	   Thorndike’s	  
experiments	  were	  better	  able	  to	  effect	  an	  escape	  from	  the	  enclosures	  by	  the	  end	  of	  a	  
testing	   session	   than	   they	  were	  at	   the	  beginning	  and	  yet	   it	   seems	   strange	   to	   suggest	  
that	  they	  had	  learnt	  new	  movements	  during	  this	  time.	  So	  what	  exactly	  did	  they	  learn?	  
One	  might	  argue	  that	  they	  learned	  that	  the	  pedal	  was	  the	  cause	  for	  the	  door	  opening	  
and	   in	  a	  sense	  this	   is	   true,	  but	  with	  an	   important	  qualification.	  Thorndike	  found	  that	  
demonstrating	  the	  task	  to	  the	  animals	  prior	  to	  a	  testing	  session	  did	  not	  increase	  their	  
rate	  of	  learning.	  He	  also	  found	  that,	  once	  trained,	  the	  animals	  would	  attempt	  to	  press	  
the	  door	  release	  pedal,	  even	  if	  that	  pedal	  was	  removed	  (they	  would	  ‘press’	  thin	  air).	  In	  
other	   words,	   it	   is	   likely	   that	   the	   cats’	   understanding	   of	   their	   behaviour	   was	   very	  
limited.	   	   However,	   what	  we	   can	   say	  with	   confidence	   is	   that	   the	   cats	   had	   learned	   a	  
stable	   sequence	   of	   movements	   that	   reliably	   resulted	   in	   a	   desirable	   outcome.	   The	  
process	  of	  combining	  and	  refining	  movements	  would	  seem,	  therefore,	  to	  be	  central	  to	  
action	  acquisition.	  
	  
There	  is	  no	  simple	  relationship	  between	  the	  proximity	  of	  any	  given	  movement	  within	  
an	  action	  and	  its	  contribution	  to	  bringing	  about	  a	  particular	  outcome.	  The	  final	  portion	  
of	  an	  action	  may	  be	  no	  more	  or	  less	  important	  to	  the	  outcome	  than	  the	  earliest	  part	  of	  
an	  action.	  Because	  of	  this,	  actions	  are	  often	  not	  decomposable	  into	  component	  parts,	  
even	  if	  each	  of	  those	  parts	   is	   just	  a	  simple	  movement	   learned	  long	  before	  the	  whole	  
action.	   Indeed,	   Ostlund,	   Winterbauer	   and	   Balleine	   (2009)	   have	   demonstrated	   that	  
action	   sequences	   –	   that	   is	   to	   say,	   combinations	   of	   not	   just	   movements,	   but	   entire	  
actions	  –	  can	  be	  treated	  as	  a	  single	  reinforceable	  entities	  or	  ‘chunks’.	  They	  found	  that	  
healthy	   rats	   were	   able	   to	   avoid	   a	   particular	   sequence	   of	   lever	   presses	   when	   the	  
outcome	  of	   that	  sequence	  had	  been	  devalued	  through	  prefeeding.	   Importantly,	   they	  
were	  able	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  rats	  weren’t	  merely	  avoiding	  sequences	  based	  on	  
individual	   components	   within	   those	   sequences.	   Actions,	   then,	   are	   perhaps	   not	   only	  
defined	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  movements	  of	  which	  they	  are	  composed,	  but	  also	  in	  terms	  of	  
the	  outcome	  they	  bring	  about.	  
	  
Action-­‐outcome	  learning	  
Thorndike’s	  work	   is	   clearly	  a	  very	  pure	  and	   intuitive	  approach	   to	   the	  study	  of	  action	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acquisition,	   but	   the	   issue	   of	   action	   sequence	   chunking	   shows	   that	   we	   can	   take	   an	  
entirely	  different	  perspective	  on	  the	  subject:	   it	   is	  possible	  to	  study	  action	  acquisition	  
when	   the	   stable	   sequence	   of	   movements	   already	   exists	   within	   the	   animal’s	  
behavioural	   repertoire.	   In	   such	   circumstances,	   we	   can	   focus	   instead	   on	   what	   the	  
animal	   learns	   about	   the	   consequences	   of	   those	  movements	   such	   as	   how	   the	   utility	  
changes	   depending	  on	   the	   animal’s	   inner	   state	   (e.g.	   level	   of	   satiety	   or	   nausea).	   This	  
approach	   has	   come	   to	   be	   known	   as	   action-­‐outcome	   learning	   (Dickinson	   &	   Balleine,	  
2000).	  
	  
Action-­‐outcome	   learning	   can	  be	   thought	   of	   as	   the	   formation	  of	  memories	   regarding	  
the	   causal	   consequences	   of	   actions,	   such	   that	   the	   probability	   of	   invoking	   a	   learnt	  
action	   at	   any	   given	   time	   is	   dependent	   on	   the	   current	   utility	   of	   that	   action's	  
consequences.	   	   Adams	   and	  Dickinson	   (1981)	   pioneered	   the	  modern	   study	  of	   action-­‐
outcome	   learning	   with	   two	   experiments	   that	   tested	   "whether	   or	   not	   animals	   know	  
about	  the	  consequences	  of	  their	  actions"	  (p.109).	  Rats	  were	  trained	  to	  press	  a	  lever	  in	  
return	  for	  a	  food	  reinforcer.	  They	  were	  also	  fed	  on	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  food,	  not	  paired	  
with	  lever	  pressing.	  	  Following	  this	  training	  phase,	  half	  of	  the	  rats	  had	  the	  contingent	  
food	   devalued	   whilst	   the	   other	   half	   had	   the	   non-­‐contingent	   food	   devalued;	   the	  
devaluation	   was	   achieved	   by	   injecting	   them	   with	   lithium	   chloride	   (a	   toxic	   salt	   that	  
causes	   sickness)	   following	   consumption	   of	   the	   relevant	   food.	   	   It	  was	   found	   that	   the	  
number	  of	   lever	  presses	  performed	  during	   subsequent	  extinction	   trials	  was	   lower	   in	  
the	  group	  of	  rats	  for	  whom	  the	  contingent	  food	  had	  been	  devalued.	  	   In	  other	  words,	  
the	  rats'	  experience	  of	  the	  contingent	  food	  (i.e.	  sickness)	  outside	  of	  the	  normal	  lever-­‐
pressing	   context	   affected	   their	   behaviour	   when	   they	   returned	   to	   the	   lever	   pressing	  
situation,	   even	   though	   they	   didn't	   experience	   the	   reinforcer	   again.	   Apparently,	   this	  
difference	   in	   behaviour	   depends	   crucially	   on	   the	   rats'	   knowledge	   of	   what	   lever	  
pressing	  does.	  
	  
This	   study	   and	   other	   similar	   studies	   (e.g.	   Colwill	   &	   Rescorla,	   1985)	   concern	   action	  
acquisition	   insofar	  as	   they	  provide	   information	  about	  precisely	  what	  has	  been	   learnt	  
by	  the	  animal.	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  Adams	  and	  Dickinson	  (1981)	  experiments,	  we	  find	  
that	   learning	   the	   action	   involves	   more	   than	   just	   the	   connection	   of	   stimuli	   with	  
responses	   because,	   after	   devaluation,	   the	   rate	   of	   response	   was	   measured	   during	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extinction	  trials	  so	  there	  was	  no	  further	  exposure	  to	  a	  stimulus-­‐response	  relationship	  
that	  could	  have	  prompted	  the	  drop	  in	  rate	  of	  response.	  Therefore,	  to	  fully	  characterise	  
the	   action	   that	   has	   been	   learnt	   by	   the	   rats,	   it	   isn’t	   enough	   speak	   in	   terms	  of	   stable	  
sequences	   of	   movements,	   we	   must	   also	   take	   into	   account	   what	   the	   rat	   has	   learnt	  
about	   the	   consequences	   of	   these	  movements	   because	   this	   informs	   its	   choices	   as	   to	  
whether	  or	  not	  to	  produce	  the	  action	  at	  a	  given	  time	  and	  allows	  it	  to	  make	  intelligent	  
decisions	  which	  take	  into	  account	  its	  own	  internal	  state.	  
	  
The	   focus	   of	   the	   current	   research	   concerns	   the	   reselection,	   repetition	   and	  
reinforcement	  of	   recent	  movements	  as	  detailed	  by	  Redgrave	  and	  Gurney	   (2006)	  and	  
Redgrave	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  and,	  therefore,	  it	  is	  considered	  that	  this	  puts	  it	  in	  the	  tradition	  
of	   Thorndike’s	   (1911)	   escape	   paradigm	   as	   opposed	   to	   the	   devaluation	   paradigms	  
which	   are	   central	   to	   action-­‐outcome	   learning	   research.	   In	   nonhuman	   animals,	   an	  
understanding	  of	  utility	  is	  most	  directly	  expressed	  in	  terms	  of	  rate	  of	  response	  and	  is	  
most	   informative	  when	  the	  response	  is	  a	  sequence	  of	  movements	  that	  already	  exists	  
within	   the	   animal’s	   behavioural	   repertoire.	   By	   contrast,	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   recent	  
motor	  output	  has	  been	  reinforced	  is	  most	  directly	  expressed	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  efficiency	  
with	  which	  a	  sequence	  of	  movements	  is	  performed.	  When	  studying	  this	  efficiency,	  we	  
must	  assume	  that	  the	  outcome/consequence	  of	  the	  recent	  motor	  output	  has	  at	  least	  
some	   utility	   to	   the	   agent	   be	   that	   through	   novelty,	   experimenter	   instructions	   or	  
nutritional	  benefits.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  animal’s	  motivation	  to	  elicit	  the	  outcome	  is	  a	  
requirement	  of	  the	  investigation,	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  outcome	  is	  useful	  to	  the	  
animal	  is	  only	  a	  secondary	  concern.	  
	  
Action-­‐acquisition	  versus	  supervised	  learning	  
A	  basic	   consideration	  when	  developing	  a	  new	  experimental	  paradigm	   is	   to	   ascertain	  
whether	  it	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  able	  to	  measure	  the	  process	  of	  interest.	  	  Specifically,	  there	  is	  a	  
risk	  that	  a	  joystick	  paradigm	  might	  tell	  us	  more	  about	  motor	  control	  than	  it	  does	  about	  
action	   acquisition.	   It	   has	   long	   been	   argued	   that	   the	  movements	   we	  make	  must,	   to	  
some	  extent,	  be	  pre-­‐programmed	  and,	  where	  necessary,	  be	  corrected	  during	  travel	  by	  
the	   use	   of	   an	   internal	   model	   predicting	   the	   sensory	   outcome	   of	   the	   movement	  
(Desmurget	  &	  Grafton,	  2000;	  Jordan	  &	  Rumelhart,	  1992).	  One	  of	  the	  most	  persuasive	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reasons	   for	   believing	   this	   is	   that	   some	   movements	   are	   executed	   and	   corrected	   so	  
rapidly	   that	   there	  wouldn’t	  be	   time	   to	  guide	   the	  movement	  using	   sensory	   feedback,	  
due	  to	  the	  latencies	   in	  conveying	  that	   information	  through	  the	  nervous	  system	  (Bard	  
et	   al.,	   1999).	   Consequently,	   it	   seems	   certain	   that	   such	   movements	   are	   carried	   out	  
based	  on	  a	  motor	  program	  that	   specifies	   the	  movement	   so,	  once	  planned,	   it	   can	  be	  
carried	   out	   without	   external	   feedback	   and	   errors	   can	   be	   predicted	   in	   advance.	   The	  
creation	  of	   these	  motor	  programs	   is,	  of	  course,	  closely	   related	  to	   the	   topic	  of	  action	  
acquisition.	   Consequently,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   be	   clear	   on	   the	   differences	   between	  
supervised	   learning	   and	   reinforcement	   learning,	   given	   that	   the	   latter	   is	   the	   primary	  
focus	  of	  the	  current	  research.	  
	  
A	  good	  example	  of	  a	  supervised	  learning	  paradigm	  is	  the	  task	  employed	  by	  Kitazawa,	  
Kohno	   and	   Uka	   (1995).	   They	   projected	   targets	   onto	   a	   screen	   and	   required	   human	  
participants	   to	   make	   reaching	   movements	   towards	   these	   targets.	   Participants	   wore	  
prism	   spectacles,	   which	   shifted	   their	   view	   of	   the	   target	   by	   a	   fixed	   amount.	   The	  
spectacles	   also	   served	   to	   render	   the	   target	   invisible	   during	   reaching	  movements	   by	  
becoming	   opaque.	   This	   ensured	   that	   the	   only	   visual	   feedback	   received	   by	   the	  
participants	  was	  on	  first	  sight	  of	  the	  target	  and	  then	  again	  once	  their	  finger	  had	  settled	  
on	   the	   screen	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   reaching	   movement.	   By	   this	   method,	   the	  
experimenters	   were	   able	   to	   measure	   the	   adaptation	   of	   the	   participants’	   reaching	  
movements	  over	  several	  trials	  as	  they	  learned	  to	  correct	  for	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  prisms.	  
	  
Whilst	   it	   is	   easy	   to	   identify	   archetypal	   examples	   of	   both	   supervised	   learning	   (e.g.	  
Kitazawa	   et	   al.,	   1995)	   and	   reinforcement	   learning	   (e.g.	   operant	   conditioning	   or	  
Thorndike,	  1911),	  the	  key	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  aren’t	  quite	  so	  apparent.	  Here	  
we	  will	  take	  a	  methodological	  perspective,	  mindful	  that	  there	  are	  other	  technical	  ways	  
of	   differentiating	   the	   two	   types	   of	   learning	   at	   the	   algorithmic	   level	   (e.g.,	   Jordan	   &	  
Rumelhart,	   1992).	   Essentially	   the	   difference	   lies	   in	   how	   the	   results	   of	   behaviour	   are	  
presented	  to	  the	  agent.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  supervised	  learning,	  the	  results	  are	  presented	  in	  
such	   a	   way	   that	   the	   agent	   can	   compare	   their	   actual	   performance	   to	   a	   target	  
performance.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   reinforcement	   learning,	   by	   contrast,	   the	   results	   are	  
qualitative	   in	   nature,	   indicating	   whether	   performance	   was	   successful	   or	   not,	   and	  
perhaps	   even	   differing	   degrees	   of	   success,	   but	   they	   can’t	   be	   compared	   to	   a	   target	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performance;	  the	  target	  performance	  must	  be	  discovered	  through	  practice.	  In	  a	  sense,	  
then,	   supervised	   learning	   is	   learning	  how	   to	  execute	  a	  movement.	   The	  outcome	  will	  
certainly	   be	   successful,	   but	   it	   is	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   it	   is	   successful	   that	   matters.	  
Reinforcement	   learning	   involves	   discovering	  what	   the	   target	   level	   of	   performance	   is	  
whilst	  simultaneously	  learning	  to	  execute	  the	  necessary	  movements.	  The	  outcome	  of	  
any	   given	   attempt	  may	   or	  may	   not	   be	   successful	   and	   often	   a	   lack	   of	   success	  won’t	  
result	  in	  explicit	  feedback.	  Another	  way	  of	  looking	  at	  the	  difference	  is	  to	  consider	  what	  
an	  absence	  of	   feedback	  means.	   In	   the	  case	  of	   reinforcement	   learning,	  an	  absence	  of	  
feedback	   provides	   the	   agent	   with	   useful	   information:	   it	   means	   that	   it	   hasn't	   yet	  
performed	  the	  relevant	  action,	  so	  it	  must	  continue	  to	  try	  to	  achieve	  the	  reinforcement.	  
By	  contrast,	  with	  supervised	  learning,	  the	  absence	  of	  feedback	  is	  not	  informative	  as	  it	  
simply	  means	  that	  the	  agent	  is	  no	  longer	  attempting	  the	  task.	  
	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  Thorndike’s	  (1911)	  escape	  paradigm,	  the	  animals	  had	  a	  clear	  goal	  which	  
was	  to	  escape	  from	  a	  puzzle	  box	  and	  they	  had	  clear	  reinforcement	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  
lever	  mechanism	   opening	   the	   door	   to	   allow	   the	   animals	   to	   escape,	   but	   they	   didn’t	  
have	   a	   way	   of	   monitoring	   performance	   at	   any	   given	   time	   relative	   to	   optimal	  
performance.	   Instead,	   they	   were	   forced	   to	   extract	   this	   information	   from	   their	   own	  
behavioural	  variance.	   In	   the	  experiment	  by	  Kitazawa	  et	  al.	   (1995),	  participants	  had	  a	  
clear	  goal,	  which	  was	  to	  touch	  the	  target,	  and	  they	  had	  clear	  feedback	  in	  the	  form	  of	  
the	  image	  of	  their	  finger	  relative	  to	  the	  target.	  This	   image	  provided	  participants	  with	  
everything	   they	   needed	   to	   know	   in	   order	   to	   improve	   their	   performance;	   unlike	  
Thorndike’s	   cat,	   there	   was	   no	   need	   for	   them	   to	   gradually	   learn	   the	   target	  
position/performance	   through	   several	   attempts	   at	   the	   task	   as	   it	   was	   explicitly	  
presented	   to	   them.	   Interestingly,	   the	   Kitazawa	   et	   al.	   (1995)	   task	   appears	   to	  
demonstrate	  that	  one	  of	  the	  features	  we	  often	  associate	  with	  reinforcement	  learning	  
paradigms	   –	   the	   discrete	   presentation	   of	   reinforcement	   rather	   than	   continuously	  
provided	   feedback	   on	   performance	   –	   is	   not	   something	   that	   can	   be	   used	   to	  
differentiate	   supervised	   learning	   paradigms	   from	   reinforcement	   learning	   paradigms.	  
By	  making	   the	  arm	  movements	   invisible	   to	   their	  participants	  Kitazawa	  et	  al.	  ensured	  





Neural	  basis	  of	  action	  acquisition	  
The	  function	  of	  dopaminergic	  neurons	  
Over	   the	  past	   25	   years	   (beginning	  with	   Schultz,	   1986),	   a	   large	  body	  of	   evidence	  has	  
accumulated	   linking	   the	   activity	   of	   dopamine	   neurons	   in	   the	   ventral	   midbrain	   with	  
reinforcement	  learning.	  It	  is	  now	  well	  documented	  that	  these	  neurons	  fire	  in	  response	  
to	  the	  presentation	  of	  rewards	  and	  information	  predicting	  rewards	  (Schultz,	  2000).	  In	  a	  
typical	   experimental	   scenario,	   during	   which	   the	   activity	   of	   dopamine	   neurons	   is	  
recorded,	   an	   animal	   learns	   that	   it	   will	   be	   presented	   with	   a	   reward	   (food	   or	   drink)	  
should	  it	  perform	  a	  specific	  action	  such	  as	  pressing	  a	  button	  following	  the	  presentation	  
of	   an	   arbitrary	   stimulus	   (a	   tone	   or	   a	   light).	   	   At	   first,	   the	   activity	   of	   the	   neurons	  
correlates	  with	  the	  presentation	  of	  the	  reward	   itself	  but	  after	  repeated	  performance	  
of	  the	  task	  the	  neural	  activity	  is	  no	  longer	  elicited	  by	  the	  reward	  and	  instead	  occurs	  in	  
response	  to	  the	  conditioned	  stimulus	  (the	  tone	  or	  light).	  	  Furthermore,	  withholding	  the	  
reward,	   and	   thus	   confounding	   the	   animal’s	   prediction,	   results	   in	   the	   suppression	   of	  
activity	   to	   below	   the	   baseline	   firing	   rate.	   	   This	   phenomenon	   has	   been	   formally	  
described	  by	  Montague,	  Dayan	  and	  Sejnowski	  (1996)	  and	  Schultz	  et	  al.	  (1997)	  and	  has	  
come	   to	   be	   known	   as	   the	   reward	   prediction	   error	   theory.	   As	   Bayer	   and	   Glimcher	  
(2005)	   have	   put	   it,	   “the	  midbrain	   dopamine	   neurons	   are	   hypothesized	   to	   provide	   a	  
physiological	  correlate	  of	  the	  reward	  prediction	  error	  signal"	  (p.129).	  
	  
A	  general	  concern	  with	  any	  claim	  to	  have	  located	  the	  site	  of	  a	  particular	  signal	  in	  the	  
brain	   is	   the	   possibility	   that	   a	   similar	   pattern	   of	   activity	   might	   exist	   in	   another	  
unrecorded	  brain	  structure	  (Hellon,	  1986).	  Furthermore,	  without	  the	  use	  of	  controls,	  it	  
cannot	  be	   ruled	  out	   that	   the	   large	  numbers	  of	   responses	   required	  of	   animals	   under	  
conditions	  of	  low	  sensory	  stimulation	  (e.g.	  Ljunberg,	  Apicella	  &	  Schultz,	  1992;	  Schultz,	  
Apicella	  &	  Ljungberg,	  1993)	  might	  generate	  abnormal	  patterns	  of	  neural	  activity.	  That	  
is	  to	  say,	  the	  unusual	  testing	  conditions	  (relative	  to	  natural	  conditions)	  might	  result	  in	  
misleading	  data.	  
	  
In	  the	  specific	  case	  of	  the	  reward	  prediction	  error	  theory,	  there	  are	  good	  reasons	  for	  
having	   confidence	   about	   the	   involvement	   of	   dopamine	   neurons	   in	   instrumental	  
learning.	   Firstly,	   increased	   activity	   is	   seen	   in	   response	   to	   stimuli	   that	   are	   correlated	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with	   the	   delivery	   of	   reward	   (behaviourally	   significant)	   and	   not	   merely	   unpredicted	  
stimuli	  (Ljunberg	  et	  al.,	  1992),	  so	  it	  isn’t	  the	  case	  that	  the	  neurons	  are	  just	  responding	  
to	  surprising	  stimuli.	  Secondly,	  and	  more	  convincingly,	   the	  experimental	   intervention	  
in	   the	   activity	   of	   dopamine	   neurons	   has	   effects	   on	   operant	   behaviour.	   Tsai	   et	   al.	  
(2009),	   for	   example,	   were	   able	   to	   bring	   about	   conditioning	   in	   mice	   through	   the	  
deliberate	   activation	   of	  midbrain	   dopamine	   neurons	   by	  means	   of	   optogenetic	   tools.	  
This	  along	  with	  lesions	  studies	  (e.g.	  Dowd	  et	  al.,	  2005)	  offer	  important	  evidence	  as	  to	  
the	   causal	   role	   that	   these	   neurons	   play	   in	   instrumental	   learning	   and,	   consequently,	  
add	  credence	  to	  theories	  of	  the	  function	  of	  dopamine	  neurons.	  
	   	   	  
The	   reward	   prediction	   error	   is	   not	   the	   only	   interpretation	   of	   this	   neural	   activity.	  
Redgrave	  and	  Gurney	  (2006)	  have	  called	  into	  question	  the	  observation	  that	  the	  activity	  
of	   dopamine	  neurons	   is	   a	   response	   to	   rewards	  per	   se	   and	  not	   simply	   a	   response	   to	  
stimuli	   that	   are	   novel.	   They	   argue	   that	   the	   neural	   response	   of	   these	   neurons	   to	  
experimental	  stimuli	  occurs	  so	  soon	  –	  approximately	  100	  ms	  (Bayer	  &	  Glimcher,	  2005;	  
Guarraci	   &	   Kapp,	   1999;	   Horvitz,	   Stewart	   &	   Jacobs,	   1997;	   Ravel	   &	   Richmond	   2006;	  
Schultz,	   1998;	   Takikawa,	   Kawagoe	   &	   Hikosaka,	   2004)	   –	   after	   the	   occurrence	   of	   a	  
stimulus	   as	   to	   be	   impossible	   for	   it	   to	   be	   a	   signal	   specifically	   associated	  with	   reward	  
value.	  	  They	  submit	  that	  there	  would	  be	  insufficient	  time	  between	  the	  presentation	  of	  
the	   stimulus	   and	   the	   response	   of	   the	   dopamine	   neurons	   for	   any	   rewarding	  
characteristics	  of	  that	  stimulus	  to	  be	  assessed.	  The	  neurons	  react	  before	  a	  saccade	  can	  
be	  executed	  at	  around	  150	   to	  200	  ms	   (Hikosaka	  &	  Wurtz,	  1983;	   Jay	  &	  Sparks,	  1987)	  
and	   at	   a	   point	   that	   is	   at	   least	   coincident	   with,	   and	   therefore	   unlikely	   to	   be	   a	  
consequence	   of,	   the	   time	   it	   takes	   for	   the	   earliest	   cortical	   identification	   of	   visual	  
stimulus	  properties	  at	  around	  80	  to	  100	  ms	  (Rousselet,	  Thorpe	  &	  Fabre-­‐Thorpe,	  2004;	  
Thorpe	   &	   Fabre-­‐Thorpe,	   2001).	   They	   point	   out	   that,	   in	   the	   visual	   domain,	   the	   only	  
sensory	  signals	  available	  at	  such	  short	  latencies	  would	  arrive	  via	  the	  superior	  colliculus,	  
a	  subcortical	  structure	  that	  is	  probably	  insensitive	  to	  the	  kind	  of	  visual	  information	  that	  
could	   indicate	   reward	   value	   (Sumner,	   Adamjee	   &	   Mollon,	   2002;	   Wurtz	   &	   Albano,	  
1980).	   	  This	  view	   is	  supported	  by	  other	  research,	  which	  suggests	   that	   the	  only	  visual	  
structures	  with	  prominent	  connections	  to	  midbrain	  dopamine	  neurons	  and	  working	  at	  
such	  short	  latencies	  are	  the	  superior	  colliculi	  (Comoli	  et	  al.,	  2003;	  Dommett	  et	  al,	  2005;	  




Redgrave	   and	   Gurney	   (2006)	   offer	   an	   alternative	   theory,	   reasoning	   that	   dopamine	  
neurons	  do	  not	  signal	  reward	  prediction	  errors	  but	  are	   instead	  involved	  in	  the	   job	  of	  
linking	  novel	  events	  (irrespective	  of	  whether	  those	  events	  are	  rewarding	  or	  not)	  with	  
the	  behavioural	  output	  that	  caused	  them.	  It	  is	  generally	  agreed	  that	  the	  phasic	  activity	  
of	   these	   neurons	   changes	   in	   response	   to	   the	   predictability	   of	   events	   in	   a	   way	   that	  
suggests	   that	   it	   is	   part	   of	   a	   learning	   process	   (Bayer	  &	  Glimcher,	   2005).	   Rather	   than	  
inferring	  what	  that	  learning	  process	  is	  from	  the	  behaviour	  of	  the	  animal,	  the	  approach	  
of	   Redgrave	   and	   Gurney	   was	   to	   identify	   regions	   to	   which	   the	   dopamine	   neurons	  
project	  and	  likely	  sources	  of	  input	  from	  other	  regions	  of	  the	  brain	  that	  would	  converge	  
at	   similar	   times.	   They	   point	   out	   that	   sources	   of	   contextual	   (Apicella,	   Legallet	   &	  
Trouche,	  1997)	  and	  motor	  information	  (Reiner,	  Jiao,	  Del	  Mar,	  Laverghetta	  &	  Lei,	  2003)	  
should,	   in	   theory,	   converge	   on	   the	   striatum	   at	   a	   point	   in	   time	   that	   just	   precedes	  
sensory	  input	  from	  the	  thalamus	  (Matsumoto,	  Minamimoto,	  Graybiel	  &	  Kimura,	  2001)	  
and	   the	   sensory	  evoked	  dopamine	   input	   from	  the	  ventral	  midbrain	   (Dommett	  et	  al.,	  
2005),	  and	  that	   this	   indicates	  that	   the	   learning	  mechanism	  might	  be	  capable	  of	  both	  
agency	   detection	   and	   the	   discovery	   of	   novel	   actions.	   In	   other	  words,	   their	   theory	   is	  
that	  the	  dopaminergic	  activity	  is	  involved	  in	  helping	  an	  animal	  to	  learn	  whether	  or	  not	  
it	  was	  responsible	  for	  the	  occurrence	  of	  a	  given	  stimulus	  and,	  if	  so,	  which	  aspect	  of	  its	  
recent	  motor	  output	  was	  critical	  to	  eliciting	  that	  stimulus.	  They	  further	  argue	  that	  one	  
of	  the	  reasons	  why	  the	  phasic	  response	  of	  dopamine	  neurons	  is	  of	  such	  short	  latency	  
relative	   to	   the	   incidence	  of	  a	  novel	   stimulus,	   is	   that	   this	   reduces	   the	  opportunity	   for	  
causally	  irrelevant	  movements	  to	  be	  reinforced	  and	  reselected	  (or	  ‘stamped-­‐in’,	  to	  use	  
Thorndike’s	  terminology).	  In	  particular,	  the	  dopaminergic	  activity	  is	  of	  sufficiently	  short	  
latency	  that	  it	  precludes	  the	  contribution	  of	  movements	  which	  are	  a	  direct	  response	  to	  
the	   novel	   stimulus	   itself,	   thus	   removing	   contamination	   from	   necessarily	   non-­‐
contingent	  motor	  output.	  
	  
The	  difference	  between	   the	   theory	  put	   forward	  by	  Redgrave	  and	  Gurney	   (2006)	  and	  
the	  more	  well	  established	  theory	  offered	  by	  Montague	  et	  al.	  (1996)	  and	  Schultz	  et	  al.	  
(1997)	  appears,	   initially,	   to	  be	  a	  subtle	  one	  at	   the	  neural	   level:	   reward-­‐driven	  versus	  
salience-­‐driven	  learning.	  However,	  ultimately	  it	  is	  behaviour	  that	  matters,	  as	  behaviour	  
is	   the	   only	   means	   through	   which	   the	   mechanism	   can	   be	   judged	   by	   evolutionary	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pressures.	  As	  Hills	  (2006)	  notes:	  
	  
It	   is	  well	   argued	   that	   [dopamine's]	   role	   in	   extant	   species	   is	   associated	  
with	  novelty	  or	  reward	  detection.	  However,	  this	  cannot	  be	  a	  complete	  
definition	  with	  respect	  to	  evolution,	  because	  evolution	  cannot	  act	  on	  a	  
detector	   that	   is	   not	   associated	   with	   some	   subsequent	   behavioural	   or	  
physiological	  modulation.	  (p.	  16).	  
	  
At	   the	   behavioural	   level,	   the	   difference	   between	   the	   two	   theories	   is	   considerable,	  
amounting	  to	  the	  difference	  between	  response	  maintenance	  (reward	  prediction	  error	  
theory)	  and	  action	  acquisition	  (Redgrave	  et	  al.).	  Whether	  or	  not	  these	  two	  aspects	  of	  
reinforcement	  learning	  ultimately	  amount	  to	  the	  same	  thing,	  the	  two	  theories	  tend	  to	  
emphasise	  one	  over	  the	  other.	  
	  
Here,	  the	  emphasis	  is	  firmly	  on	  action	  acquisition	  and,	  therefore,	  the	  theory	  offered	  by	  
Redgrave	   and	   Gurney’s	   (2006)	   and	   Redgrave	   et	   al.	   (2008)	   will	   be	   the	   primary	  
theoretical	   reference	  point	  with	   regard	   to	   the	  neural	   correlates	  of	  action	  acquisition	  
and	  their	  likely	  impact	  on	  behaviour.	  If	  this	  interpretation	  is	  correct	  then	  it	  means	  that	  
phasic	  dopaminergic	  activity	  in	  the	  midbrain	  is	  doing	  a	  job	  very	  similar	  to	  the	  process	  
of	   ‘stamping-­‐in’	   referred	  to	  by	  Thorndike	   (1911).	  For	   the	  present	  purposes,	   the	  term	  
‘stamping-­‐in’	  will	  be	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  processes	  of	  reinforcement	  and	  reselection	  of	  
motor	   output	   described	   by	   Redgrave	   and	   Gurney	   as	   being	   triggered	   by	   the	   phasic	  
activity	  of	  dopamine	  neurons.	  
	  
Temporal	  alignment	  and	  the	  eligibility	  period	  
A	  key	  component	  of	  Redgrave	  and	  Gurney’s	  (2006)	  theory	  is	  the	  idea	  that	  a	  temporal	  
alignment	  of	   sensory	   input	   and	  motor	   output	   is	   essential	   to	   the	  processes	   of	   action	  
acquisition	   and	   credit	   assignment.	   They	   argue	   that	   phasic	   dopaminergic	   activity	   is	  
triggered	  by	  salient	  stimuli	  and	  functions	  as	  a	  time	  stamp	  to	  indicate	  the	  portion	  of	  the	  
motor	  record	  with	  which	  the	  stimulus	  is	  temporally	  aligned	  and,	  by	  virtue	  of	  this,	  the	  
last	   part	   in	   the	   motor	   record	   that	   will	   be	   eligible	   for	   stamping-­‐in	   (Redgrave	   et	   al.,	  
2008).	   As	   to	   the	   learning	   and	   storage	   mechanisms,	   they	   point	   to	   long-­‐term	  
potentiation	   (LTP)	   and	   long-­‐term	   depression	   (LTD)	   as	   the	   means	   by	   which	   motor	  
output	  might	   be	   stamped-­‐in	   and	   stamped-­‐out	   respectively.	   If	   they	   are	   correct,	   then	  
20 
 
there	   is	  a	   short-­‐latency,	   short-­‐duration	   timing	   signal	   to	   indicate	  when	  a	   sequence	  of	  
movements	   is	   successful	   in	   eliciting	  a	  novel	   stimulus.	   There	   is	   also	  a	  process	  of	   LTP,	  
triggered	   by	   the	   short-­‐duration	   timing	   signal,	   which	   acts	   as	   the	   means	   by	   which	  
successful	  sequences	  of	  behaviour	  are	  stored	  over	  an	  extended	  period	  of	  time	  (Staubli	  
&	  Lynch,	  1987).	  However,	  what	  is	  missing	  from	  the	  picture	  so	  far	  is	  a	  mechanism	  that	  
can	  explain	  how	  contingent	  motor	  output	  and	  the	  consequences	  of	  actions	  are	  stored	  
in	  the	  short	  term,	  from	  one	  attempt	  to	  the	  next	  and	  that	  can	  also	  determine	  how	  great	  
a	  portion	  of	  the	  previous	  motor	  output	  should	  be	  eligible	  for	  stamping-­‐in.	  
	  
Histed,	   Pasupathy	   and	  Miller	   (2009)	   describe	   two	   possible	   explanations	   of	   how	   the	  
consequences	   of	   an	   action	   might	   be	   stored	   in	   the	   short-­‐term:	   either	   changes	   to	  
synapses	  or	  "sustained	   firing	  patterns	  of	  neurons"	   (p.245).	  Their	   research	  has	  shown	  
that	  sustained	  firing	  in	  the	  striatum	  and	  prefrontal	  cortex	  can	  last	  for	  several	  seconds,	  
enough	  time	  to	  allow	  the	  temporary	  storage	  of	  the	  consequences	  of	  actions	  over	  the	  
period	  between	  trials	  in	  their	  experimental	  testing	  sessions.	  They	  argue	  that	  sustained	  
neuronal	   activity	   is	   the	   best	   candidate	   for	   short-­‐term	   storage	   between	   learning	  
attempts	  because	  it	  isn’t	  subject	  to	  the	  delays	  inherent	  in	  synaptic	  changes	  that	  allow	  
storage	   over	   comparable	   periods	   of	   time	   (2	   to	   6	   s).	   Sustained	   neural	   activity	   is	   an	  
excellent	   candidate	   mechanism	   for	   a	   process	   that	   involves	   an	   eligibility	   period.	   It	  
seems	  plausible	  that	  such	  a	  mechanism	  might	  be	  responsible	  for	  sustaining	  the	  neural	  
activity	  associated	  with	  motor	  output	  and	  there	  is	  evidence	  that	  preparatory	  activity	  in	  
the	   human	  motor	   cortex	   (Mars,	   Coles,	   Hulstijn	  &	   Toni,	   2008)	   can	   be	   sustained	   over	  
similar	  periods	  of	  time	  	  
	  
One	   of	   the	   implications	   of	   a	   timing	   based	   system	  of	   action	   acquisition	   is	   that	   it	  will	  
learn	   indiscriminately.	   In	  a	  new	   learning	  situation,	   for	  example,	  an	  animal	   is	   likely	   to	  
perform	  an	  action	  sub-­‐optimally	   to	  begin	  with	  and	  yet	   the	  contiguous	  portion	  of	   the	  
motor	  output,	  warts	  and	  all,	  will	  be	  stamped-­‐in	  by	  virtue	  of	  its	  temporal	  proximity	  to	  a	  
novel	  stimulus.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  if	  the	  system	  works	  by	  simply	  reinforcing	  recent	  motor	  
output,	   it	   will	   be	   reliant	   on	   the	   imperfect	   repetition	   of	   this	   motor	   output	   during	  
subsequent	  attempts	   in	  order	  to	  extract	  the	  common,	  task-­‐relevant,	  elements	  of	  the	  
behavioural	   variance.	   There	   is	   some	   evidence	   to	   support	   the	   existence	   of	   such	   a	  
learning	   system.	   Thorndike's	   (1911)	   experiments,	   for	   example,	   revealed	   the	   kind	   of	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gradual	  learning	  and	  apparent	  absence	  of	  insight	  that	  one	  would	  expect	  to	  result	  from	  
such	   a	   mechanism.	   Skinner	   (1948),	   too,	   provides	   evidence	   in	   the	   form	   of	   the	  
development	   of	   superstitious	   behaviour	   in	   pigeons:	   conditioning	   in	   the	   animals	  was	  
produced	  by	  the	  coincidence	  of	  a	  movement	  with	  the	  non-­‐contingent	  release	  of	  a	  food	  
reinforcer.	   	  That	   is	   to	  say,	  Skinner	   found	  that	  movements	  could	  be	  stamped-­‐in	   if	   the	  
temporal	  alignment	  was	  right,	  even	  if	  those	  movements	  were	  functionally	  irrelevant	  to	  
the	  process	  of	  acquiring	  food.	  
	  
What	  is	  reward	  and	  what	  is	  reinforcement?	  
Throughout	  the	  present	  research,	  repeated	  reference	  will	  be	  made	  to	  the	  process	  of	  
reinforcement	  so	  it	  is	  important	  to	  outline	  what	  is	  meant	  by	  this	  term.	  Much	  has	  been	  
made	   of	   the	   distinction	   between	   rewards	   and	   reinforcers	   with	   some	   researchers	  
placing	  great	  emphasis	  on	  the	  need	  to	  distinguish	  between	  the	  two.	  Salamone,	  Correa,	  
Farrar,	   Nunes	   and	   Pardo	   (2009),	   for	   example,	   make	   a	   strong	   case	   for	   the	   need	   to	  
define	  the	  concept	  of	  reward	  when	  undertaking	  research:	  
	  
In	   some	   papers,	   the	   word	   “reward”	   seems	   to	   be	   used	   as	   a	   rather	  
monolithic,	  all-­‐	  encompassing	  term	  that	  refers	  to	  any	  and	  all	  aspects	  of	  
appetitive	   learning,	   motivation	   and	   emotion,	   whether	   conditioned	   or	  
unconditioned.	   Used	   in	   this	   way,	   the	   term	   reward	   is	   a	   rather	   blunt	  
instrument.	  These	  problems	  are	  not	  merely	  semantic,	  as	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  
test	   a	   hypothesis	   which	   maintains	   that	   a	   neurotransmitter	   mediates	  
such	  an	  ill-­‐defined	  set	  of	  functions.	  (p.1).	  
	  
Certainly	  this	  is	  true	  when	  research	  depends	  on	  a	  theory	  that	  relates	  to	  things	  that	  are	  
rewarding	   as	   opposed	   to	  merely	   reinforcing.	   However,	   with	   the	   greatest	   will	   in	   the	  
world,	   authors	   can	   struggle	   to	   pin	   down	   the	   concept	   of	   reward.	   The	   following	  
definition	  from	  Schultz	  et	  al.	  (1997)	  is	  as	  good	  an	  attempt	  as	  any	  and	  yet	  it	  is	  still	  tends	  
towards	  the	  broad;	  it	  isn’t	  clear,	  for	  example,	  whether	  it	  would	  meet	  the	  standards	  of	  
Salamone	  et	  al.	  (2009):	  
	  
“Reward”	   is	   an	   operational	   concept	   for	   describing	   the	   positive	   value	  
that	   a	   creature	   ascribes	   to	   an	   object,	   a	   behavioral	   act,	   or	   an	   internal	  
physical	  state.	  The	  function	  of	  reward	  can	  be	  described	  according	  to	  the	  
behavior	   elicited.	   For	   example,	   appetitive	   or	   rewarding	   stimuli	   induce	  
approach	   behavior	   that	   permits	   an	   animal	   to	   consume.	   Rewards	  may	  
also	   play	   the	   role	   of	   positive	   reinforcers	   where	   they	   increase	   the	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frequency	   of	   behavioral	   reactions	   during	   learning	   and	   maintain	   well-­‐
established	   appetitive	   behaviors	   after	   learning.	   The	   reward	   value	  
associated	   with	   a	   stimulus	   is	   not	   a	   static,	   intrinsic	   property	   of	   the	  
stimulus.	  Animals	  can	  assign	  different	  appetitive	  values	  to	  a	  stimulus	  as	  
a	   function	   of	   their	   internal	   states	   at	   the	   time	   the	   stimulus	   is	  
encountered	   and	   as	   a	   function	   of	   their	   experience	  with	   the	   stimulus.	  
(p.1593).	  
	  
The	  concept	  of	  reward	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  particularly	  fuzzy	  in	  the	  context	  of	  research	  
into	   action	   acquisition	   and	   often	   the	   term	   ‘reinforcer’	   is	   used	   in	   its	   place.	   Natural	  
examples	   of	   action	   acquisition	   do	   not	   involve	   operant	   chambers	   and	   food	   hoppers.	  
Indeed,	  it	  can	  be	  difficult	  even	  to	  identify	  what	  the	  reinforcer	  is	  in	  a	  given	  situation,	  let	  
alone	   make	   a	   decision	   as	   to	   whether	   or	   not	   it	   is	   best	   described	   as	   a	   reward	   or	  
reinforcer.	  It	  is	  during	  the	  early	  development	  of	  higher	  mammals	  that	  we	  can	  observe	  
the	  fastest	  rate	  of	  action	  acquisition	  and	  yet	  the	  rewards	  in	  operation	  during	  intensive	  
exploratory	  and	  play	  behaviour	  are	  particularly	  obscure.	   There	  are	  also	  a	  number	  of	  
non-­‐play	  examples	  of	  responses	  being	  maintained	  by	  outcomes	  that	  have	  no	  obvious	  
relationship	  to	  basic	  survival	  or	  reproductive	  requirements	  of	  an	  animal.	  For	  example,	  
light	  flashes	  which	  are	  delivered	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  temporally	  contiguous	  and	  contingent	  
with	  bar	  touching	   in	  mice	  result	   in	   increased	  responding	  and	  extinction	  effects	  when	  
the	  light	  is	  not	  longer	  provided	  (Kish,	  1955).	  Presumably,	  the	  ultimate	  advantage	  of	  a	  
learning	   system	   that	   does	   not	   necessarily	   require	   reinforcement	   in	   the	   form	   of	  
economic	   rewards	   (or	   stimuli	  predicting	  economic	   rewards)	   is	   that	   the	  organism	  can	  
build	  up	  a	  behavioural	   repertoire	   in	  advance	  of	  needing	  to	  use	  the	  actions	   for	  direct	  
survival	  reasons.	  Singh,	  Lewis,	  Barto	  and	  Sorg	  (2010)	  capture	  this	  distant	  relationship	  
between	  reinforcement	  and	  ultimate	  survival	  benefits	   in	  their	  account	  of	   intrinsically	  
motivated	   learning:	   "there	   are	   no	   hard	   and	   fast	   features	   distinguishing	   intrinsic	   and	  
extrinsic	   reward	  computationally.	  Rather,	   the	  directness	  of	   the	   relationship	  between	  
rewarding	   behavior	   and	   evolutionary	   success	   varies	   along	   a	   continuum"	   (p.70).	   In	  
other	   words,	   the	   more	   distal	   the	   apparent	   relationship	   between	   a	   behaviour	   and	  
genetic	   fitness,	   the	  more	  we	   can	   describe	   the	   properties	   of	   any	   reward	   involved	   as	  
being	  intrinsic	  as	  opposed	  to	  extrinsic.	  
	  
The	  idea	  that	  some	  behaviour	  is	  intrinsically	  motivated	  and	  that	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  it	  
is	   intrinsic	   can	   be	   placed	   on	   a	   continuum	   of	   how	   distal	   is	   its	   relationship	   to	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evolutionary	   success,	   ties	   in	   with	   theories	   about	   changes	   in	   the	   way	   dopamine	   has	  
mediated	  behaviour	  over	  evolutionary	  time.	  Hills	   (2006)	  speculates	  that	  the	  effect	  of	  
dopamine	  on	  behaviour	  in	  higher	  mammals	  is	  not	  so	  different	  to	  its	  effects	  on	  foraging	  
and	  spatial	  search	  for	  food	  rewards	  in	  much	  more	  primitive	  animals;	  what	  has	  changed	  
is	  rather	  the	  range	  of	  things	  that	  modern	  animals	  are	  capable	  of	  treating	  as	  goals	  and	  
rewards:	  
	  
Molecular	   machinery	   that	   initially	   evolved	   for	   the	   control	   of	   foraging	  
and	   goal-­‐directed	   behavior	   was	   co-­‐opted	   over	   evolutionary	   time	   to	  
modulate	   the	   control	   of	   goal-­‐directed	   cognition.	   What	   was	   once	  
foraging	   in	   a	   physical	   space	   for	   tangible	   resources	   became,	   over	  
evolutionary	  time,	  foraging	  in	  cognitive	  space	  for	  information	  related	  to	  
those	  resources.	  (p.4).	  
	  
In	   other	   words,	   higher	   mammals	   are	   no	   longer	   restricted	   to	   motivation	   through	  
primary	  rewards	  and	  are	  able,	  via	  the	  effects	  of,	  amongst	  other	  things,	  dopamine,	  to	  
treat	  abstract	  objects,	  events	  and	  perhaps	  even	  memories	  as	  goals.	  And	  yet,	  responses	  
to	   these	   abstract	   goals	   should	   be	  much	   the	   same	   as	   they	   are	   still	  mediated	   by	   the	  
same	   underlying	   brain	   processes.	   All	   of	   this	   would	   seem	   to	   support	   Redgrave	   and	  
Gurney’s	  (2006)	  account	  of	  the	  function	  of	  dopamine	  neurons	  because	  it	  suggests	  that	  
there	  has	  been	  a	  move	  away	   from	  purely	  appetitive	   stimuli	   towards	   stimuli	   that	  are	  
interesting	   to	   an	   animal	   for	   other	   reasons.	   As	   Berridge	   and	   Robinson	   (1998)	   have	  
suggested,	  the	  effect	  of	  dopamine	  might	  be	  to	  make	  animals	  ‘want’	  something	  without	  
necessarily	   ‘liking’	   it,	  a	  particularly	  useful	   trait	   for	  any	  animal	  that	   is	  designed	  to	  add	  
lots	  of	  actions	  to	  its	  behavioural	  repertoire.	  
	  
The	   reinforcement	   that	   will	   feature	   in	   the	   experiments	   to	   follow	   tends	   to	   involve	  
simple	   discrete	   sounds	   or	   visual	   stimuli.	   These	   will	   be	   referred	   to	   as	   instances	   of	  
reinforcement	  and,	  following	  Redgrave	  and	  Gurney	  (2006)	  and	  Redgrave	  et	  al.	  (2008),	  
it	  will	  be	  assumed	  that	  these	  novel	  events	  will	  be	  reinforcing	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  action	  
acquisition.	  This	  is	  in	  the	  tradition	  of	  behaviourism	  where	  Ferster	  and	  Skinner	  (1957),	  
for	   example,	   defined	   a	   reinforcer	   as	   anything	   that	   increases	   the	   probability	   of	   a	  
specific	   response	   being	   emitted.	   	   From	   this	   perspective,	   then,	   there	   is	   no	   sense	   in	  
which	   we	   should	   talk	   about	   rewards	   and	   reinforcers	   as	   being	   separate	   things;	   they	  




Methodological	   requirements	   for	   a	   behavioural	   test	   of	  
action	  acquisition	  
Thorndike’s	  (1911)	  escape	  paradigm,	  described	  above,	   is	  an	  excellent	  methodological	  
precedent	   for	   the	   study	   of	   action	   acquisition.	   However,	   whilst	   it	   is	   an	   elegant	  
approach,	   it	   has	  many	   limitations,	   both	   from	   a	   quantitative	   and	   a	   practical	   point	   of	  
view.	   Consequently,	   it	   provides	   a	   useful	   starting	   point	   for	   identifying	   the	  
characteristics	  we	  would	  ideally	  find	  (or	  avoid)	  in	  a	  good	  action	  acquisition	  paradigm.	  
Perhaps	  the	  biggest	  single	  limitation	  of	  the	  puzzle-­‐box	  paradigm	  is	  that	  it	  makes	  data	  
collection	   difficult.	   Whilst	   it	   was	   possible	   to	   extract	   a	   useful	   one-­‐dimensional	  
performance	  metric	   in	   the	   form	  of	  escape	   time,	   it	  was	  not	  possible	   for	  Thorndike	   to	  
quantitatively	  deal	  with	  the	  more	  complex	  aspects	  of	  an	  animal’s	  behaviour,	  so	  metrics	  
such	  as	  the	  distance	  travelled	  by	  an	  animal	  or	  the	  time	  spent	   in	  the	  proximity	  of	  the	  
lever	   were	   not	   readily	   available.	   Furthermore,	   the	   task	   was	   not	   easy	   to	   automate:	  
whilst	  it	  would	  not	  be	  difficult	  to	  automatically	  record	  the	  time	  from	  when	  the	  animal	  
first	  entered	  the	  puzzle-­‐box	  to	  the	  point	  at	  which	  it	  effected	  its	  escape,	  each	  new	  trial	  
still	  required	  experimenter	  intervention	  in	  order	  to	  put	  the	  animal	  back	  into	  the	  puzzle	  
box.	  A	  further	  limitation	  is	  that	  the	  puzzle	  box	  scenario	  is	  clearly	  not	  suited	  to	  testing	  
human	   subjects:	   any	   such	   endeavour	   would	   be	   unwieldy,	   requiring	   a	   large	   and	  
complex,	   yet	   safe,	   puzzle	   environment.	   Perhaps	   more	   importantly,	   though,	   is	   the	  
problem	   of	   hiding	   the	   puzzle	   mechanism	   from	   a	   human	   participant.	   When	   using	  
animal	   subjects	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   rely	   on	   the	   animal’s	   lack	   of	   insight	   into	   the	   action-­‐
outcome	  mechanism	  as	   a	  way	  of	   forcing	   the	  animal	   to	   rely	  on	   the	   reinforcement	  of	  
recent	  motor	  output	  rather	  than	  simply	  jumping	  to	  a	  solution.	  This	  is	  far	  more	  difficult	  
with	   human	   participants.	   It	   is	   therefore	   important	   that	   any	   new	   paradigm	   aimed	   at	  
investigating	   action	   acquisition	   in	   humans,	   involves	   some	   means	   of	   obscuring	   the	  
method	   of	   eliciting	   the	   outcome	   so	   that	   participants	   are	   forced	   to	   learn	   and	   not	  
merely	  perform	  the	  required	  action.	  Finally,	  the	  puzzle-­‐box	  scenario	  was	  limited	  from	  
the	   point	   of	   view	   of	   repeated	   testing	   of	   individual	   subjects:	   repeated	  measures	   for	  
Thorndike	  meant	  physically	  changing	  the	  apparatus	  that	  the	  animals	  were	  required	  to	  
escape	  from.	  Such	  a	  high	  maintenance	  approach	  to	  repeated	  measures	  investigations	  




Thorndike’s	  line-­‐drawing	  paradigm	  
Thorndike	   (1927)	   addressed	   some	   of	   the	   above	   limitations	  with	   an	   experiment	   that	  
tested	  the	  ability	  of	  human	  participants	  to	  draw	  lines	  of	  particular	  lengths.	  Blindfolded	  
participants	  were	  asked	  to	  draw	  lines	  as	  close	  to	  a	  target	  length	  as	  possible.	  In	  the	  first	  
phase	  of	  a	  testing	  session	  all	  of	  the	  lines	  were	  drawn	  without	  any	  feedback.	  During	  the	  
second	  phase,	  feedback	  was	  provided	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  verbal	  responses	  “right”	  and	  
“wrong”,	  depending	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  length	  of	  the	  line	  was	  close	  enough	  to	  the	  
target	   length.	   In	   the	   third	   and	   final	   phase,	   the	   participants	   were	   tested	   once	   again	  
without	   any	   feedback.	   Thorndike	  was	   then	   able	   to	   calculate	   the	   improvement	   from	  
phase	  one	   to	   three	  as	  a	  means	  of	  describing	   the	  amount	  of	   learning	   that	  had	   taken	  
place.	  For	  the	  present	  purposes,	  the	  line-­‐drawing	  paradigm	  solves	  some	  of	  the	  short-­‐
comings	   of	   the	   puzzle	   box	   approach.	   From	   a	   practical	   point	   of	   view,	   the	   approach	  
lends	   itself	   to	   the	   testing	   of	   human	   participants	   and	   also	   to	   the	   automation	   of	   the	  
learning	   procedures.	   Whilst	   Thorndike	   himself	   was	   not	   able	   to	   implement	   the	  
experiment	   in	   an	   automated	   fashion,	   it	   is	   nonetheless	   easy	   to	   appreciate	   how	   we	  
might	   translate	   his	   procedure	   into	   a	   computerised	   version	   that	   could	   be	   run	   with	  
relatively	   little	   input	   from	   the	   experimenter.	   Furthermore,	   the	   drawing	   approach	  
makes	   it	   simple	   to	   run	   repeated	   measures	   designs.	   Participants	   can,	   of	   course,	   be	  
tested	  on	  different	  lengths	  of	  lines,	  but	  clearly	  they	  can	  also	  be	  tested	  on	  other	  shapes	  
and	  symbols.	  
	  
However,	   whilst	   the	   line-­‐drawing	   paradigm	   solves	   some	   of	   the	   problems	   associated	  
with	  the	  puzzle	  box,	  it	  also	  has	  some	  limitations	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  the	  current	  
research.	  At	  first,	  it	  appears	  like	  Thorndike	  was	  able	  to	  obscure	  the	  method	  of	  eliciting	  
the	  outcome	  simply	  by	  blindfolding	  the	  participants:	  the	  task	  demands	  are	  sufficiently	  
straightforward	  that	  they	  can	  be	  achieved	  whilst	  wearing	  a	  blindfold	  so	  the	  blindfold	  
can	   be	   employed	   as	   a	   means	   of	   forcing	   the	   participants	   to	   learn	   to	   draw	   the	   lines	  
through	   ‘feel’	   rather	   than	   simply	   remembering	  what	   the	   correct	   length	  of	   line	   looks	  
like.	  However,	  whilst	  the	  blindfold	  certainly	  serves	  to	  make	  the	  task	  more	  difficult,	  the	  
task	  is	  still	  primarily	  one	  of	  executing	  a	  pre-­‐specified	  movement	  more	  accurately.	  This	  
point	   is	  easier	   to	  appreciate	  when	  we	  consider	  the	  kind	  of	  behavioural	  variance	  that	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was	   being	   produced	   in	   the	   experiment.	   In	   theory,	   Thorndike	  was	   able	   to	   extract	   an	  
extremely	   rich	   data	   set	   from	   the	   line	   drawing	   paradigm:	   participants	   produced	  
hundreds	   of	   two	   dimensional	   movement	   traces	   and,	   in	   a	   modern	   computerised	  
version	   of	   the	   task,	   it	   would	   be	   easy	   to	   also	   collect	   accurate	   timing	   data.	   And	   yet,	  
irrespective	   of	   how	   complete	   the	   record	  of	   behaviour	   is,	   the	   task	   is	   just	   too	  heavily	  
constrained	  to	  make	  full	  use	  of	  the	  record.	  There	  is	  only	  one	  way	  to	  complete	  a	  trial;	  
no	   degrees	   of	   freedom	   other	   than	   the	   length	   of	   the	   line	   remain	   open	   for	   the	  
participant	  to	  express	  behavioural	  variance.	  Failure	  to	  draw	  a	   line	   is	  simply	  failure	  to	  
perform	  the	  task	  and	  the	  relative	  quality	  of	  a	  line	  (e.g.	  its	  straightness)	  is	  not	  taken	  into	  
account.	   If	  we	  consider	   the	  puzzle	  box	  scenario	   it	   is	   clear	   that	  whilst	  each	   trial	  must	  
ultimately	  end	  with	  the	  cat	  falling	  upon	  the	  lever	  in	  order	  to	  open	  the	  door,	  the	  means	  
by	   which	   the	   cat	   achieves	   this	   end	   are	   free	   to	   vary	   as	   the	   cat	   chooses.	   In	   the	   line	  
drawing	  task,	  there	  is	  no	  sense	  in	  which	  the	  participant	  can	  achieve	  the	  drawing	  of	  a	  
line	  in	  an	  efficient	  or	  an	  inefficient	  manner:	  efficiency	  is	  not	  a	  parameter	  that	  is	  free	  to	  
vary.	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	   line-­‐drawing	   paradigm	   is	   somewhat	   more	   similar	   to	   a	  
supervised	   learning	   task	   as	   opposed	   to	   a	   reinforcement	   learning	   task.	   This	   point	   is	  
particularly	  underlined	  when	  we	  consider	  that	  feedback,	  whether	  it	  indicates	  a	  correct	  
or	   an	   incorrect	   response,	   is	   provided	   regardless	   of	   what	   the	   participant	   does:	   the	  
presence	   or	   absence	   of	   feedback	   is	   not	   contingent	   on	   performance,	   rather	   it	   is	   a	  
description	  (albeit	  a	  crude	  one)	  of	  performance.	  
	  
The	  serial	  response	  time	  task	  
An	   alternative	   approach	   to	   the	   study	   of	   action	   learning	   in	   humans	   is	   to	   record	  
sequence	  learning	  in	  the	  form	  of	  multiple	  button	  presses.	  The	  serial	  response	  time	  task	  
(SRTT)	  (Nissen	  &	  Bullemer,	  1987)	  is	  designed	  to	  measure	  motor	  sequence	  learning	  at	  
different	  levels	  of	  attention.	  	  In	  a	  typical	  set-­‐up,	  participants	  press	  one	  of	  four	  buttons	  
on	   a	   keypad	   in	   response	   to	   visual	   cues	   that	   occur	   at	   one	   of	   four	   corresponding	  
locations	  on	  a	  computer	  monitor.	  As	   the	  buttons	  are	  pressed,	   the	   time	  between	  the	  
signal	  appearing	  on	  the	  monitor	  and	  the	  associated	  button	  being	  pressed	  is	  recorded.	  
Depending	   on	   the	   particular	   methodological	   setup,	   repeating	   sequences	   of	   button	  
presses	   are	   hidden	   from	   attention	   by	   asking	   participants	   to	   perform	   a	   concurrent	  
secondary	   task	   or	   by	   embedding	   them	   within	   random,	   non-­‐repeating	   sequences	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(Willingham,	  Salidis	  &	  Gabrieli,	  2002).	  	  The	  aim	  is	  therefore	  to	  investigate	  “whether	  it	  
is	   necessary	   to	   attend	   to	   a	   stimulus	   event	   in	   order	   to	   remember	   it	   later”	   (Nissen	  &	  
Bullemer,	  1987,	  p.1)	  and	  the	  relationship	  between	  learning	  and	  attention	  is	  effectively	  
distilled	  down	  to	  a	  single	  vector	  of	  response	  time.	  
	  
Researchers	  who	  employ	  the	  SRTT	  tend	  to	  be	  interested	  in	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  or	  
not	  learning	  is	  available	  to	  awareness	  rather	  than	  the	  particular	  type	  of	  learning	  that	  is	  
taking	  place.	  As	  a	  result,	   the	  task	   is	  difficult	   to	  categorise	   from	  a	  theoretical	  point	  of	  
view.	  It	  is	  similar	  to	  a	  supervised	  learning	  paradigm	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  all	  of	  the	  targets	  
and	  movements	  are	  visible	  to	  participants,	  so	  it	  is	  possible	  for	  a	  participant	  to	  monitor	  
their	  performance	  at	  all	   times.	  However,	   it	  differs	   from	  a	   typical	   supervised	   learning	  
task	  in	  that	  learning	  can	  only	  be	  expressed	  in	  terms	  of	  speed.	  Accuracy	  of	  movement	  
has	   little	   freedom	   to	   vary:	   clearly	   it	   is	   possible	   for	   a	   participant	   to	  miss	   a	   button	   or	  
press	  the	  wrong	  button,	  but	  there	  is	  no	  sense	  in	  which	  a	  correct	  button-­‐press	  can	  be	  
either	  accurate	  or	  inaccurate.	  In	  this	  respect,	  it	  is	  rather	  more	  like	  an	  action	  acquisition	  
paradigm	  in	  that	  learning	  can	  be	  expressed	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  speed	  at	  which	  an	  action	  is	  
performed.	   But,	   there	   are	   some	   differences	   here	   too.	   For	   instance,	   the	   learning	  
environment	   is	   so	   highly	   constrained	   that	   participants	   must	   always	   produce	   the	  
correct	  sequence	  of	  button	  presses;	   the	  way	  that	  a	  sequence	   is	  executed,	   therefore,	  
cannot	  vary	  in	  structure.	  Furthermore,	  nothing	  is	  contingent	  on	  improved	  performance	  
at	   the	   sequence	   level.	   Loosely	   speaking,	   we	   could	   say	   that	   the	   action	   that	   is	   being	  
learnt	   is	   the	   sequence	   of	   button-­‐presses;	   however	   this	   isn’t	   itself	   a	   unit	   of	  
reinforcement.	  The	  event	  that	  is	  contingent	  on	  behaviour	  is	  the	  disappearance	  of	  the	  
current	  set	  of	  cues	  on	  the	  monitor.	  These	  cues	  disappear	  when	  the	  correct	  button	   is	  
pressed,	   but	   they	   are	   unaffected	   by	   previous	   button-­‐presses	   in	   the	   sequence.	  
Consequently,	  whilst	  the	  SRTT	  is	  an	  attractive	  research	  option	  from	  a	  practical	  point	  of	  
view	  and	  is	  an	  example	  of	  action	  learning,	  it	  does	  not	  allow	  the	  freedom	  of	  movement	  
that	  will	  be	  a	  focus	  of	  the	  present	  research.	  
	  
The	  Morris	  water	  maze	  
The	  Morris	  water	  maze	  (Morris,	  1981)	  was	  developed	  as	  a	  way	  of	  investigating	  spatial	  
memory	  in	  rats	  and	  is	  an	  example	  of	  a	  learning	  paradigm	  that	  allows	  for	  high	  variations	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in	   the	   efficiency	   with	   which	   trials	   are	   solved.	   The	   search	   environment	   consists	   of	   a	  
circular	  pool	  of	  water	   rendered	  opaque	  by	   the	  addition	  of	  milk.	  Rats	   are	   introduced	  
into	  the	  pool	  whereupon	  they	  begin	  to	  search	  for	  a	  means	  of	  escape.	  The	  key	  to	  the	  
paradigm	  is	  a	  platform	  that	  can	  be	  introduced	  just	  beneath	  the	  surface	  of	  the	  water.	  
This	   platform	   is	   hidden	   from	  view	  and	   yet	   provides	   the	   animals	  with	   somewhere	   to	  
stand	  if	  they	  are	  able	  to	  find	  it,	  enabling	  Morris	  to	  hide	  the	  means	  of	  escape	  without	  
the	   use	   of	   physical	   barriers.	   The	   behaviour	   of	   the	   rats	   is	   recorded	   using	   a	   camera	  
placed	   over	   the	   pool	   of	   water.	   From	   this	   recording,	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   extract	   a	   two-­‐
dimensional	  movement	  trace	  of	  the	  animals’	  attempts	  at	  finding	  the	  hidden	  platform;	  
all	  manner	  of	  metrics	   can	   then	  be	  extracted	  and	  submitted	   to	  analysis.	  Of	  particular	  
interest	  to	  Morris	  was	  path	  directionality.	  Previous	  walled	  maze	  paradigms	  physically	  
restricted	  the	  ability	  of	  animals	  to	  express	  the	  directionality	  of	  their	  movements	  to	  a	  
few	  particular	  choice	  points.	  The	  Morris	  water	  maze	  removes	  these	  constraints	  so	  that	  
animals	  are	  not	   forced	   into	  correct	  or	   incorrect	  choices	  but	  can	   instead	  display	   their	  
understanding	  of	  the	  environment	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  efficiency	  of	  their	  movement	  traces.	  
	  
From	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  the	  current	  research,	  the	  Morris	  water	  maze	  solves	  some	  of	  
the	   limitations	   of	   Thorndike’s	   (1911)	   puzzle	   box	   escape	   paradigm	   described	   earlier.	  
The	   issue	   of	   rich	   data	   collection	   is	   solved	   by	   the	   use	   of	   a	   video	   camera,	   which	   can	  
capture	  the	  two-­‐dimensional	  movement	  trace	  of	  the	  animals.	  This	  trace	  is	  rich	  enough	  
to	  provide	  the	  experimenter	  with	  a	  choice	  of	  metrics	   to	   investigate	  and	  yet	   it	   is	  also	  
constrained	  enough	  that	  the	  data	  are	  not	  overly	  difficult	  to	  interpret.	  The	  advantage	  of	  
rich	   data	   is	   that	   it	   allows	   for	   multiple	   descriptions	   of	   the	   data.	  Whilst	   escape	   time	  
scores	  might	  only	  tell	  us	  about	  raw	  performance	  for	  a	  given	  trial,	  other	  aspects	  of	  the	  
data	  can	  convey	  information	  about	  particular	  processes:	  reduced	  speed	  of	  movement,	  
for	  example,	  can	  indicate	  impaired	  sensorimotor	  function	  (Vorhees	  &	  Williams,	  2006).	  
Importantly,	  the	  paradigm	  constrains	  behaviour	  to	  two	  dimensions	  in	  a	  credible	  way.	  It	  
doesn’t	  take	  much	  of	  a	  stretch	  to	  imagine	  how	  the	  task	  demands	  of	  a	  trial	  in	  the	  water	  
maze	  might	  translate	  into	  wild	  behaviour.	  The	  data	  are	  constrained	  to	  two	  dimensions	  
not	   because	   the	   movements	   are	   only	   recorded	   from	   one	   angle	   but	   because	   the	  
environment	  provided	  to	  the	  animals	  only	  allows	  the	  expression	  of	  behaviour	  in	  a	  two	  
dimensional	  plane.	  This	  was	  not	   the	  case	  with	  Thorndike’s	   task	  because	   locating	   the	  
lever	   and	   pressing	   the	   lever	   were	   two	   separate	   components	   of	   the	   overall	   action.	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Whilst	  it	  might	  be	  possible	  to	  describe	  the	  cat’s	  movement	  towards	  the	  lever	  in	  terms	  
of	  a	  two-­‐dimensional	  trace,	  the	  cat’s	  efforts	  at	  operating	  the	  lever	  must	  be	  described	  
in	  a	  different	  way.	  
	  
A	   further	   advantage	   to	   the	   water	   maze	   is	   that	   it	   solves	   the	   problem	   of	   hiding	   the	  
mechanism	   from	   the	   animal	   performing	   the	   task	   so	   that,	   during	   hidden	   trials,	   the	  
animal	   is	   forced	   to	   discover	   the	   location	   of	   the	   platform	   through	   its	   own	   search	  
behaviour;	   it	   can	   only	   solve	   the	   problem	   of	   how	   to	  move	   towards	   the	   platform	   by	  
virtue	   of	   its	   memory	   for	   the	   location;	   it	   can	   never	   perceive	   the	   location	   directly.	  
Because	  of	  this	  location	  finding	  structure,	  the	  water	  maze	  also	  makes	  it	  easy	  to	  employ	  
repeated	  measures	  designs.	  The	  starting	  position	  of	  the	  animal	  and	  the	  position	  of	  the	  
platforms	   can	   be	   moved	   easily	   with	   each	   new	   position	   presenting	   a	   new	   learning	  
scenario	  for	  the	  animal,	  whilst	  keeping	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  task	  consistent.	  
	  
A	   final	   advantage	  of	   the	  Morris	  water	  maze,	   from	   the	  present	  perspective,	   is	   that	   it	  
provides	   a	   means	   of	   running	   control	   conditions	   that	   share	   most	   of	   the	   physical	  
demands	  but	  fewer	  of	  the	  memory	  and	  cognition	  demands	  found	  in	  the	  experimental	  
conditions.	  Whilst	  a	  hidden	  platform	  provides	  challenges	  to	  memory	  and	  cognition,	  a	  
visible	  platform	  can	  also	  be	  made	  available	  which	  allows	  experimenters	  to	  run	  control	  
tests	   to	   ensure	   that	   animals	   are	   capable,	   and	  willing,	   to	   perform	   the	   basic	   physical	  
dimension	   of	   the	   task	   (D’Hooge	   &	   De	   Deyn,	   2001).	   In	   this	   way,	   experimenters	   can	  
check	   to	   make	   sure	   that	   any	   manipulation	   hasn’t	   unduly	   affected	   the	   animals’	  
motivation	  or	  basic	  motor	  abilities.	  
	  
Whilst	  the	  water	  maze	  has	  many	  of	  the	  attributes	  that	  we	  might	  want	  from	  an	  action	  
acquisition	   paradigm,	   it	   is	   also	   limited	   in	   some	   important	   respects.	   From	   a	   purely	  
practical	   point	   of	   view,	   the	   task	   is	   not	   scalable	   from	   rodent	   subjects	   up	   to	   human	  
participants	   and	   it	   requires	   substantial	   experimenter	   input.	   Another	   issue	   is	   the	  
number	  of	  movements	  required	  in	  order	  to	  complete	  a	  trial.	  It	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  the	  
rats	   were	   able	   to	   complete	   a	   trial	   from	   start	   to	   finish	   in	   a	   handful	   of	   continuous	  
movements.	   Optimal	   performance	   in	   the	   water	   maze	   still	   requires	   that	   the	   animal	  
swim	   for	  many	   seconds	   and	   produce	   all	   of	   the	  movements	   involved	   in	   this	   activity.	  
Even	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  strict	  definition	  of	  what	  constitutes	  an	  action,	  it	  seems	  clear	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that	  a	  typical	  water	  maze	  trial	  does	  not	  so	  clearly	  represent	  what	  we	  normally	  mean	  by	  
an	   action	   as,	   say,	   a	   lever	   press	   or	   the	   unscrewing	   of	   a	   cap.	   A	   problem	   that	   is	   also	  
related	  to	  the	  length	  of	  the	  trials	  is	  the	  difficulty	  in	  moving	  away	  from	  simple	  location	  
finding	   to	   more	   complex	   gestural	   movements	   that	   we	   might	   associate	   with	   action	  
acquisition.	  Clearly	   the	  availability	  of	   the	  platform	   in	   the	  water	  maze	  could	  be	  made	  
contingent	  on	  the	  rats	  moving	  through	  certain	  other	  portions	  of	  the	  pool	  first,	  but	  the	  
time	   it	  would	   take	   to	   discover	   and	  perform	   such	   gestures	   through	   swimming	  would	  
likely	   make	   this	   kind	   of	   learning	   extremely	   difficult.	   The	   water	   maze	   is	   therefore	   a	  
useful	  starting	  point	  for	  developing	  an	  action	  acquisition	  paradigm.	  If	  we	  bear	  in	  mind	  
some	   of	   these	   limitations	   this	   general	   concept	   will	   form	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   action	  
acquisition	  paradigm	  that	  is	  central	  to	  the	  current	  investigation.	  
	  
Putting	  the	  pieces	  together:	  the	  joystick	  task	  
With	   these	   theoretical,	   methodological	   and	   statistical	   considerations	   in	   mind,	   the	  
following	  chapters	  will	   show	  how	  this	   information	  was	  used	  to	  design	  and	  develop	  a	  
task	  with	  some	  of	  the	  theoretical	  and	  practical	  attributes	  of	  existing	  paradigms	  whilst	  
also	  attempting	   to	  capture	  an	   intuitive	  sense	  of	  what	  constitutes	  an	  action.	  The	   first	  
version	  of	  the	  task	  is	  detailed	  in	  chapter	  2.	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Chapter	   2:	   the	   joystick	   task	   and	   reinforcement	  
delay	  
Having	  set	  out	  the	  motivations	  for	  the	  current	  research	  and	  situated	  the	  topic	  of	  action	  
acquisition	  relative	  to	  other	  research	  areas,	  the	  current	  chapter	  provides	  a	  description	  
of	  the	  joystick	  task.	  Following	  this,	  the	  importance	  of	  delay	  as	  an	  experimental	  variable	  
for	   the	   investigation	   of	   action	   acquisition	   is	   discussed	   and	   a	   study	   investigating	   the	  
impact	  of	  delayed	  audio	  and	  visual	  reinforcement	  is	  described.	  
	  
The	  joystick	  task	  
In	  an	  attempt	   to	  achieve	  a	  balance	  between	   freedom	  and	  constraints	  of	  movement,	  
the	   current	   task	   deliberately	   emulates	   the	   Morris	   water	   maze	   (Morris,	   1981)	   by	  
providing	  a	   learning	  environment	   (albeit	   a	   virtual	  one)	  with	   similar	   characteristics.	  A	  
computer	  defines	  a	  two-­‐dimensional,	  square	  environment	  and	  a	  joystick	  is	  the	  means	  
by	  which	   a	   user	   can	   search	   this	   space	   (figure	   2.1).	  Whilst,	   technically	   speaking,	   any	  
input	   device	   could	   have	  been	  used,	   a	   joystick	  was	   chosen	   for	   several	   reasons.	  Most	  
important	  of	   these	   is	   that	   joysticks	  provide	  a	  good	  physical	   representation	  of	  a	   two-­‐
dimensional	   search	   space.	   The	   travel	   of	   the	   joystick	   is	   constrained	   by	   the	   aperture	  
within	  which	  the	  moveable	  part	  of	  the	  apparatus	  is	  moved	  so	  that	  the	  user	  can	  feel	  the	  
limits	  of	  the	  space	  that	  they	  have	  to	  explore	  and	  are	  physically	  restricted	  from	  going	  
beyond	   it.	   The	   joystick	   also	   provides	   the	   benefit	   that	   the	   moveable	   part	   of	   the	  
apparatus	  cannot	  be	  separated	  from	  the	  base	  (unlike	  a	  mouse	  or	  a	  stylus,	  for	  example)	  
so	   the	  participant’s	  understanding	  of	   the	   search	   space	   (and	  our	  ability	   to	   track	   their	  
movements	  within	  it)	  are	  consistent	  because	  all	  movements	  are	  relative	  to	  the	  stable	  
base	  of	  the	  joystick.	  The	  result	  is	  that	  the	  user	  has	  an	  intuitive	  understanding	  of	  which	  
of	  their	  movements	  are	  task	  relevant	  because	  they	  can	  be	  sure	  that	  only	  movements	  
of	   the	   joystick	  will	   translate	   into	  movements	  within	   the	   search	  environment.	   Finally,	  
the	  joystick	  offers	  a	  great	  practical	  benefit	  to	  the	  researcher	  in	  that	  the	  spring	  allows	  it	  





Figure	  2.1	  The	  basic	  design	  of	  the	  task	  was	  based	  on	  the	  Morris	  water	  maze,	  with	  a	  joystick	  being	  used	  to	  search	  a	  
two-­‐dimensional	  square	  space	  for	  a	  circular	  reinforced	  area	  (coloured	  red	  above).	  The	  small	  white	  circle	  marks	  the	  
centre	  point	  to	  which	  the	  joystick	  returns	  when	  released.	  
	  
A	  virtual	  search	  environment	  offers	  huge	  flexibility	  to	  the	  experimenter.	  The	  means	  of	  
eliciting	  reinforcement	  in	  the	  joystick	  task	  was	  based	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  escape	  platforms	  
in	  the	  Morris	  water	  maze	  (Morris,	  1981).	  Circular	  portions	  of	  the	  search	  space,	  instead	  
of	  providing	  a	  means	  of	  escape	   from	  a	  pool	  of	  water,	   simply	  cause	  a	   stimulus	  event	  
(reinforcement)	   to	   occur	   when	   the	   joystick	   is	   moved	   into	   them.	   In	   this	   virtual	  
environment,	  we	  might	  lose	  the	  ability	  to	  elicit	  primary	  motivational	  drives	  (such	  as	  a	  
desire	   to	   escape	   from	   water)	   that	   align	   with	   our	   experimental	   goals,	   but	   the	   task	  
provides	  a	  very	  intuitive	  game-­‐like	  experience	  and	  we	  gain	  much	  in	  terms	  of	  flexibility	  
with	   the	   ability	   to	   vary	   the	   goals	   easily.	   For	   instance,	   the	   range	   of	   reinforcement	  
contingencies	  that	  can	  be	  set	  up	  is	  essentially	  limitless	  and	  the	  rules	  can	  be	  changed	  at	  
any	  time,	  offering	  the	  additional	  benefit	  of	  allowing	  the	  experimenter	  to	  present	  the	  
same	   individual	   with	   many	   different	   learning	   situations	   within	   a	   single	   experiment.	  
Furthermore,	  it	  should	  also	  be	  possible	  to	  scale	  task	  difficulty.	  The	  benefit	  of	  this	  lies	  in	  
the	   opportunity	   it	   presents	   for	   calibrating	   task	   difficulty	   when	   testing	   clinical	  
populations	  or	  even	  non-­‐human	  animals.	  
	  
In	  terms	  of	  data	  collection,	  the	  joystick	  task	  provides	  3	  basic	  elements,	  x	  coordinates,	  y	  
coordinates	  and	  time.	  From	  these	  data	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  calculate	  the	  distance,	  duration	  
and	   speed	   of	  movement	   as	  well	   as	   potentially	   deriving	   a	   host	   of	   other	   higher	   level	  
metrics	  that	  focus	  on	  the	  shape	  or	  style	  of	  movement.	  The	  focus	  of	  the	  current	  study	  is	  
on	   the	   simpler	   performance	   metrics	   such	   as	   distance,	   however,	   even	   then,	   the	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richness	  of	  the	  data	  still	  provide	  the	  researcher	  with	  useful	  information.	  For	  instance,	  
it	   is	  possible	   to	  play	  back	  all	  of	   the	  movements	  made	  during	  a	  particular	   trial	   in	   the	  
form	   of	   a	   continuous	   movement	   trace;	   it	   is	   also	   possible	   to	   generate	   still	   images	  
featuring	  all	  or	  part	  of	  the	  total	  movement	  trace	  (figure	  2.2).	  The	  advantage	  of	  this	  is	  
that	  it	  alerts	  the	  researcher	  to	  problems	  with	  the	  task,	  enabling	  us	  to	  ask	  the	  question	  
of	  whether	  participants	  are	  performing	  the	  task	  in	  the	  intended	  way	  and,	  if	  not,	  what	  
might	  be	  done	  to	  develop	  the	  task	  in	  future.	  A	  further	  advantage	  is	  that	  the	  traces	  can	  
provide	  information	  about	  which	  formal	  analysis	  might	  best	  represent	  the	  learning	  and	  
behaviour	   that	   occurred.	   For	   example,	   and	   as	   we	   will	   see	   later	   in	   this	   chapter,	   the	  
movement	  data	  can	  alert	  us	  to	  sources	  of	  variance	  that	  make	  one	  performance	  metric	  
difficult	  to	  analyse,	  but	  that	  are	  largely	  absent	  from	  another	  performance	  metric	  and	  




Figure	  2.2	  An	  example	  movement	  trace	  taken	  from	  the	  data	  for	  a	  trial	   in	  experiment	  1.	  The	  ability	  to	   inspect	  still	  
images	  and	  even	  play	  back	  trials	  to	  observe	  movement	  properties	  is	  a	  useful	  resource	  for	  both	  development	  of	  the	  
task	  and	  for	  performing	  checks	  when	  conducting	  formal	  analyses	  of	  the	  data.	  
	  
Reinforcement	  delay	  
Differing	  sensitivities	  to	  delay	  depending	  on	  the	  type	  of	  motor	  
task	  
The	   effect	   of	   delay	   on	   reinforcement	   learning	   is	   dependent	   on	   a	   number	   of	   factors	  
from	  the	  agent’s	  experience	  of	  the	  learning	  environment	  (Dickinson,	  Watt	  &	  Griffiths,	  
1992)	   to	   the	   relative	   contribution	  of	   stimulus-­‐response	   versus	   goal-­‐directed	   learning	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systems	  (Cardinal,	  2006).	  It	  is,	  therefore,	  difficult	  to	  build	  up	  a	  picture	  of	  how	  learning	  
responds	   to	   differing	   delay	   durations,	   partly	   because	   of	   these	   factors	   and	   partly	  
because	   of	   how	   results	   are	   presented:	   researchers	   are	   free	   to	   report	   the	   point	   at	  
which	   learning	   is	   abolished,	   the	   point	   at	   which	   an	   effect	   of	   delay	   is	   detected	   and	  
everything	   in	  between.	   In	  other	  words,	  as	  Snycerski,	  Laraway	  and	  Poling	  (2005)	  have	  
noted,	  the	  success	  criterion	  can	  have	  a	  huge	  effect	  on	  how	  results	  are	  interpreted.	  
	  
Where	   there	  does	  appear	   to	  be	  a	   clear	   split,	  however,	   is	   in	   the	  overall	   sensitivity	   to	  
delay	   seen	   in	   motor	   control	   and	   motor	   adaptation	   paradigms	   versus	   traditional	  
reinforcement	  learning	  paradigms.	  	  It	  has	  been	  shown	  in	  human	  subjects,	  for	  example,	  
that	   in	   visual	   tracking	   tasks,	   feedback	   delays	   as	   short	   as	   300	   ms	   can	   have	   a	   large	  
impact	  on	  performance	  (Foulkes	  &	  Miall,	  2000;	  Miall	  &	  Jackson,	  2006;	  Miall,	  Weir,	  &	  
Stein,	   1985);	   tasks	   involving	   adaptation	   to	   visually	   displaced	   targets	   are	   found	   to	  be	  
equally	  sensitive	  to	  delay	  (Held,	  Efstathiou,	  &	  Greene,	  1966),	  with	  some	  demonstrating	  
an	  effect	  at	   just	  50	  ms	  (Kitazawa	  et	  al.,	  1995).	   	   In	  reinforcement	   learning	  paradigms,	  
learning	   and	  performance	  does	  not	   appear	   to	  be	  quite	   as	   sensitive	   to	   the	  effects	  of	  
delay,	   with	   studies	   showing	   an	   effect	   at	   somewhere	   between	   1	   to	   2	   s	   (Elsner	   &	  
Hommel,	   2004;	   Shanks	   &	   Dickinson,	   1991;	   Shanks,	   Pearson	   and	   Dickinson,	   1989),	  
although	  there	  is	  a	  notable	  absence	  of	  data	  to	  indicate	  the	  duration	  at	  which	  the	  effect	  
of	  delay	  first	  appears.	  
	  
However,	   whilst	   there	   is	   an	   apparent	   difference	   in	   the	   sensitivity	   to	   delay	   of	  
reinforcement	  learning	  and	  supervised	  learning	  paradigms,	  there	  is	  also	  a	  difference	  in	  
the	   type	  of	   experimental	   task	  employed.	   The	   former	   tend	   to	  employ	   simple	  button-­‐
pressing	   response	   mechanisms,	   whilst	   the	   latter	   rely	   on	   more	   complex	   reaching	  
movements	   and	   target	   pursuit,	   which	   require	   precise	   motor	   control.	   The	   current	  
experiments	   will	   investigate	   the	   effect	   of	   delay	   in	   a	   task	   that	   involves	   rich	   motor	  
behaviour	  with	  delivery	  that	  is	  more	  typical	  of	  reinforcement	  learning.	  
	  
Short	  latency	  dopaminergic	  activity	  and	  contamination	  	  
According	  to	  Redgrave	  and	  Gurney	  (2006),	  the	  advantage	  of	  time-­‐stamping	  so	  quickly	  
following	   the	   incidence	   of	   a	   novel	   stimulus	   (~100	   ms)	   is	   that	   this	   reduces	   the	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opportunity	   for	  causally	   irrelevant	  movements	  to	  be	  reinforced.	  Furthermore,	  such	  a	  
rapid	   response	   effectively	   precludes	   the	   contribution	   to	   motor	   learning	   of	   any	  
movements	   that	   are	   a	   direct	   consequence	   of	   the	   novel	   stimulus	   itself.	   The	  
disadvantage	  of	  such	  low-­‐latency	  activity,	  however,	  is	  that	  the	  response	  is	  necessarily	  
an	  indiscriminate	  one.	  As	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  one,	  the	  signal	  occurs	  so	  quickly	  after	  an	  
event	   that	   it	  happens	  before	   the	  stimulus	  can	  be	  brought	  onto	   the	   fovea	  and	  at	   the	  
same	  time	  as	  cortical	  processing	  required	  for	  identifying	  stimulus	  characteristics.	  
	  
These	  points	  raise	  the	  following	  question:	  why	  could	  the	  time-­‐stamp	  not	  have	  evolved	  
with	  a	  longer	  delay?	  Delaying	  the	  dopamine	  response	  for	  several	  hundred	  milliseconds	  
would	  allow	  for	  a	  saccade	  to	  take	  place,	  plus	  some	  subsequent	  cortical	  processing	  of	  
the	   event.	   Contamination	   could	   then	   be	   avoided	   simply	   by	   discounting	   the	   motor	  
activity	   that	   occurred	   whilst	   this	   extra	   sensory	   processing	   was	   taking	   place.	   Similar	  
discounting	   mechanisms	   for	   coping	   with	   internal	   biological	   transmission	   delays	   are	  
commonly	  proposed	  in	  the	  supervised	  learning	  literature	  (e.g.	  Miall,	  Weir,	  Wolpert	  &	  
Stein,	   1993).	   However,	   the	   problem	   with	   this	   idea	   is	   that	   the	   time	   required	   for	  
discounting	   would	   not	   be	   stable.	   Unlike	   simple	   internal	   transmission	   time	   delays,	  
which	  change	  only	  gradually	  over	  time	  due	  to	  growth,	  ageing	  and	  other	  physiological	  
factors,	   the	   length	   of	   time	   taken	   to	   identify	   a	   stimulus	   is	   necessarily	   highly	   variable	  
from	  one	  instance	  to	  the	  next.	  It	  isn’t	  clear	  how	  any	  neural	  mechanism	  could	  make	  a	  
decision	  as	   to	  when	   the	   stimulus	   could	  be	   considered	  adequately	   identified,	   or	  how	  
this	   information	   could	   be	   incorporated	   into	   such	   an	   evolutionarily	   ancient	   neural	  
mechanism.	  It	  seems	  more	  likely,	  therefore,	  that	  an	  indiscriminate	  time-­‐stamp	  evolved	  
because	   it	   is	   sufficient	   for	  most	  purposes	  and	  has	  been	  selected	   in	   favour	  of	  a	  more	  
resource-­‐intensive	  ‘sample	  and	  hold’	  discounting	  system.	  
	  
If	   the	   dopamine	   time-­‐stamp,	   as	   described	   by	   Redgrave	   and	   Gurney	   (2006)	   and	  
Redgrave	   et	   al.	   (2008),	   is	   low	   latency	   specifically	   to	   avoid	   contamination,	   then	   the	  
learning	   mechanism	   that	   it	   contributes	   to	   should	   be	   highly	   sensitive	   to	   delays	   of	  
reinforcement.	   One	   way	   to	   investigate	   this	   is	   to	   test	   the	   sensitivity	   to	   temporal	  
alignment	  of	  learning	  procedures	  that	  are	  believed	  to	  be	  dependent	  on	  the	  dopamine	  
time-­‐stamp.	   Whilst	   we	   can’t	   experimentally	   manipulate	   the	   post-­‐stimulus,	   pre-­‐
dopamine	  delay,	  it	  is	  a	  straightforward	  task	  to	  introduce	  post-­‐movement,	  pre-­‐stimulus	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delays	   into	   the	   action-­‐effect	   chain.	   In	   other	   words,	   temporal	   alignment	   of	   motor	  
output	  and	  sensory	  feedback	  can	  be	  manipulated	  by	  interposing	  a	  delay	  between	  the	  
point	   at	   which	   an	   animal	   causes	   an	   event	   to	   occur	   and	   the	   moment	   that	   the	  
occurrence	  of	  this	  event	  is	  presented	  to	  the	  animal	  as	  a	  stimulus,	  thus	  approximating	  a	  
learning	  system	  with	  a	  longer	  latency	  time-­‐stamp.	  In	  theory,	  the	  temporally	  contiguous	  
yet	  non-­‐contingent	  motor	  activity	   that	  occurs	  during	  the	  delay	  period	  (that	   is	   to	  say,	  
the	   artificial	   delay	   plus	   the	   100	   ms	   biological	   delay)	   would	   act	   as	   an	   unavoidable	  
contaminant	   in	   the	   animal’s	   learning	   system,	   making	   it	   more	   difficult	   to	   identify	  
causally	  relevant	  portions	  of	  motor	  output.	   Indeed,	  Redgrave	  and	  Gurney	  (2006)	  and	  
Redgrave	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  point	  to	  research	  demonstrating	  the	  detrimental	  effects	  of	  delay	  
on	  reinforcement	  learning	  (Dickinson,	  2001;	  Elsner	  &	  Hommel,	  2004;	  Schultz,	  2006)	  to	  
support	  their	  explanation	  for	  the	  evolution	  of	  such	  a	  low	  latency	  system;	  however,	  the	  
delay	  durations	  at	  which	  the	  effects	  are	  found	  in	  these	  studies	  start	  at	  0.5	  s	  (Schultz,	  
2006,	  original	  source:	  Hollerman	  &	  Schultz,	  1998),	  much	  longer	  than	  the	  latency	  of	  the	  
dopamine	   activity	   in	   question	   and	   sufficiently	   long	   that	  we	  might	   assume	   the	   delay	  
would	   also	   interfere	   with	   post-­‐saccadic	   (and	   high-­‐level	   post-­‐identification)	   learning	  
processes.	  
	  
If	   we	   are	   to	   believe	   that	   the	   phasic	   dopamine	   timestamp	   evolved	   as	   a	   means	   of	  
reducing	  motor	  contamination	  and	  therefore	  reducing	  the	  credit	  assignment	  problem,	  
then	  we	  would	  expect	  much	  shorter	  delays	  than	  the	  0.5	  s	  cited	  by	  Redgrave	  et	  al.	  to	  
have	  a	  severe	  impact	  on	  learning.	  Specifically,	  there	  should	  be	  a	  measurable	  effect	  at	  
shorter	  durations	  than	  that	  which	  would	  be	  required	  for	  identification	  of	  the	  stimulus	  
to	  occur.	  If	  this	  were	  not	  the	  case,	  then	  it	  would	  be	  difficult	  to	  explain	  why	  the	  system	  
doesn’t	  simply	  delay	  the	  time-­‐stamp	  for	  a	  similar	  duration,	  given	  the	  potential	  benefits	  
this	  would	   bring	   as	   the	   dopamine	   response	  would	   not	   need	   to	   be	   an	   indiscriminate	  
one.	   It	   seems	   reasonable	   to	   assume	   that	   for	   identification	   of	   the	   stimulus	   to	   occur,	  
approximately	  150	  ms	  would	  be	  required	  for	  a	  saccade	  (Hikosaka	  &	  Wurtz,	  1983;	  Jay	  &	  
Sparks,	  1987)	  to	  bring	  the	  stimulus	  on	  to	  the	  fovea,	  plus	  an	  additional	  80	  to	  100	  ms	  for	  
basic	  cortical	  processing	  of	  the	  new	  image	  (Rousselet,	  Thorpe	  &	  Fabre-­‐Thorpe,	  2004;	  
Thorpe	  &	  Fabre-­‐Thorpe,	  2001),	  giving	  a	  total	  of	  around	  250	  ms,	  i.e.	  150	  ms	  longer	  than	  
the	   dopamine	   time	   stamp.	   In	   other	  words,	   a	   detrimental	   impact	   of	   delays	   less	   than	  
150	  ms	  in	  duration	  would	  provide	  more	  convincing	  support	  for	  the	  theory	  than	  the	  0.5	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s	  durations	  referred	  to	  in	  the	  literature.	  
	  
Experiment	   1:	   within-­‐trial	   repetition	   of	   audio	  
reinforcement	  
Experiment	  1	  was	  developed	  to	  investigate	  the	  effects	  of	  reinforcement	  delay	  on	  the	  
ability	   of	   people	   to	   home	   in	   on	   the	   location	   of	   a	   reinforced	   area	   within	   a	   two-­‐
dimensional	   search	   space.	   The	   first	   reason	   for	   the	   task	   was	   to	   assess	   where	   the	  
sensitivity	  to	  delay	  lies	  in	  a	  rich	  motor	  task	  featuring	  discrete	  and	  qualitative	  instances	  
of	   reinforcement.	   The	   results	  will	   provide	   insight	   into	  whether	   the	   key	   factor	   in	   the	  
effect	  of	  delay	  has	  to	  do	  with	  the	  motor	  demands	  of	  the	  task,	  such	  as	  the	  speed	  and	  
the	   accuracy	   of	  movements,	   or	  whether	   the	   type	   of	   reinforcement	   and	   the	   type	   of	  
learning	   are	   the	   most	   important	   factors.	   In	   other	   words,	   does	   delay	   sensitivity	   lie	  
beneath	   0.5	   s,	   as	   we	   might	   expect	   based	   on	   previous	   studies	   featuring	   tasks	   with	  
similar	  physical	  demands,	  or	  does	  it	  lie	  somewhere	  in	  excess	  of	  1	  s,	  as	  we	  might	  expect	  
based	   on	   physically	   very	   different	   reinforcement	   learning	   paradigms?	   The	   second	  
question	  also	  concerns	  sensitivity	  to	  delay.	  If	  task	  performance	  ultimately	  relies	  on	  the	  
activity	  of	  midbrain	  dopamine	  neurons	  and	  this	  activity	  is	  short	  latency	  specifically	  to	  
avoid	   contamination	   with	   non-­‐contingent	  motor	   output,	   then	   we	   would	   expect	   the	  
system	  to	  be	  highly	  sensitive	  to	  artificial	  delays.	  It	  was,	  therefore,	  a	  goal	  of	  the	  current	  
experiments	   to	   investigate	   the	   effect	   of	   delays	   of	   less	   than	   0.5	   s,	   including	   delays	  




27	  people	  (25	  female)	  participated	  in	  all	  conditions	  of	  this	  study.	  	  Ages	  ranged	  from	  18	  
to	   24	   years	   with	   a	   mean	   age	   of	   19	   (SD	   =	   1.3	   years).	   	  Participants	   were	   all	  
undergraduate	   students	   at	   the	   University	   of	   Sheffield	   who	   took	   part	   in	   return	   for	  
credits	  in	  the	  department's	  research	  participation	  scheme.	  	  All	  subjects	  were	  naive	  to	  





The	   experiment	   program	   was	   written	   using	   Matlab	   (Version	   2007)	   with	   the	  
Psychophysics	   Toolbox	   extension.	   A	   commercial	   joystick	   (Logitech	   extreme	   3D	   pro	  
joystick,	  P/N:	  863225-­‐1000)	  was	  used	  as	  the	  input	  device.	  These	  tools	  were	  used	  for	  all	  
experiments	  described	  in	  this	  thesis.	  
	  
Defining	  the	  search	  environment	  and	  the	  reinforced	  area	  
The	  search	  space	  was	  defined	  as	  a	  square	  that	  was	  1024	  by	  1024	  units	  in	  size,	  which	  
corresponded	   to	   the	   limits	   of	   the	   joystick’s	   travel	   (the	   joystick	   movements	   were	  
physically	  restricted	  by	  a	  square	  aperture	  at	  the	  base	  of	  the	  stick).	  Movements	  of	  the	  
joystick	  mapped	  on	  to	  movements	  within	  the	  search	  space	  in	  a	  1	  to	  1	  fashion,	  with	  the	  
joystick	  starting	  in	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  search	  space	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  each	  trial.	  Once	  
released	  from	  the	  grip	  of	  a	  participant,	  the	  joystick	  was	  able	  to	  return	  to	  the	  centre	  of	  
the	   search	   space	   within	   a	   tolerance	   of	   10	   units,	   by	   virtue	   of	   a	   built-­‐in	   spring	  
mechanism.	  
	  
Different	   sizes	   of	   reinforced	   area	   (hotspots)	   were	   tested	   during	   development	   and	  
piloting	  of	  the	  task.	  The	  size	  was	  eventually	  set	  to	  occupy	  0.91%	  of	  the	  overall	  search	  
space	   based	   on	   finding	   a	   balance	   between	   making	   the	   task	   sufficiently	   difficult	   to	  
provide	  useful	   data	   and	   the	  practical	   limitations	  of	   running	  multiple	   trials	   that	  were	  
not	   time-­‐limited;	   there	   was	   no	   theoretical	   reason	   for	   choosing	   this	   specific	   size	   of	  
hotspot.	  At	  the	  beginning	  of	  every	  new	  trial,	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  hotspot	  was	  positioned	  
randomly	  on	  an	  annulus	  placed	  centrally	  within	  the	  search	  space	  (figure	  2.2).	  The	  inner	  
edge	  of	  the	  annulus	  was	  exactly	  1	  times	  the	  diameter	  of	  the	  hotspot	  from	  the	  centre	  
of	  the	  search	  space.	  At	   its	  closest	  point,	   the	  outer	  edge	  of	  the	  annulus	  equivalent	  to	  
the	   radius	   of	   the	   hotspot	   from	   edge	   of	   the	   search	   space.	   The	   reason	   for	   these	  
dimensions	  was	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  hotspot	  never	  overlapped	  the	  central	  starting	  point	  





Figure	  2.3	  Experimental	  search	  space	  and	  hotspot	  positioning.	  The	  black	  area	  represents	  the	  search	  space	  and	  the	  
grey	  annulus	  represents	  the	  area	  of	   the	  search	  space	   in	  which	  the	  centre	  of	   the	  hotspot	   (shown	   in	  red)	  could	  be	  
randomly	  positioned	  at	  the	  start	  of	  each	  trial.	  The	  diagram	  is	  drawn	  to	  scale.	  
	  
Defining	  reinforcement	  and	  the	  learning	  criterion	  
Any	  movement	  of	  the	  joystick	  into	  the	  hotspot	  region	  of	  the	  search	  space	  was	  defined	  
as	   a	  hit	   and	   resulted	   in	   a	   short	   ‘pip’	   sound	  of	   10	  ms	  duration	   (the	   reinforcement)	   –	  
holding	   the	   joystick	   over	   the	  hotspot	   resulted	   in	   a	   rapid	   series	   of	   these	  discrete	  pip	  
sounds	   (i.e.	   not	   a	   continuous	   sound).	   An	   audio	   stimulus	   was	   chosen	   for	   the	   first	  
experiment	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   reduce	   any	   focus	   the	   participants	   might	   have	   on	   the	  
computer	   monitor	   and	   increase	   the	   feeling	   that	   the	   task	   was	   to	   find	   the	   correct	  
position	   to	  hold	   the	   joystick	   in	   rather	   than	  a	   location	  on	  a	   screen;	   it	  was	  considered	  
that	  if	  participants	  thought	  about	  the	  task	  in	  terms	  of	  points	  on	  the	  computer	  monitor,	  
they	  would	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  take	  a	  cognitive/strategic	  approach	  to	  the	  task	  and	  their	  
performance	   would	   then	   be	   less	   representative	   of	   the	   kind	   of	   learning	   under	  
investigation.	   Another	   reason	   for	   choosing	   an	   audio	   stimulus	   was	   that	   such	   stimuli	  
convey	   much	   less	   in	   the	   way	   of	   spatial	   information,	   misleading	   or	   otherwise.	  
Generating	  a	  single	  hit	  was	  not	  sufficient	  to	  bring	  an	  end	  to	  a	  trial.	  Instead,	  a	  learning	  
criterion	  was	  used	  to	  determine	  whether	  a	  participant	  had	   learnt	  the	   location	  of	   the	  
hotspot.	  The	  learning	  criterion	  was	  defined	  as	  the	  number	  of	  hits	  required	  within	  1	  s	  in	  
order	  to	  bring	  an	  end	  to	  a	  trial.	  Like	  hotspot	  size,	  the	  learning	  criterion	  was	  set	  using	  
information	  gained	   from	  pilot	   tests	   in	  order	   to	  balance	   task	  difficulty	   (more	  hits	  per	  
second	  meant	  the	  threshold	  was	  harder	  to	  meet)	  against	  better	  verification	  of	  learning	  
(more	   hits	   per	   second	   requires	   a	   participant	   to	   demonstrate	   better	   learning	   of	   the	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hotspot	   location).	   The	   criterion	   was	   set	   at	   15	   hits	   per	   second.	   From	   an	   individual	  
participant’s	  perspective	  the	  aim	  in	  a	  given	  trial	  was,	  therefore,	  to	  find	  the	  hotspot	  and	  
try	   to	  maintain	   the	  position	  of	   the	   joystick	  over	   this	   region	  until	   having	  achieved	  15	  
hits	  (and	  audio	  reinforcements)	  in	  a	  second.	  
	  
Delay	  
Delayed	   reinforcement	   was	   achieved	   by	   interposing	   a	   delay	   between	   the	   point	   at	  
which	  a	  participant	  moved	   into	  the	  reinforced	  area	  and	  the	  point	  at	  which	  a	  hit	  was	  
recorded	   and	   the	   audio	   reinforcement	   delivered.	   In	   all,	   6	   delay	   conditions	   were	  
chosen:	  0-­‐ms,	  75-­‐ms,	  150-­‐ms,	  225-­‐ms,	  300-­‐ms	  and	  375-­‐ms.	  Despite	  the	  findings	  from	  
previous	   reinforcement	   learning	   paradigms	   showing	   a	   sensitivity	   to	   delay	   starting	   at	  
around	   500	  ms,	   pilot	   test	   revealed	   that	   the	   experiment	   was	   extremely	   sensitive	   to	  
delay	   and	   that	   delays	   of	   500	   ms	   would	   have	   made	   trials	   difficult	   to	   complete.	  
Consequently	  the	  6	  delay	  conditions	  were	  chosen	  to	  provide	  a	  balance	  between	  task	  
difficulty	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  discern	  the	  point	  at	  which	  an	  effect	  of	  delay	  started.	  It	  was	  
necessary	  to	  include	  a	  refractory	  period	  of	  25	  ms	  after	  each	  instance	  of	  reinforcement	  
during	  which	  another	   stimulus	   (and	  hit)	   could	  not	  occur;	   this	  was	   to	  allow	   sufficient	  
time	  to	  prepare	  and	  play	  each	  audio	  stimulus	  and	  enabled	  us	  to	  ensure	  that	  we	  could	  
provide	  discrete	  stimuli	  that	  didn’t	  blend	  into	  one	  another	  and	  that	  would	  be	  repeated	  
at	  regular	  intervals	  at	  their	  fastest	  rate.	  
	  
Procedure	  
Participants	   sat	   at	   a	   desk	   in	   front	   of	   the	   joystick	   and	   a	   19	   inch	   computer	   monitor.	  
Before	  starting	  the	  experimental	  program,	  the	  task	  was	  briefly	  described	  verbally	  with	  
the	   task	   goal	   being	   phrased	   in	   terms	   of	   “finding	   the	   correct	   position	   to	   place	   the	  
joystick	   in”	  rather	  than,	  say,	  “search	  for	  the	  correct	   location”.	   In	  order	  to	  reduce	  the	  
tendency	  of	  individuals	  to	  simply	  move	  the	  joystick	  around	  the	  very	  edges	  of	  its	  travel	  
(something	  flagged	  up	  during	  pilot	  sessions),	  participants	  were	  encouraged	  to	  explore	  
the	  whole	   range	   of	   joystick	  movements.	   Finally,	   the	   participants	  were	   told	   that	   the	  
experiment	  involved	  no	  deception	  and	  that	  the	  correct	  position	  could	  always	  be	  found.	  
This	  guidance	  was	  included	  because	  pilot	  tests	  revealed	  the	  task	  to	  be	  difficult	  and	  the	  
lack	   of	   feedback	   might	   lead	   sceptical	   participants	   to	   believe	   that	   a	   given	   trial	   was	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impossible,	  based	  on	  their	  experience	  of	  participating	  in	  other	  psychology	  experiments	  
featuring	   deception.	   Following	   the	   verbal	   instructions,	   the	   experiment	   program	  was	  
then	  started	  and	  the	  participants	  were	  asked	  to	  follow	  the	  onscreen	  instructions	  (see	  
appendix	  1).	  After	  reading	  the	  instructions,	  3	  practice	  trials	  commenced	  automatically.	  
The	   practice	   trials	   involved	   no	   reinforcement	   delay	   and,	   as	   with	   all	   trials	   in	   the	  
experiment,	   no	   feedback	   or	   screen	   graphics	   were	   provided	   during	   the	   trial	   (the	  
monitor	   was	   kept	   black	   until	   the	   end	   of	   a	   trial).	   Once	   the	   practice	   trials	   were	  




A	  repeated	  measures	  design	  was	  used.	   	  The	   independent	  variable	  was	  reinforcement	  
delay	  and	  it	  included	  6	  conditions:	  0-­‐ms,	  75-­‐ms,	  150-­‐ms,	  225-­‐ms,	  300-­‐ms	  and	  375-­‐ms.	  
Each	   experimental	   session	  was	  made	  up	  of	   21	   trials:	   3	   of	  which	  were	  practice	   trials	  
(involving	  no	  delay);	  the	  remaining	  18	  were	  experimental	  trials.	  The	  experimental	  trials	  
were	  presented	  in	  3	  batches	  of	  6,	  such	  that	  all	  6	  conditions	  were	  experienced	  in	  each	  
of	   the	   three	   batches.	   This	   was	   done	   to	   ensure	   that	   the	   3	   attempts	   at	   a	   particular	  
condition	  were	  spread	  out	  over	  the	  full	  testing	  session.	  Each	  level	  of	  the	  independent	  
variable	  was,	  therefore,	  experienced	  a	  total	  of	  3	  times	  with	  the	  order	  of	  presentation	  
being	  randomly	  shuffled	  within	  each	  of	  the	  3	  batches.	  	  
	  
Results	  	  
The	  post	  discovery	  period	  
For	   the	  purposes	  of	   analysis,	   each	   trial	  was	   treated	  as	  occurring	   in	   two	  phases:	  pre-­‐
discovery	  and	  post-­‐discovery.	  	  The	  pre-­‐discovery	  period	  lasts	  from	  the	  start	  of	  the	  trial	  
to	   the	   first	   instance	  of	   reinforcement:	   it	   is	   the	  period	  during	  which	  the	  participant	   is	  
naïve	  as	  to	  the	  position	  of	  the	  hotspot.	  The	  post-­‐discovery	  period	  lasts	  from	  the	  first	  
instance	   of	   reinforcement	   to	   the	   end	   of	   the	   trial;	   this	   period	   is	   of	   primary	   interest	  
because	  it	  includes	  all	   instances	  of	  reinforcement	  and	  is,	  therefore,	  the	  period	  that	  is	  




Distance	  travelled	  during	  the	  post-­‐discovery	  period	  
Distance	  was	  identified	  as	  the	  baseline	  metric	  of	  performance	  and	  measured	  in	  search	  
space	   units.	   Better	   performance	   should	   be	   reflected	   in	   a	   participant	   travelling	   a	  
relatively	   short	  distance	  over	   the	   course	  of	   a	   trial.	   In	  other	  words,	   a	   top	  performing	  
individual	   should	   be	   able	   to	   achieve	   the	   required	   hit	   rate	   with	   comparatively	   little	  
movement	  of	  the	  joystick.	  Each	  participant	  had	  3	  attempts	  at	  each	  delay	  condition	  and	  
it	  was	  the	  mean	  of	  these	  3	  distances	  that	  was	  submitted	  to	  analysis.	  
	  
It	   was	   anticipated	   based	   on	   the	   recommendation	   of	   Keene	   (1995),	   that	   log-­‐
transformed	  data	  would	  provide	  the	  most	   representative	  picture	  of	   the	   learning	  and	  
behaviour	   under	   investigation,	   when	   analysed	   using	   parametric	   tests.	   However,	   all	  
data	   in	   this	   thesis	   also	   underwent	   tests	   of	   normality	   (Shapiro-­‐Wilk	   before	   and	   after	  
transformation)	  as	  well	  as	  checks	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  standard	  deviations	  and	  
means	   (i.e.	   whether	   standard	   deviations	   increased	   with	   higher	   mean	   values)	   and	  
inspection	  of	  the	  frequency	  distributions	  in	  all	  cases	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  data	  submitted	  
to	  analysis	  were	   suitable	   for	  parametric	   tests.	  Due	   to	   the	  open	  ended	  nature	  of	   the	  
tasks	  described,	  most	  of	  the	  data	  in	  this	  thesis	  were	  found	  to	  be	  positively	  skewed	  and	  
were	   corrected	   using	   a	   log	   transformation	   (base-­‐10).	   On	   each	   occasion	   throughout,	  
this	  is	  indicated	  in	  the	  relevant	  results	  section.	  
	  
A	   one-­‐way	   repeated-­‐measures	   analysis	   of	   variance	   (ANOVA),	   with	   6	   levels	   of	   delay,	  
was	   conducted	   on	   the	   log-­‐transformed	   data.	   	  Mauchly's	   test	   indicated	   that	   the	  
assumption	  of	  sphericity	  had	  been	  violated	  (ϰ²	  (14)	  =	  27.54,	  p	  <	  .05;	  therefore	  degrees	  
of	  freedom	  were	  corrected	  using	  a	  Greenhouse-­‐Geisser	  estimate	  of	  sphericity	  (ε	  =	  .74).	  
The	   results	   showed	   that	  there	  was	  a	   significant	  effect	  of	   reinforcement	  delay	  on	   the	  
distance	   travelled	   during	   the	   post-­‐discovery	   period,	  F(3.7,	   88.69)	   =	   6.87,	   p	   <	  
.001.	   	  Figure	   2.3	   shows	   that	   the	   effect	   of	   delay	  was	   to	   increase	   the	   duration	   of	   the	  
post-­‐discovery	   period.	  Bonferroni	   corrected	   post	   hoc	   t-­‐tests	   revealed	   that	   the	   0-­‐ms	  
condition	  differed	  significantly	  from	  the	  75-­‐ms	  condition	  (t(26)	  =	  3.11,	  p	  <	  .05)	  and	  that	  





Figure	  2.4	  Mean	  distance	  travelled	  during	  the	  post-­‐discovery	  period	  (and	  standard	  error)	  for	  the	  6	  levels	  of	  delayed	  
audio	  reinforcement.	  Values	  are	  back-­‐transformed	  from	  the	  log	  transformation.	  
	  
Instances	   of	   reinforcement	   (hits)	   during	   the	   post-­‐discovery	  
period	  
As	   expected,	   the	   distance	   data	  were	   sensitive	   to	   an	   effect	   of	   delay	   but	   contained	   a	  
large	  amount	  of	  variance,	  especially	  in	  the	  longer	  delay	  conditions.	  The	  ability	  to	  play	  
back	   individual	   movement	   traces	   made	   it	   possible	   to	   look	   for	   potential	   sources	   of	  
variance	  in	  the	  behaviour.	  One	  issue	  identified	  was	  that	  participants	  would	  often	  move	  
into	  the	  reinforced	  area	  and	  receive	  reinforcement	  but	  then	  seemingly	  lose	  their	  way,	  
resulting	   in	   large	  distance	  scores,	  despite	   the	   fact	   that	  on	   returning	   the	  correct	  area	  
they	  were	   then	  able	   to	  home	   in	  on	   the	  hotspot	   relatively	  quickly.	  A	  way	  of	   reducing	  
the	   impact	  of	  these	  events	   is	  to	  use	  the	  number	  of	  hits	  as	  a	  performance	  metric.	  An	  
early	   hit	   followed	   by	   lots	   of	   searching	   does	   not	   impact	   the	   total	   number	   of	   hits	   as	  
much	  as	   it	  would	   influence	  other	  metrics	  such	  as	   time	  or	  distance.	  Consequently,	  an	  
analysis	  was	  conducted	  on	  the	  number	  of	  hits	  recorded	  during	  a	  trial:	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  
number	  of	  instances	  of	  reinforcement	  required	  for	  a	  participant	  to	  reach	  the	  learning	  
criterion.	  With	  this	  metric,	  a	  top	  performing	  individual	  would	  require	  fewer	  hits	  (and,	  
















Reinforcement delay (ms) 
44 
 
Once	  again,	  the	  mean	  number	  of	  hits	  for	  each	  delay	  condition	  was	  calculated	  from	  the	  
3	   attempts	   made	   by	   each	   participant.	   A	   one-­‐way	   repeated-­‐measures	   ANOVA	   was	  
conducted	  on	  the	  log-­‐transformed	  data.	  	  Mauchly's	  test	  indicated	  that	  the	  assumption	  
of	  sphericity	  had	  been	  violated	  (ϰ²	  (14)	  =	  30.69,	  p	  <	  .05;	  therefore	  degrees	  of	  freedom	  
were	  corrected	  using	  Greenhouse-­‐Geisser	  estimates	  of	  sphericity	  (ε	  =	  .68).	  	  The	  results	  
show	  that	  there	  was	  a	  significant	  effect	  of	  reinforcement	  delay	  on	  the	  number	  of	  hits	  
during	  the	  post-­‐discovery	  period,	  F(3.4,	  81.47)	  =	  13.88,	  p	  <	  .001.	  	  Figure	  2.4	  shows	  that	  
for	   longer	   reinforcement	   delays,	   more	   instances	   of	   reinforcement	   were	   required	   in	  
order	  to	  bring	  a	  trial	  to	  an	  end.	  Bonferroni	  corrected	  post	  hoc	  t-­‐tests	  revealed	  that	  the	  
number	  of	  hits	  for	  the	  0-­‐ms	  condition	  differed	  significantly	  from	  the	  75-­‐ms	  condition	  
(t(26)	  =	  4.12,	  p	  <	  .05)	  and	  that	  the	  75-­‐ms	  condition	  differed	  significantly	  from	  the	  150-­‐
ms	  condition	  (t(26)	  =	  3.05,	  p	  <	  .05).	  A	  further	  comparison	  was	  made	  between	  the	  150-­‐




Figure	  2.5	  Mean	  number	  of	  hits	   (and	  standard	  error)	   for	   the	  6	   levels	  of	  delayed	  audio	   reinforcement.	  Values	  are	  
back-­‐transformed	  from	  the	  log	  transformation.	  
	  	  	  
Speed	  during	  the	  post-­‐discovery	  period	  
Whilst	   the	   length	   of	   the	   delay	   period	  was	   short	   in	   all	   conditions,	   the	   effects	   of	   the	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participant.	   During	   development	   and	   piloting	   of	   the	   task,	   all	   of	   the	   delay	   conditions	  
were	  tested	  and	  the	  general	   impression	  when	  experiencing	  a	  condition	  with	  delayed	  
reinforcement	   was	   one	   of	   frustration,	   almost	   as	   if	   the	   target	   position	   was	   moving,	  
particularly	  for	  delays	  in	  excess	  of	  200	  ms.	  This	  experience	  of	  frustration	  was	  echoed	  
by	  many	   of	   the	   participants	   in	   the	   experiment,	   though	   none	   of	   them	  were	   able	   to	  
guess	  what	  was	  being	  manipulated.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  manipulation	  was	  noticeable,	  at	  
least	   to	   some	   people,	   raises	   the	   possibility	   that	   participants	   might	   have	   adopted	   a	  
strategy	  either	  consciously	  or	  unconsciously.	  If	  this	  was	  the	  case	  then	  a	  basic	  check	  is	  
to	  test	  whether	  speed	  varies	  depending	  on	  the	  amount	  of	  delay	  experienced.	  To	  this	  
end,	  speed	  was	  calculated	  in	  terms	  of	  screen	  units	  per	  second	  for	  the	  post-­‐discovery	  
period.	  A	  one-­‐way	  repeated-­‐measures	  ANOVA	  was	  conducted.	  The	  results	  (figure	  2.5)	  
showed	   that	  there	   was	   no	   effect	   of	   reinforcement	   delay	   on	   speed	   during	   the	   post-­‐
discovery	  period,	  F(5,	  120)	  =	  1.23,	  p	  =	  .3.	  
	  
	  
Figure	  2.6	  Mean	  speed	  (and	  standard	  error)	  for	  the	  6	  levels	  of	  delayed	  audio	  reinforcement.	  
	  
Discussion	  
The	  results	  of	  experiment	  1	  revealed	  an	  effect	  of	   reinforcement	  delay	  on	   learning	  at	  
just	  75	  ms.	  Even	  allowing	  for	  any	  additional	  delay	  caused	  by	  latencies	  in	  the	  apparatus,	  
this	  still	  puts	  the	  effective	  delay	  at	  around	  100	  ms.	  If	  this	  type	  of	  learning	  is	  dependent	  
on	   the	   short	   latency	  dopamine	   response,	   as	   argued	  by	  Redgrave	   and	  Gurney	   (2006)	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having	  a	  longer	  latency	  dopamine	  response.	  The	  fact	  that	  this	  delay	  is	  shorter	  than	  the	  
time	  it	  would	  take	  for	  a	  saccade	  and	  the	  necessary	  processing	  that	  would	  be	  required	  
to	   identify	   the	   source	   suggests	   any	   costs	   associated	   with	   generating	   the	   dopamine	  
response	  indiscriminately	  (i.e.	  without	  having	  first	  processed	  identifying	  characteristics	  
of	   the	   stimulus)	   would	   be	   offset	   by	   the	   considerable	   costs	   associated	   with	   a	   more	  
complex	  credit	  assignment	  problem.	  This	  finding,	  therefore,	  adds	  greater	  credibility	  to	  
claims	   that	   the	   dopamine	   response	   is	   short	   latency	   as	   a	   means	   of	   minimising	   the	  
amount	  of	   irrelevant	   contaminating	  motor	  and	  contextual	   input	   that	   is	   reinforced	   in	  
the	  striatum	  following	  the	  occurrence	  of	  a	  novel	  stimulus	  (Redgrave	  &	  Gurney,	  2006;	  
Redgrave	  et	  al.	  2008).	  
	  
The	   sensitivity	   to	   delay	   in	   the	   current	   task	   is	   far	   higher	   than	   is	   generally	   found	   in	  
reinforcement	   learning	   paradigms	   (Anderson	  &	   Elcoro,	   2007;	   Black,	   Belluzzi	  &	   Stein,	  
1985;	   Elsner	   &	   Hommel,	   2004;	   Hollerman	   &	   Schultz,	   1998;	   Lattal	   &	   Gleeson,	   1990;	  
Okouchi,	  2009;	  Renner,	  1964;	  Shanks	  &	  Dickinson,	  1991;	  Shanks	  et	  al.	  1989;	  Sizemore	  
&	   Lattal,	   1977;	   Snycerski,	   Laraway,	   Huitema	   &	   Poling,	   2004;	   Snycerski	   et	   al.,	   2005;	  
Stubbs,	   1969)	   and	  much	  more	   in	   line	  with	  what	   is	   reported	   for	   supervised	   learning	  
paradigms	  (Foulkes	  &	  Miall,	  2000;	  Held,	  Efstathiou,	  &	  Greene,	  1966;	  Kitazawa,	  Kohno	  
&	   Uka,	   1995;	   Miall	   &	   Jackson,	   2006;	   Miall,	   Weir,	   &	   Stein,	   1985).	   Furthermore,	  
comparisons	   between	   pairs	   of	   conditions	   revealed	   that	   the	   effect	   was	   not	   simply	   a	  
delay	  versus	  no	  delay	  effect	  and	  that	  additional	  delays	  within	  the	  range	  tested	  had	  an	  
added	  impact	  on	  performance.	  This	  is	  important	  because	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  
two	  types	  of	  learning	  tends	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  informational	  content	  of	  the	  feedback	  that	  is	  
provided.	   However,	   the	   current	   results	   suggest	   that,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   delay,	   it	   is	   the	  
specific	   task	  demands	   that	   are	  more	   important.	   This	   result	  widens	   the	   already	   large	  
range	  of	  sensitivities	  to	  delay	  that	  have	  been	  observed	  in	  the	  reinforcement	   learning	  
literature	  and	  calls	   into	  question	   the	  extent	   to	  which	  we	  can	   speak	  of	   the	  effects	  of	  
delayed	  reinforcement	  on	   learning	  and	  response	  acquisition.	  The	  effects	  of	  delay	  are	  
perhaps	  better	  described	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  task	  properties	  on	  which	  they	  are	  measured.	  
	  
A	  useful	  property	  of	  the	  current	  paradigm	  was	  the	  resistance	  to	  the	  use	  of	  strategies	  
on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  participants.	  The	  fact	  that	  there	  was	  no	  effect	  of	  delay	  on	  speed	  and	  
that	  none	  of	   the	  participants	  guessed	  the	   independent	  variable	  suggests	   that	  people	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weren’t	  reacting	  systematically	  to	  delay	  by	  adopting	  strategies	  to	  cope	  with	  it.	  This	  is	  
important	   because	   in	   supervised	   learning	   tasks,	   where	   targets	   are	   not	   hidden,	  
researchers	   have	   found	   that	   people	   have	   a	   tendency	   to	   adopt	   strategies	   such	   as	   a	  
‘move	   and	  wait’	   approach	   in	   order	   to	   cope	  with	   delay	   (Sheridan,	   1993;	   Sheridan	   &	  
Ferrell,	   1963).	   In	   the	   current	   study,	   such	   strategies	   would	   have	   interfered	   with	   our	  
ability	   to	   interpret	   the	   effect	   of	   delay	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   low-­‐level	   neural	   mechanism	  
offered	  by	  Redgrave	  and	  Gurney	  (2006)	  as	  an	  explanation	  for	  the	  acquisition	  of	  novel	  
actions.	  However,	   it	   is	   nonetheless	  possible	   that	   the	  effect	   found	   in	   this	   experiment	  
was	  associated	  with	  high-­‐level	  cognitive/declarative	  processes	  and	   it	   is	   impossible	   to	  
rule	  this	  out	  given	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  current	  paradigm.	  
	  
Having	  tested	  the	  paradigm	  with	  audio	  stimuli	  and	  finding	   it	  to	  be	  highly	  sensitive	  to	  
the	  effects	  of	  delay,	  it	  was	  decided	  that	  the	  experiment	  should	  be	  repeated	  with	  visual	  
stimuli	   to	   test	   whether	   the	   result	   was	   robust	   and	   also	   to	   ascertain	   whether	   the	  
modality	  of	  the	  stimuli	  is	  important	  at	  such	  short	  delay	  durations.	  As	  will	  be	  explained	  
in	   experiment	   2,	   Redgrave	   and	   Gurney	   (2006)	   make	   particular	   reference	   to	   visual	  
stimuli	   and	   the	   activity	   of	   the	   superior	   colliculus	   at	   less	   than	  100	  ms.	   Consequently,	  
testing	  the	  effects	  with	  visual	  stimuli	  will	  provide	  further	   information	  relevant	  to	  this	  
theory.	  
	  
Experiment	   2:	   within-­‐trial	   repetition	   of	   visual	  
reinforcement	  
Experiment	  1	  demonstrated	  a	  high	  sensitivity	  to	  short	  delays,	  consistent	  with	  Redgrave	  
and	   Gurney’s	   (2006)	   theory;	   however,	   it	   relied	   on	   audio	   stimuli	   for	   reinforcement.	  
Redgrave	  and	  Gurney	  (2006)	  and	  Redgrave	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  make	  specific	  reference	  to	  the	  
superior	  colliculus	  and	  visual	  stimuli	  as	  the	  source	  of	  sensory	  input	  on	  which	  the	  phasic	  
dopamine	  response	  might	  depend.	  As	  noted	  by	  Redgrave	  et	  al.,	   the	  claim	   is	  not	  that	  
action	   learning	   is	   modality	   specific;	   rather	   the	   emphasis	   on	   visual	   input	   from	   the	  
superior	  colliculus	  reflects	  the	  fact	  that	  most	  previous	  research	  has	  involved	  the	  use	  of	  
visual	  stimuli.	  Response	  latencies	  in	  the	  superior	  colliculus	  are	  unique	  amongst	  visual	  
areas	  in	  that	  they	  precede	  even	  the	  short	  latency	  dopamine	  response	  in	  the	  substantia	  
nigra,	  indicating	  that	  they	  could	  provide	  the	  input	  that	  triggers	  this	  activity	  (Comoli	  et	  
48 
 
al.,	   2003).	   Furthermore,	   it	   has	   been	   found	   that	   the	   superior	   colliculus	   has	   a	   greater	  
ability	  to	  stimulate	  nigral	  neurons	  as	  compared	  to	  cortical	  visual	  areas	  (Comoli	  et	  al.,	  
2003),	   thus	  adding	   support	   to	   the	   idea	   that	   these	  areas	  of	   the	  brain	   contribute	   to	  a	  
single	   learning	  mechanism.	   In	   light	   of	   this,	   it	  was	   decided	   that	   a	   version	  of	   the	   task	  
utilising	  visual	  stimuli	  should	  be	  run.	  This	  would	  not	  only	  provide	  data	  that	  is	  relevant	  
to	  action	  learning	  mediated	  by	  input	  from	  the	  superior	  colliculus,	  but	  would	  allow	  for	  a	  
comparison	   of	   learning	   dependent	   on	   stimuli	   from	   two	   different	  modalities.	   A	   final	  
motivation	  for	  this	  version	  of	  the	  task	  was	  to	  pave	  the	  way	  for	  future	  research	  within	  
this	   author’s	   research	   group.	   Future	   experiments	   hope	   to	   compare	   action	   learning	  
with	  visual	  stimuli	  to	  which	  the	  superior	  colliculus	  is	  minimally	  sensitive	  versus	  stimuli	  
to	  which	  cortical	  visual	  areas	  are	  minimally	  sensitive.	  
	  
Method	  
The	  method	  and	  design	  were	   identical	  to	  that	  employed	  in	  experiment	  1	  except	  that	  
the	  reinforcement	  signal	  was	  visual	  instead	  of	  audio.	  	  
	  
Participants	  	  
24	  people	   (22	   female)	  participated	   in	  all	   conditions	  of	   this	  experiment.	   	  Ages	   ranged	  
from	   18	   to	   23	   years	  with	   a	  mean	   age	   of	   19	   (SD.	   =	   1.4	   years).	   	  Participants	  were	   all	  
undergraduate	   students	   at	   the	   University	   of	   Sheffield	   who	   took	   part	   in	   return	   for	  
credits	  in	  the	  department's	  research	  participation	  scheme.	  	  All	  subjects	  were	  naive	  to	  
the	  purpose	  of	  the	  experiment.	  
	  
Visual	  reinforcement	  stimuli	  
Any	  movement	   into	   the	   hotspot	  was	   reinforced	   by	   a	   short	   duration	   (17	  ms)	   screen	  
flash.	  A	  single	  flash	  consisted	  of	  the	  whole	  monitor	  area,	  which	  was	  black	  by	  default,	  
turning	   completely	   white	   and	   then	   back	   to	   black	   again.	   Whilst	   a	   full	   screen	   flash,	  
viewed	  straight	  on,	  was	  too	   large	  to	  be	  a	  stimulus	  to	  which	  collicular	  neurons	  would	  
respond	  maximally,	  it	  was	  used	  to	  avoid	  any	  misleading	  (or,	  indeed,	  revealing)	  location	  
information	  that	  might	   interfere	  with	  the	  task	  of	   finding	  the	  correct	   joystick	  position	  
and	   the	   high	   change	   in	   luminance	   with	   each	   stimulus	   presentation	   ensured	   that	   it	  
would	  be	  a	  stimulus	  to	  which	  the	  superior	  colliculus	  would	  be	  sensitive	  (Sparks,	  1986).	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This	   is	   particularly	   important	   when	   we	   consider	   the	   high	   sensitivity	   of	   the	   superior	  
colliculus	   to	   stimulus	   location	   (Sparks,	   1986;	   Wurtz	   &	   Albano,	   1980).	   In	   practice,	  
participants	  tended	  to	  adopt	  a	  similar	  attitude	  in	  this	  task	  to	  that	  adopted	  in	  the	  audio	  
task	   and	   paid	  most	   attention	   to	   the	  movement	   of	   their	   hand.	   The	   screen	   flash	  was	  




Distance	  travelled	  during	  the	  post-­‐discovery	  period	  
Once	  again,	  the	  data	  describing	  the	  distance	  travelled	  were	  the	  first	  to	  be	  investigated.	  
A	   one-­‐way	   repeated-­‐measures	   ANOVA,	   with	   6	   levels,	   was	   conducted	   on	   the	   log-­‐
transformed	   data	   in	   order	   to	   investigate	   the	   effect	   of	   reinforcement	   delay.	   The	  
analysis	  revealed	  that	  there	  was	  a	  significant	  effect	  of	  delay	  on	  the	  distance	  travelled	  
during	  the	  post-­‐discovery	  period,	  F(5,	  100)	  =	  7.19,	  p	  <	  .001.	  	  Figure	  2.7	  shows	  that	  the	  
general	   effect	   of	   delay	   was	   to	   increase	   the	   duration	   of	   the	   post-­‐discovery	   period,	  
though	   the	   clearest	   effect	   was	   between	   the	   no	   delay	   and	   all	   other	   delay	  
conditions.	  Bonferroni	   corrected	   post	   hoc	   t-­‐tests	   revealed	   that	   the	   0-­‐ms	   condition	  
differed	   significantly	   from	  all	   other	   conditions:	   75-­‐ms	   (t(23)	   =	  3.79,	  p	   <	   .05);	   150-­‐ms	  
(t(23)	  =	  3.34,	  p	  <	  .05);	  225-­‐ms	  (t(23)	  =	  4.79,	  p	  <	  .05);	  300-­‐ms	  (t(23)	  =	  5.14,	  p	  <	  .05);	  375-­‐
ms	  (t(20)	  =	  5.92,	  p	  <	  .05).	  A	  further	  comparison	  between	  the	  300-­‐ms	  and	  the	  375-­‐ms	  






Figure	  2.7	  Mean	  distance	  travelled	  during	  the	  post-­‐discovery	  period	  (and	  standard	  error)	  for	  the	  6	  levels	  of	  delayed	  
visual	  reinforcement.	  Values	  are	  back-­‐transformed	  from	  the	  log	  transformation.	  
	  
Total	  number	  of	  hits	  recorded	  during	  the	  post-­‐discovery	  period	  
Once	  again,	   the	  distance	  metric	   contained	  a	   considerable	  amount	  of	   variance,	   so	  an	  
analysis	  of	  the	  hits	  metric	  was	  performed.	  A	  one-­‐way	  repeated-­‐measures	  ANOVA	  was	  
conducted	  on	  the	  log-­‐transformed	  data.	  	  The	  results	  show	  that	  there	  was	  a	  significant	  
effect	   of	   reinforcement	   delay	   on	   the	   number	   of	   hits	   during	   the	   post-­‐discovery	  
period,	  F(5,	   100)	   =	   14.84,	  p	   <	   .001.	   	  Figure	   2.8	   shows	   the	   result	   from	   the	   audio	   task	  
(experiment	  1)	  plotted	  alongside	  the	  current	  visual	  results.	   Just	  as	  was	  the	  case	  with	  
the	  audio	   task,	   the	  effect	  of	   the	   reinforcement	  delay	  was	   to	   increase	   the	  number	  of	  
hits	  during	   the	  post-­‐discovery	  period.	  Bonferroni	   corrected	  post	  hoc	   t-­‐tests	   revealed	  
that	  the	  0-­‐ms	  condition	  was	  significantly	  different	  to	  the	  75-­‐ms	  (t(23)	  =	  4.18,	  p	  <	  0.05),	  
150-­‐ms	  ((23)	  =	  4.56,	  p	  <	  0.05)	  and	  the	  225-­‐ms	  ((23)	  =	  6.14,	  p	  <	  0.05)	  conditions.	  Further	  
comparisons	   revealed	   that	   the	   75-­‐ms	   condition	   did	   not	   differ	   significantly	   from	   the	  
225-­‐ms	  (t(23)	  =	  2.05,	  p	  >	  0.05)	  condition	  but	  did	  differ	  from	  both	  the	  300-­‐ms	  (t(23)	  =	  
3.74,	  p	  <	  0.05)	  and	  375-­‐ms	  (t(20)	  =	  4.48,	  p	  <	  0.05)	  conditions.	  And	  finally,	  two	  further	  
comparisons	  revealed	  that	  the	  150-­‐ms	  did	  not	  differ	  significantly	  from	  either	  the	  300-­‐
ms	  (t(23)	  =	  2.78,	  p	  >	  0.05)	  or	  the	  375-­‐ms	  (t(20)	  =	  2.92,	  p	  >	  0.05)	  conditions.	  Thus,	  once	  
again,	   the	   effect	   was	   not	   simply	   a	   delay	   versus	   no	   delay	   effect	   and	   the	   additional	  















Figure	   2.8	   Mean	   number	   of	   hits	   during	   the	   post-­‐discovery	   period	   (and	   standard	   error)	   for	   the	   6	   levels	   of	  
reinforcement	   delay	   in	   experiments	   1	   (audio,	   shown	   in	   black)	   and	   2	   (visual,	   shown	   in	   red).	   Values	   are	   back-­‐
transformed	  from	  the	  log	  transformation.	  
	  
Speed	  during	  the	  post-­‐discovery	  period	  
Just	  as	  with	  experiment	  one,	  speed	  was	  calculated	  in	  terms	  of	  screen	  units	  per	  second	  
for	  the	  post-­‐discovery	  period.	  A	  one-­‐way	  repeated-­‐measures	  ANOVA	  was	  conducted.	  
The	  results	  showed	  that	  there	  was	  no	  effect	  of	   reinforcement	  delay	  on	  speed	  during	  
the	  post-­‐discovery	  period,	  F(5,	  100)	  =	  1.87,	  p	  =	   .12	  (means	  and	  standard	  error	  of	  the	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The	  results	  of	  experiment	  2	  were	  largely	  in	  agreement	  with	  the	  first	  experiment.	  Once	  
again,	   there	   was	   an	   effect	   of	   delay	   at	   just	   75	   ms,	   which	   lends	   further	   support	   to	  
Redgrave	   and	   Gurney’s	   (2006)	   theory.	   The	   results	   also	   indicated	   that	   delay	   had	   an	  
additional	   effect	   for	  durations	   in	  excess	  of	  75	  ms	  demonstrating	   that	   the	  effect	  was	  
not	   simply	  a	  delay	   versus	  no	  delay	   contrast.	   There	  was	  no	  effect	  of	  delay	  on	   speed,	  
once	   again,	   suggesting	   that	   participants	   (none	   of	   whom	   were	   able	   to	   guess	   the	  
independent	  variable)	  were	  not	  using	  strategies	  to	  adjust	  their	  behaviour	   in	  order	  to	  
cope	  with	  delay	  and	  therefore	  providing	  some	  assurance	  that	  the	  task	  was	  capable	  of	  
measuring	   low-­‐level,	   nondeclarative	   learning	   effects.	   Most	   importantly,	   the	   results	  
showed	   that	   the	   sensitivity	   to	   delay	   at	   durations	   close	   to	   the	   latency	   of	   the	   phasic	  
response	  of	  dopamine	  neurons	  held	  for	  visual	  stimuli	  (large	  changes	  in	  luminance)	  to	  
which	  the	  superior	  colliculus	  would	  have	  been	  sensitive	  (Sparks,	  1986).	  This,	  therefore,	  
provides	   support	   for	   the	   specific	   account	   of	   an	   action	   acquisition	   mechanism	   that	  
relies	  on	  the	  very	  short	  latency	  input	  from	  the	  superior	  colliculus.	  
	  
General	  Discussion	  
There	   were	   three	   main	   reasons	   for	   conducting	   the	   experiments	   described	   in	   this	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experiments	  allow	  for	  an	  initial	  assessment	  of	  it	  as	  a	  new	  behavioural	  paradigm	  for	  the	  
investigation	   of	   action	   acquisition.	   Secondly,	   the	   experiments	   provided	   a	   means	   of	  
investigating	  sensitivity	  to	  delay	  in	  a	  task	  that	  relies	  on	  feedback	  delivered	  in	  a	  fashion	  
consistent	  with	  reinforcement	  learning	  and	  yet	  demanding	  of	  responses	  similar	  to	  the	  
kind	  normally	   found	   in	  adaptation	   learning	  or	   supervised	   learning	   tasks.	  And	   thirdly,	  
the	  experiments	  allowed	  for	  a	  test	  of	  an	  effect	  of	  delay	  at	  a	  duration	  of	  less	  than	  100	  
ms	  as	  a	  way	  of	   investigating	  the	   idea	  that	  the	  phasic	  activity	  of	  dopamine	  neurons	   is	  
short	   latency	   as	   an	   evolved	   means	   of	   reducing	   contamination	   when	   associating	  
outcomes	  with	   the	  movements	   that	   caused	   them.	   These	   three	   issues	   are	   discussed	  
below	  in	  reverse	  order.	  
	  
High	  delay	  sensitivity	  and	  time-­‐stamping	  mechanisms	  
It’s	   easy	   to	   appreciate	   how	   a	   neural	  mechanism	  designed	   to	   stamp-­‐in	   recent	  motor	  
output,	   following	  a	  novel	   stimulus,	  might	  have	  evolved	   to	   function	  at	  extremely	   low	  
latencies.	   The	   advantage	   of	   ignoring	   causally	   irrelevant	   motor	   output	   by	   promptly	  
time-­‐stamping	   behaviour	   that	   led	   up	   to	   a	   stimulus	   is	   conceivably	   so	   great	   that	   it	  
outweighs	   any	   gains	   that	   might	   come	   from	   waiting	   for	   sensory	   input	   that	   has	  
undergone	  a	  greater	  degree	  of	  processing.	  Consequently,	  the	  argument	  from	  Redgrave	  
and	   Gurney	   (2006)	   and	   Redgrave	   et	   al.	   (2008),	   that	   short	   latency	   collicular	   input	  
prompts	   short	   latency	   activity	   of	   dopamine	   neurons	   as	   part	   of	   a	   system	   involved	   in	  
action	   acquisition,	   is	   a	   compelling	   one:	   it	   might	   be	   better	   to	   learn	   first	   and	   ask	  
questions	  later.	  
	  
Whilst	  we	  can’t	  directly	  increase	  the	  latency	  of	  dopamine	  neurons	  in	  human	  subjects,	  
it	   is	   possible	   to	   introduce	   a	   delay	   between	   an	   action	   and	   the	   subsequent	   stimulus.	  
Even	   though	   the	   stimulus	   would	   not	   be	   contingent	   on	   the	   activity	   that	   took	   place	  
during	  the	  delay	  period,	  there	  would	  be	  no	  way	  for	  an	  indiscriminate	  low-­‐level	  learning	  
mechanism	  to	  take	  this	  into	  account	  on	  its	  own.	  We	  might,	  therefore,	  assume	  that	  at	  
least	  some	  of	  the	  irrelevant	  behaviour	  from	  the	  delay	  period	  will	  be	  stamped-­‐in.	  So,	  if	  
we	   introduce	   delay	   into	   a	   task	   that	   relies	   heavily	   enough	   on	   this	   kind	   of	   low-­‐level	  
learning	  mechanism,	  then	  we	  should	  expect	   it	  to	  interfere	  with	  learning	  even	  at	  very	  
short	   durations.	   In	   both	   of	   the	   experiments	   detailed	   in	   this	   chapter,	   an	   effect	   was	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found	  at	  delays	  in	  the	  region	  of	  75	  to	  100	  ms	  in	  duration.	  Although	  this	  doesn’t	  prove	  
that	   a	   particular	   brain	   region	   was	   involved	   in	   the	   effect,	   it	   shows	   that	   there	   is	   a	  
learning	   mechanism,	   of	   some	   description,	   that	   is	   so	   sensitive	   to	   the	   timing	   of	  
movements	  and	  sensory	  outcomes	  that	  it	  would	  benefit	  from	  short	  neural	  latencies	  of	  
the	   kind	   discussed	   by	   Redgrave	   and	  Gurney	   (2006).	   Certainly,	   the	   effect	   found	   here	  
offers	  more	  convincing	   support	   for	   this	   theory	   than	   the	  comparatively	   long	  duration	  
delay	  effects	  found	  in	  previous	  experiments	  involving	  reinforcement	  learning	  cited	  by	  
Redgrave	   and	   Gurney	   (e.g.	   Elsner	   &	   Hommel,	   2004;	   Hollerman	   &	   Schultz,	   1998).	  
However,	   this	   in	   itself	   raises	   questions	   as	   to	   why	   the	   sensitivity	   in	   the	   current	  
experiment	   should	   be	   so	   much	   greater	   than	   in	   previous	   studies	   of	   reinforcement	  
learning.	  
	  
Differing	  sensitivities	  to	  delay	  depending	  on	  the	  type	  of	  motor	  
task	  
We	   hardly	   need	   to	   run	   an	   experiment	   to	   appreciate	   that	   the	   impact	   of	   delay	   on	  
learning	  and	  performance	   is	   likely	   to	  be	  a	  negative	  one	   in	  most	  situations.	  However,	  
predicting	   the	   relative	   impact	   of	   different	   delay	  durations	  depending	  on	   the	   type	  of	  
learning	  or	  activity	  being	  undertaken	  is	  rather	  less	  straightforward.	  An	  apparent	  split	  in	  
the	  overall	  sensitivity	  to	  delay	  seen	  in	  motor	  control	  and	  motor	  adaptation	  paradigms	  
versus	   reinforcement	   learning	   paradigms	   is	   difficult	   to	   interpret	   due	   to	   major	  
differences	  in	  the	  response	  mechanisms	  involved.	  Generally	  speaking,	  the	  former	  rely	  
on	  tasks	  that	  demand	  complex	  or	  highly	  accurate	  responses	  such	  as	  precise	  reaching	  
movements	  or	  target	  tracking.	  The	  latter,	  by	  contrast,	  tend	  to	  rely	  on	  simple	  discrete	  
responses	  that	  place	  no	  emphasis	  on	  accuracy,	  such	  as	  button	  pressing.	  Consequently,	  
we	  can’t	  come	  to	  any	  conclusions	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  apparent	  difference	  in	  the	  effect	  
of	  delay	  is	  due	  to	  the	  different	  learning	  mechanisms	  being	  employed	  or	  whether	  it	   is	  
due	  to	  the	  response	  requirements	  of	  the	  tasks.	  
	  
By	  employing	  a	  rich	  input	  device	  instead	  of	  button-­‐press	  or	  lever-­‐press	  responses,	  the	  
task	   described	   in	   this	   chapter	  minimised	   one	   of	   the	  major	   differences	   between	   the	  
experimental	   approaches.	   The	   results	   show	   that,	   in	   terms	   of	   overall	   sensitivity	   to	  
delay,	   the	   task	  described	   in	   this	   chapter	  was	  more	   akin	   to	   tasks	   employed	   in	  motor	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control	   (Foulkes	   &	  Miall,	   2000;	   Miall	   &	   Jackson,	   2006;	   Miall	   et	   al.,	   1985)	   or	   motor	  
adaptation	   paradigms	   (Held	   et	   al.,	   1966;	   Kitazawa	   et	   al.,	   1995)	   than	   reinforcement	  
learning	  paradigms	  (Elsner	  &	  Hommel,	  2004;	  Shanks	  &	  Dickinson,	  1991;	  Shanks	  et	  al.,	  
1989),	   and	  yet	   it	  was	  designed	   to	  be	  a	   test	  of	   reinforcement	   learning,	  with	   stimulus	  
characteristics	   that	   one	   would	   expect	   to	   find	   in	   such	   a	   task.	   For	   instance,	   all	  
reinforcement	   signals	   were	   qualitative,	   indicating	   whether	   or	   not	   the	   correct	  
movement	  had	  been	  produced	  but	  providing	  no	   information	  on	   the	   relative	   level	   of	  
performance:	   the	   output	   only	   ever	   indicated	   whether	   or	   not	   the	   joystick	   had	   been	  
moved	   into	  the	  correct	  position.	  Reinforcement	  was	  also	  contingent	  on	  behaviour:	   if	  
an	  individual	  failed	  to	  move	  the	  joystick	  into	  the	  hotspot,	  they	  would	  have	  received	  no	  
feedback	  at	  all.	  The	  question	   is:	  what	  can	  such	  a	   finding	  tell	  us	  about	  the	  distinction	  
between	  these	  two	  kinds	  of	  learning?	  
	  
There	   is	   much	   to	   be	   said	   for	   drawing	   a	   theoretical	   distinction	   between	   supervised	  
learning	  and	  reinforcement	  learning	  (Jordan	  &	  Rumelhart,	  1992;	  Wolpert,	  Ghahramani	  
&	  Flanagan,	  2001).	  However,	   in	  developing	  a	  task	  that	   involves	  rich	  movements	  with	  
feedback	   of	   the	   kind	   found	   in	   reinforcement	   learning,	   there	   is	   a	   sense	   in	  which	   the	  
boundaries	  between	  the	  two	  types	  of	  learning	  have	  been	  methodologically	  blurred	  in	  
the	   current	   task.	   From	   a	   participant’s	   perspective,	   the	   within-­‐trial	   repetition	   of	  
reinforcement	  found	  in	  these	  experiments	  demanded	  the	  kind	  of	  online	  readjustment	  
of	  performance	  that	  we	  would	  not	  typically	  associate	  with	  reinforcement	  learning	  and	  
yet	   the	   feedback	   provided	   retained	   characteristics	   associated	   with	   reinforcement	  
learning.	   This	   version	   of	   the	   task,	   therefore,	   raises	   the	   question	   of	   whether	   the	  
distinction	  between	   supervised	  and	   reinforcement	   learning	   carries	  much	  meaning	  at	  
the	  behavioural	   level.	   	   It	   is	  possible	   that	   the	  distinctions	  we	  draw	  between	  different	  
types	  of	  learning	  and	  their	  associated	  forms	  of	  feedback	  do	  not	  correspond	  to	  the	  way	  
in	  which	   the	   brain	   deals	  with	   this	   information.	   Certainly,	   the	   current	   study	   suggests	  
that,	  at	  the	  behavioural	  level,	  sensitivity	  to	  delay	  has	  more	  to	  do	  with	  whether	  or	  not	  
reinforcement	   is	   delivered	   rapidly	   as	   an	   action	   is	   being	  produced	  as	  opposed	   to	   the	  
informational	  properties	  of	  the	  reinforcement.	  	  
	  
There	   is	  evidence	   that	  motor	  control	  with	  delayed	  visual	   feedback	  can	   improve	  with	  
considerable	   practice,	   though	   performance	   always	   remains	   far	   below	   that	   achieved	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with	   immediate	   feedback	   (Miall	  &	   Jackson,	   2006;	   Sheridan,	   1993).	   Such	   findings	   are	  
primarily	  from	  supervised	  learning	  tasks,	  where	  the	  current	  position	  and	  the	  target	  are	  
always	  visible	  to	  the	  agent.	  As	  a	  means	  of	  further	  understanding	  the	  type	  of	  learning	  
that	   is	   being	   tested	   in	   the	   current	   task	   and	   the	   more	   general	   differences	   between	  
supervised	   learning	   and	   reinforcement	   learning,	   it	  would	  be	   informative	   to	  measure	  
the	  ability	  of	  people	   to	   improve	   their	  performance	  with	  delayed	   reinforcement	  over	  
many	  trials	  and	  many	  experimental	  sessions.	  
	  
Audio	  versus	  visual	  reinforcement	  
One	  possibility	   for	   the	   similarity	   in	   the	  effects	  of	   audio	  and	  visual	   stimuli	   is	   that	   the	  
experiment	   simply	   wasn’t	   calibrated	   to	   detect	   any	   such	   differences.	   Previous	  
psychophysics	   research	   (Jaśkowski,	   Jaroszyk	  &	  Hojan-­‐Jezierska,	  1990),	  has	   found	  that	  
reactions	   times	   to	   audio	   stimuli	   are	   approximately	   40	   ms	   faster	   than	   those	   to	  
equivalent	  visual	  stimuli.	  On	  this	  basis,	  one	  might	  have	  expected	  to	  find	  a	  difference	  in	  
the	  joystick	  task,	  especially	  in	  light	  of	  the	  large	  number	  of	  stimulus	  presentations	  that	  
occurred	   in	   each	   trial.	   However,	   when	   audio	   and	   visual	   stimuli	   are	   well	   above	  
threshold,	   as	  was	   the	   case	   here,	   there	   appear	   to	   be	   no	   such	  differences	   in	   reaction	  
times	  (Kohfeld,	  1971).	  Consequently,	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  different	  modalities	  could	  have	  
produced	   a	   different	   effect	   unless	   the	   role	   they	   played	   in	   the	   learning	   mechanism	  
being	  tested	  was	  substantially	  different.	  
	  
Assessment	  of	  the	  task	  
The	   intention	  when	   developing	   the	   task	  was	   to	  measure	   learning	   based	   on	   discrete	  
instances	   of	   qualitative	   reinforcement.	   This	   type	   of	   feedback	   could	   only	   provide	  
information	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  correct	  action	  had	  been	  performed	  so	  it	  was	  a	  desirable	  
means	   of	   investigating	   a	   learning	  mechanism	   based	   on	   the	   reinforcement	   of	   recent	  
motor	   output.	   The	   learning	   criterion	  was	   introduced	   as	   a	  means	   of	   determining	   the	  
point	  at	  which	  the	  correct	  position	  of	   the	   joystick	  had	  been	  sufficiently	  well	   learned.	  
The	  combination	  of	   these	   two	   features	  made	   it	  possible	   to	  present	  participants	  with	  
multiple	  new	  learning	  scenarios	  (in	  the	  form	  of	  new	  hotspot	  locations)	  and	  to	  extract	  a	  
performance	  metric	  in	  the	  form	  of	  hits	  that	  was	  resistant	  to	  some	  sources	  of	  variance	  




However,	   efficient	   though	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   task	  was,	   it	   was	   nonetheless	   limited	  
from	  the	  perspective	  of	  making	  use	  of	  the	  rich	  data	  that	  was	  collected.	  In	  essence,	  the	  
action	  being	  learnt	  in	  this	  task	  was	  to	  hold	  the	  joystick	  steady	  in	  a	  particular	  position.	  
Whilst	   the	  end	  position	   is	  well	  defined	   in	   this	   task,	   there	   is	  nothing	   to	   constrain	   the	  
route	   that	   is	   taken	  towards	   the	  hotspot	   following	  each	   instance	  of	   reinforcement.	   In	  
other	  words,	  the	  end	  point	  might	  be	  clearly	  spatially	  defined,	  but	  movement	  towards	  
that	   point	   is	   bound	   to	   vary	   between	   instances	   of	   reinforcement	   as	   the	   participants	  
overshoot	  the	  target	  and	  attempt	  to	  return.	  Figure	  2.10	  illustrates	  this	  point.	  We	  can	  
see	   that	   the	  post	  discovery	  period	   is	   typified	  by	  a	   clustering	  of	  movements	  within	   a	  





Figure	  2.10	  A	  trace	  of	  movements	  during	  the	  post-­‐discovery	  period	  only.	  The	  task	  demands	  are	  such	  that	  they	  don’t	  
encourage	  particular	  shapes	  of	  movement.	  (The	  black	  frame	  depicts	  the	  boundaries	  of	  the	  search	  space.)	  	  
	  
A	  further	  problem	  stemming	  from	  the	  task	  structure	  was	  that	  participants	  were	  never	  
required	  to	  repeat	  a	  particular	  sequence	  of	  movements	  in	   its	  entirety.	   In	  Thorndike’s	  
(1911)	   puzzle-­‐box	   paradigm,	   animals	   were	   required	   to	   perform	   a	   task	   until	   they	  
happened	  upon	  the	  solution,	  at	  which	  point	  they	  were	  placed	  back	  into	  the	  puzzle-­‐box	  
and	  required	  to	  produce	  the	  whole	  sequence	  of	  movements	  again.	  If	  we	  could	  draw	  a	  
movement	  trace	  of	  this	  activity,	  we	  would	  see	  that	  the	  trace	  would	  take	  on	  a	  clearer	  
shape	   as	   trials	   progressed	   and	   movement	   became	   more	   efficient.	   In	   the	   current	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version	  of	  the	  joystick	  task,	  however,	  it	  would	  have	  been	  difficult	  to	  learn	  the	  correct	  
hand	  position	  through	  the	  reinforcement	  of	  particular	  muscle	  movements;	  instead,	  the	  
consistent	  aspect	  of	  behaviour	  was	   the	  particular	   resting	  place	  of	   the	  hand,	  a	  higher	  
level	   motor	   command.	   Whilst	   this	   level	   of	   representation	   is	   something	   that	   the	  
nervous	  system	  is	  more	  than	  capable	  of	  encoding	  (Graziano,	  2006;	  Graziano,	  Taylor	  &	  
Moore,	  2002),	  from	  an	  experimental	  point	  of	  view	  it	  makes	  the	  progression	  of	  learning	  
much	   harder	   to	   decompose	   at	   the	   behavioural	   level.	   A	   potentially	   better	   situation	  
would	  be	  to	  split	   learning	  into	  discrete	  trials	  (i.e.	  between-­‐trial	  as	  opposed	  to	  within-­‐
trial	  repetition	  of	  reinforcement)	  and	  this	  will	  be	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  next	  chapter.	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Chapter	  3:	  contamination,	  delay	  and	  between-­‐trial	  
repetition	  of	  reinforcement	  
This	   chapter	   focuses	   on	   a	   change	   to	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   joystick	   task,	   whereby	  
reinforcement	  is	  repeated	  between	  trials	  rather	  than	  within	  trials.	  Experiment	  3	  details	  
the	  development	  of	  this	  task	  and	   its	  structure	  whilst	  also	   investigating	  the	  possibility	  
that	  target	  size	  might	  be	  utilised	  as	  a	  way	  of	  scaling	  task	  difficulty	  for	  potential	  future	  
investigations	  comparing	  populations	  of	  differing	  abilities.	  Experiment	  4	  details	  a	  study	  
designed	  to	  investigate	  the	  effects	  of	  delay	  with	  this	  new	  task	  structure.	  The	  purpose	  
of	   this	   was	   twofold.	   Firstly,	   it	   provides	   a	  measure	   of	   the	   sensitivity	   to	   delay	   of	   the	  
joystick	  task	  where	  the	  delivery	  of	  reinforcement	  is	  more	  comparable	  to	  that	  used	  in	  
other	  areas	  of	  research.	  Secondly,	  it	  allows	  the	  opportunity	  to	  more	  clearly	  investigate	  
the	  activity	  that	  occurs	  during	  the	  delay	  period	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  investigate	  hypotheses	  
regarding	  the	  contamination	  of	  the	  motor	  record	  during	  action	  acquisition.	  	  
	  
Reasons	   for	   employing	   between-­‐trial	   repetition	   of	  
reinforcement	  
Response	   acquisition	   in	   non-­‐human	   animals	   is	   a	   subject	   that	   has	   received	   much	  
research	   attention	   in	   fields	   associated	  with	   operant	   conditioning	   and	   reinforcement	  
learning.	   At	   least	   some	   of	   this	   interest	   has	   to	   do	   with	   the	   practicalities	   of	   training	  
animals	   to	   produce	   responses	   in	   the	   laboratory	   that	   they	   might	   not	   be	   naturally	  
disposed	  to	  produce	  (Peterson,	  2004).	  Many	  species	  of	  animal,	  faced	  with	  the	  need	  to	  
produce	   a	   novel	   response,	   are	   not	   able	   to	   infer	   that	   response	   from	   the	  mechanism	  
that	  confronts	  them,	  nor	  are	  they	  able	  to	  copy	  the	  behaviour	  from	  other	  animals	  or	  a	  
human	  instructor	  (Thorndike,	  1911).	  They	  are,	  therefore,	  forced	  to	  acquire	  responses	  
through	   trial	   and	   error,	   extracting	   the	   important	   motor	   elements	   from	   their	   own	  
behavioural	   variance.	   It	   is	   perhaps	  unsurprising,	   then,	   that	   a	   similar	   interest	  has	  not	  
been	  taken	  in	  response	  acquisition	  in	  humans.	  The	  ability	  to	  acquire	  responses	  can,	  by	  
and	   large,	  be	   taken	   for	   granted	   in	  humans:	   a	  person	  will	   either	   come	   to	  a	  new	   task	  
with	   the	   response	   already	   in	   their	   behavioural	   repertoire	   or	   they	   will	   be	   able	   to	  
produce	  the	  response	   immediately	  after	  having	  observed	  another	  person	  performing	  
it.	  The	  joystick	  task	  is	  aimed	  specifically	  at	  recording	  response	  acquisition	  in	  humans	  by	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removing	  access	  to	  a	  perfect	  model	  of	  performance	  and	  increasing	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  
people	  must	  extract	  a	  response	  from	  their	  own	  behavioural	  variance.	  
	  
Chapter	  2	  detailed	  a	  version	  of	  the	  joystick	  task	  that	  measured	  the	  ability	  of	  people	  to	  
acquire	  novel	   responses	  based	  on	  discrete	   instances	  of	  qualitative	   feedback,	  but	   the	  
structure	   of	   the	   task	   differed	   from	   the	   type	   of	   response	   acquisition	   that	   is	   typically	  
required	  of	  laboratory	  animals	  (e.g.	  Lattal	  &	  Gleeson,	  1990).	  During	  the	  acquisition	  of	  a	  
lever-­‐press	  response	  by	  a	  rat,	   for	  example,	  a	  stable	  set	  of	  movements,	  necessary	   for	  
depression	  of	  the	  lever,	  must	  be	  produced	  before	  reinforcement	  can	  be	  delivered.	  This	  
set	   of	   movements	   does	   not	   change	   from	   one	   lever-­‐depression	   to	   the	   next	   and	  
therefore	  it	   is	  this	  common	  element	  within	  the	  animal’s	  behaviour	  that	   is	   learnt.	  The	  
joystick	  task	  featuring	  within-­‐trial	  repetition	  of	  reinforcement,	  described	  in	  chapter	  2,	  
required	   the	   learning	   of	   a	   stable	   hand	   position	   rather	   than	   a	   stable	   sequence	   of	  
movements	  and	  therefore	  differed	  from	  the	  typical	  structure	  employed	  to	  investigate	  
action	   acquisition	   in	   laboratory	   animals.	   In	   order	   that	   the	   joystick	   task	   can	   be	  
considered	  on	  similar	  terms	  to	  such	  studies,	   it	  was	  decided	  that	  a	  version	  of	  the	  task	  
featuring	  between-­‐trial	  repetition	  of	  reinforcement	  should	  be	  developed.	  
	  
By	  iterating	  the	  learning	  process	  between	  trials,	  with	  a	  stable	  starting	  position,	  we	  can	  
ensure	   that	   the	  data	   for	  each	   trial	   represents	  a	   single	  attempt	  at	   finding	   the	  correct	  
movement.	  Figure	  3.1	  shows	  what	  this	  looks	  like	  in	  practice.	  Trial	  one	  is	  necessarily	  a	  
naïve	  trial	  and	  locating	  the	  correct	  position	  is	  a	  question	  of	  exploring	  the	  search	  space.	  
The	  hotspot	  can	  then	  be	  kept	  in	  the	  same	  position	  for	  subsequent	  trials,	  allowing	  us	  to	  
record	   performance	   following	   an	   individual	   instance	   of	   reinforcement.	   It	   is	   much	  
easier	   to	   appreciate	   with	   this	   design	   how	   people	   have	   deviated	   from	   optimal	  





Figure	  3.1	  The	  progression	  of	  a	  movement	  trace	  over	  10	  trials	  with	  reinforcement	  occurring	  just	  once	  in	  a	  trial,	  on	  
entry	  into	  the	  hotspot	  region	  of	  the	  search	  space	  (shown	  here	  in	  red).	  
	  
A	  further	  advantage	  of	  adopting	  this	  task	  structure	   is	  that	   it	  should	  make	  it	  easier	  to	  
draw	   comparisons	   concerning	   the	   effects	   of	   delayed	   reinforcement	  with	   the	   studies	  
cited	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  (e.g.	  Anderson	  &	  Elcoro,	  2007;	  Black	  et	  al.,	  1985;	  Elsner	  &	  
Hommel,	   2004;	   Hollerman	   &	   Schultz,	   1998;	   Lattal	   &	   Gleeson,	   1990;	   Okouchi,	   2009;	  
Renner,	  1964;	  Shanks	  &	  Dickinson,	  1991;	  Shanks	  et	  al.,	  1989;	  Sizemore	  &	  Lattal,	  1977;	  
Snycerski	  et	  al.	  2004;	  Snycerski	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  Stubbs,	  1969).	  It	   is	  possible	  that	  the	  high	  
degree	   of	   sensitivity	   to	   delay	   found	   when	   employing	   within-­‐trial	   repetition	   of	  
reinforcement	  in	  experiments	  1	  and	  2	  would	  not	  occur	  with	  a	  task	  structure	  based	  on	  
between-­‐trial	  repetition	  of	  reinforcement.	  In	  other	  words,	  this	  change	  in	  task	  structure	  
might	  bring	  the	  sensitivity	  to	  delay	  into	  the	  0.5	  to	  1	  s	  range,	  a	  duration	  that	  marks	  the	  
maximal	  sensitivity	  of	  the	  experiments	  cited	  above.	  
	  
Scaling	  task	  difficulty	  
Before	  exploring	  the	  effects	  of	  delay,	   the	  new	  task	  structure	  was	  used	  to	   investigate	  
the	   potential	   scalability	   in	   difficulty	   of	   the	   joystick	   task.	   Such	   manipulations	   are	  
potentially	   of	   benefit	   when	   comparing	   across	   populations,	   for	   instance	   between	  
clinical	  and	  control	  populations.	  Clearly,	  the	  difficulty	  of	  all	  experimental	  tasks	  can	  be	  
varied	   to	   some	   extent	   but	   the	   advantage	   here	   is	   that	   the	   required	   precision	   of	  
movement	   can	   potentially	   be	   calibrated	   to	   the	   abilities	   of	   a	   particular	   population	  
whilst	  leaving	  the	  basic	  task	  rules	  (the	  contingencies	  on	  which	  reinforcement	  depends)	  
stable.	  Such	  calibration	  could	  potentially	  provide	  a	  means	  of	  running	  more	  successful	  
control	   groups	   when	   comparing	   healthy	   and	   clinical	   populations.	   This	   type	   of	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manipulation	   is	   not	   possible	   in	   simple	   reaction	   time	   or	   lever	   pressing	   paradigms	  
because	  in	  these	  instances	  the	  response	  itself	  never	  varies	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  difficulty	  of	  
exploration.	  Experiment	  3,	  therefore,	  details	  the	  structure	  of	  a	   joystick	  task	  featuring	  
between-­‐trial	  repetition	  of	  reinforcement	  and	  describes	  a	  test	  designed	  to	  investigate	  
whether	  the	  joystick	  task	  paradigm	  would	  allow	  the	  effective	  scaling	  of	  task	  difficulty	  
for	  such	  purposes.	  
	  
Experiment	  3:	  scaling	  task	  difficulty	  with	  variable	  target	  
sizes	  
With	   a	   task	   based	   on	   location	   finding,	   the	   obvious	   candidate	   parameter	   for	   scaling	  
difficulty	   is	   to	   change	   the	   size	   of	   that	   location.	   With	   larger	   targets	   it	   is	   easier	   to	  
produce	  a	  sequence	  of	  movements	  that	  will	  take	  the	  joystick	  into	  the	  hotspot	  region	  of	  
the	  search	  space	  and	  therefore	  learning	  and	  performance	  should	  improve	  with	  larger	  
hotspot	  sizes.	  This	  experiment	  was	  designed	   to	   investigate	   the	  effect	  of	  hotspot	  size	  
on	  performance	  and	  determine	  whether	  the	  change	  in	  task	  difficulty	  with	  hotspot	  size	  
is	   a	   viable	   method	   for	   calibrating	   the	   task	   based	   on	   the	   abilities	   of	   a	   particular	  
individual	  or	  population.	  A	  further	  benefit	  of	  running	  a	  formal	  test	  to	   investigate	  the	  
effect	   of	   hotspot	   size	   is	   that	   it	   enables	   better	   informed	   choices	   of	   suitable	   hotspot	  
sizes	  for	  future	  experiments	  including	  experiment	  4	  described	  later	  in	  this	  chapter.	  
	  
Method	  
Unless	  otherwise	  stated,	  all	  apparatus	  and	  procedures	  were	  the	  same	  as	  those	  used	  in	  
experiment	  1	  (see	  chapter	  2).	  
	  
Participants	  
29	  people	  (26	  female)	  participated	  in	  all	  conditions	  of	  this	  study.	  	  Ages	  ranged	  from	  18	  
to	   26	   years	   with	   a	   mean	   age	   of	   19	   (SD.	   =	   1.8	   years).	   	   Participants	   were	   all	  
undergraduate	   students	   at	   the	   University	   of	   Sheffield	   who	   took	   part	   in	   return	   for	  
credits	  in	  the	  department's	  research	  participation	  scheme.	  	  All	  subjects	  were	  naive	  to	  





Defining	  the	  reinforced	  area	  
It	   was	   easy	   to	   determine	   from	   pilot	   studies	   that	   hotspots	   of	   the	   size	   used	   in	  
experiment	   1	   (i.e.	   occupying	   0.91%	   of	   the	   search	   space)	   would	   have	   made	   a	   task	  
featuring	  between-­‐trial	  repetition	  of	  reinforcement	  much	  too	  easy.	  Consequently,	  the	  
largest	  hotspot	  in	  the	  current	  experiment	  was	  chosen	  to	  be	  substantially	  smaller	  than	  
that	   used	   in	   experiments	   1	   and	   2,	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   cover	   as	   informative	   a	   range	   of	  
hotspot	   sizes	   as	   possible.	   Ultimately,	   4	   different	   sizes	   were	   chosen.	   In	   order	   from	  
smallest	   to	   largest,	   they	  occupied	  0.07%	   (small),	   0.14%	   (medium),	   0.28%	   (large)	   and	  
0.56%	  (exlarge)	  of	  the	  search	  space,	  thus	  the	  figure	  doubled	  with	  each	  increase	  in	  size.	  
Figure	  3.2	  is	  drawn	  to	  scale	  and	  gives	  a	  visual	  representation	  of	  the	  size	  of	  the	  hotspots	  
relative	  to	  the	  overall	  search	  space.	  
	  
	  
Figure	  3.2	  Hotspot	  sizes	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  the	  overall	  search	  space.	  
	  
Defining	  reinforcement	  	  
Just	   as	   in	   experiment	   1,	   the	   screen	   was	   kept	   black	   throughout	   a	   trial	   and	   any	  
movement	  into	  the	  hotspot	  resulted	  in	  a	  brief	  audio	  stimulus	  (10	  ms	  ‘pip’	  sound)	  but,	  
unlike	  experiment	  1,	  it	  also	  resulted	  in	  the	  immediate	  ending	  of	  that	  trial	  accompanied	  





Participants	  were	  given	  verbal	   instructions	  as	  explained	  in	  experiment	  1	  (see	  chapter	  
2).	   Following	   this,	   the	   task	   program	  was	   started	   and	   the	   participants	  were	   asked	   to	  
follow	   the	   onscreen	   instructions	   (see	   appendix	   3).	   After	   reading	   the	   instructions,	   3	  
practice	  trials	  commenced	  automatically.	  For	  the	  first	  practice	  trial,	  the	  participant	  was	  
required	  to	  move	  the	  joystick	  around	  in	  search	  of	  the	  correct	  position	  and	  on	  finding	  
that	  position	  was	  presented	  with	  a	  pip	  sound	  and	  the	  end	  of	  the	  trial.	  Following	  this	  
they	   would	   then	   complete	   the	   second	   and	   then	   the	   third	   practice	   trials,	   with	   the	  
hotspot	   remaining	   in	   the	   same	   position	   for	   all	   3	   practice	   trials.	   As	   with	   all	   the	  
experiment	   trials,	   no	   feedback	  or	   screen	  graphics	  were	  provided	  during	   the	  practice	  
trials	   and	   the	  monitor	   set	   to	  display	  a	  black	   screen.	  The	  practice	   trials	  differed	   from	  
experimental	   trials	   in	   that	   the	   hotspot	   was	   larger	   than	   any	   of	   the	   experimental	  
hotspots,	   occupying	   0.75%	   of	   the	   search	   space.	   Once	   the	   practice	   trials	   were	  
completed	   the	  experimental	   trials	  began.	  Participants	  were	   required	   to	   complete	  10	  
trials	  at	  each	  hotspot	  size.	   	  For	  the	  first	  trial	   in	  a	  batch	  of	  10	  the	  hotspot	  was	  placed	  
randomly	  within	  a	   limited	  region	  of	  the	  search	  space	  (as	  defined	  in	  experiment	  one),	  
such	  that	  no	  part	  of	  it	  could	  overlap	  either	  the	  centre	  or	  the	  outer	  edges	  of	  the	  search	  
space.	   During	   each	   batch	   of	   10	   trials,	   the	   size	   and	   position	   of	   the	   hotspot	   did	   not	  
change.	  	  	  
	  
Design	  
There	  was	  one	  independent	  variable	  with	  4	  levels:	  the	  4	  hotspot	  sizes	  detailed	  above.	  
There	   were	   43	   trials	   in	   total:	   3	   practice	   trials	   and	   40	   experimental	   trials.	   	   Each	  
experimental	  condition	  was	  therefore	  experienced	  in	  the	  form	  of	  10	  identical	  trials	  (i.e.	  
same	   hotspot	   position	   and	   size).	   	   The	   order	   of	   presentation	   of	   the	   experimental	  
conditions	  was	  counterbalanced.	  
	  
Results	  
Irrelevant	  distance	  as	  a	  performance	  metric	  
As	   a	   result	   of	   the	   way	   that	   hotspot	   positions	   were	   determined,	   each	   new	   hotspot	  
location	   could	  differ	   in	   terms	  of	   its	   distance	   from	   the	   centre	  of	   the	   screen.	   In	  other	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words,	   the	   optimum	   distance	   between	   the	   starting	   position	   and	   the	   hotspot	   varied	  
between	   trials.	   The	   reason	   for	   this	   was	   to	   keep	   the	   required	   action	   as	   variable	   as	  
possible	  within	  the	  confines	  of	  the	  two-­‐dimensional	  search	  space.	  However,	   it	  meant	  
that	  2	  people	  achieving	  optimum	  performance	  on	  a	  given	  trial	  could	  differ	  in	  terms	  of	  
the	  distance	   travelled.	  One	  potential	   alternative	   to	  using	   the	   raw	  distance	   is	   to	   take	  
the	   ratio	   between	   the	   total	   distance	   and	   the	   optimum	   distance.	   This	   is	   intuitively	  
appealing	  because	  it	  would	  seem	  to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  fact	  that	  for	  longer	  optimum	  
distances	   there	   is	  more	   opportunity	   to	  make	   irrelevant	  movements,	   simply	   because	  
more	  distance	  must	  be	  travelled	  in	  order	  to	  reach	  the	  hotspot.	  
	  
However,	   the	   chief	   problem	  with	   ratio	   scores	   is	   that	   they	   have	   a	   disproportionately	  
large	   effect	   on	   trials	   that	   involve	   even	  moderate	   amounts	   of	  movement.	  Whilst	   the	  
optimum	   distance	   may	   only	   represent	   a	   small	   proportion	   of	   the	   overall	   distance	  
travelled,	  it	  can	  greatly	  affect	  the	  performance	  score	  because	  it	  is	  the	  denominator	  in	  
the	   fraction.	   	   This	   effect	   is	   easier	   to	   appreciate	   if	  we	   look	   at	  movement	   traces	   that	  
display	   similar	   overall	   amounts	   of	   movement	   with	   different	   optimal	   distances.	   The	  
actual	  distance	  travelled	  for	  the	  trace	  on	  the	  left	  hand	  side	  of	  figure	  3.3	  is	  14	  times	  the	  
optimal	  distance	  whereas	  this	  ratio	   is	   just	  6.5	   for	  the	  trace	  on	  the	  right	  of	   the	  figure	  
and	  yet	  it	  seems	  strange	  to	  suggest	  that	  performance	  is	  twice	  as	  efficient	  in	  the	  right	  
hand	  trace.	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Figure	  3.3	  Examples	  of	  movement	  traces	  of	  similar	  length	  in	  trials	  with	  very	  different	  optimal	  distances.	  
	  
In	  order	  to	  investigate	  this	  issue	  further,	  a	  test	  for	  a	  correlation	  between	  the	  optimum	  
distance	  and	  the	  ‘irrelevant	  distance’	  (total	  distance	  minus	  optimum	  distance)	  was	  run	  
for	   each	   of	   the	   4	   hotspot	   sizes.	   If	   the	   optimum	   distance	  were	   having	   an	   important	  
effect	   on	   the	   actual	   distance	   travelled	   then	   we	   would	   expect	   these	   two	  metrics	   to	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correlate	  with	  one	  another.	  A	  Pearson	  product-­‐moment	  correlation	  was	  run	  to	  test	  the	  
relationship	   between	   the	   optimum	   and	   log-­‐transformed	   irrelevant	   distances.	   This	  
revealed	   that	   there	  was	   a	   significant	   (2-­‐tailed)	   positive	   correlation	   for	   the	   small	   (r	   =	  
0.5,	  n	  =	  29,	  p	  <	  .01)	  and	  medium	  (r	  =	  0.52,	  n	  =	  29,	  p	  <	  .01)	  conditions	  but	  no	  correlation	  
for	  the	   large	  (r	  =	  0.23,	  n	  =	  29,	  p	  =	   .23)	  and	  the	  exlarge	  condition	  (r	  =	  0.3,	  n	  =	  29,	  p	  =	  
.12).	   Longer	   optimal	   distances	   were	   therefore	   correlated	   with	   longer	   irrelevant	  
distances	  for	  2	  of	  the	  4	  conditions.	  
	  
Because	   the	   correlation	   differed	   across	   conditions,	   it	   was	   decided	   that	   optimum	  
distance	  would	  not	  have	  made	  a	  consistent	  covariate	  and	  that	  the	  effect	  of	  calculating	  
a	   ratio	   score	  might	   have	   interacted	  with	   the	   independent	   variable.	   It	  was	   therefore	  
decided	  that	  irrelevant	  distance	  (total	  distance	  minus	  optimal	  distance)	  would	  be	  used	  
as	  a	  conservative	  measure	  of	  performance.	  This	  metric	  avoids	  the	  issue	  of	  potentially	  
overestimating	   the	  effect	  of	   the	  optimal	  distance	  whilst	   also	   taking	   into	  account	   the	  
basic	  additional	  distance	  that	  some	  trials	  required	  over	  others	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  hotspot	  
being	  located	  further	  from	  the	  central	  starting	  position.	  
	  
Scalable	  task	  difficulty	  and	  the	  effect	  of	  hotspot	  size	  
For	  each	  participant	  the	  mean	   irrelevant	  distance	  was	  calculated	  based	  on	  the	   last	  9	  
trials	  of	  the	  10	  trial	  batches;	  the	  first	  trial	  was	  always	  excluded	  from	  the	  calculation	  as	  
it	   represented	   naïve	   performance,	   indicative	   of	   search	   time	   rather	   than	   learning.	   A	  
one-­‐way	   repeated-­‐measures	   ANOVA	   showed	   that	   there	   was	   a	   significant	   effect	   of	  
hotspot	  size	  (F(3,	  84)	  =	  13.29,	  p	  <	  .001).	  Figure	  3.4	  shows	  that	  as	  hotspot	  size	  increases	  
so	  does	  the	  mean	  irrelevant	  distance	  travelled;	   in	  other	  words,	  as	  one	  would	  expect,	  
the	  task	  gets	  more	  difficult	  with	  small	  hotspots.	  Bonferroni	  corrected	  post	  hoc	  t-­‐tests	  
revealed	  that	  the	  mean	  distance	  travelled	  in	  the	  small	  condition	  differed	  significantly	  
to	  both	  the	  large	  (t(28)	  =	  4.6,	  p	  <	  .05)	  and	  the	  exlarge	  (t(28)	  =	  4.94,	  p	  <	  .05)	  conditions	  
and	  that	  the	  medium	  condition	  differed	  significantly	  from	  the	  exlarge	  condition	  (t(28)	  
=	   4.18,	   p	   <	   .05).	   No	   other	   comparisons	   reached	   significance,	   although	   the	   small-­‐





Figure	  3.4	  Mean	  irrelevant	  distance	  travelled	  for	  the	  4	  different	  hotspot	  sizes:	  small	  (0.07%),	  medium	  (0.14%),	  large	  
(0.28%)	  and	  exlarge	  (0.56%).	  Values	  are	  back-­‐transformed	  from	  the	  log	  transformation.	  
	  
Because	   of	   the	   iterated	   structure	   of	   the	   task	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   plot	   the	   mean	  
performance	  on	  each	  trial	   for	   the	   four	  different	  hotspot	  sizes.	  Figure	  3.5	  shows	  how	  
the	   mean	   performance	   across	   participants	   improves	   with	   experience	   at	   a	   given	  
hotspot	  size	  and	  location	  (the	  naïve	  trial	  1	  has	  been	  removed	  to	  make	  the	  comparison	  
clearer).	   Figure	   3.6	   has	   the	   error	   bars	   removed	   and	   includes	   trial	   1	   to	   show	  where	  
post-­‐reinforcement	   performance	   lies	   relative	   to	   naïve	   searching.	   Overall	   learning	   is	  
rapid	  for	  each	  of	  the	  4	  hotspot	  sizes,	  with	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  improvement	  occurring	  




















Figure	  3.5	  Mean	   irrelevant	  distance	   (and	   standard	  error)	   for	  each	   trial	   at	   the	   four	  different	  hotspot	   sizes.	   Trial	  1	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Figure	   3.6	  Mean	   irrelevant	   distance	   for	   each	   trial	   at	   the	   four	   different	   hotspot	   sizes.	   Trial	   1	   is	   included	   to	   show	  
where	  post	  reinforcement	  performance	  lies	  relative	  to	  naïve	  searching.	  Error	  bars	  have	  been	  removed	  so	  that	  the	  
approximate	  rate	  can	  be	  seen	  more	  clearly	  (see	  figure	  3.5	  for	  error	  bars	  on	  trials	  1-­‐9).	  Values	  are	  back-­‐transformed	  
from	  the	  log	  transformation.	  
	  
Discussion	  	  
The	   results	   of	   the	   overall	   comparison	   in	   performance	   (figure	   3.4)	   indicate	   that	   task	  
difficulty	  does	   significantly	  differ	  depending	  on	  hotspot	   size;	   however,	   the	   scope	   for	  
calibrating	  the	  joystick	  task	  based	  on	  manipulations	  to	  this	  experimental	  parameter	  is	  
likely	  to	  be	  limited.	  In	  terms	  of	  overall	  performance	  and	  rate	  of	  learning,	  the	  smallest	  
hotspot	  size	  (0.07%)	  appears	  to	  mark	  a	  substantial	  shift	  in	  task	  difficulty	  relative	  to	  the	  
other	   sizes.	   Despite	   the	   considerable	   variance	   in	   the	   performance	   scores,	   the	  
difference	   to	   the	   other	   conditions	   was	   either	   significant	   or	   approached	   significance	  
with	   a	   conservative	   post	   hoc	   correction.	   Furthermore,	   figure	   3.5	   indicates	   that	   this	  
difference	  appears	  to	  be	  sustained	  across	  trials.	  In	  one	  sense,	  this	  is	  potentially	  useful	  
as	   it	   indicates	   that	   with	   hotspots	   of	   this	   size	   we	   can	   be	   assured	   of	   avoiding	   ceiling	  
effects.	   However,	   on	   playing	   back	   trials	   from	   this	   condition,	   there	   were	   signs	   that	  
some	   of	   the	   variance	   and	   difficulty	   might	   have	   been	   caused	   by	   limitations	   in	   the	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hotspot	  occupied	   so	   little	  of	   the	   search	   space	   that	   irregularities	   in	   the	  movement	  of	  
the	  joystick	  would	  have	  made	  it	  more	  difficult	  to	  locate	  the	  hotspots.	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  
is	  more	  likely	  in	  the	  small	  condition	  that	  a	  participant	  could	  produce	  a	  movement	  that,	  
under	  perfect	  conditions,	  would	  have	  entered	  the	  hotspot	  but	  due	  to	  the	  noise	  in	  the	  
apparatus	  would	  actually	  result	  in	  a	  false-­‐negative	  outcome.	  Furthermore,	  it	  is	  possible	  
that	   this	   hotspot	   was	   presenting	   substantial	   challenges	   to	   the	   motor	   control	   of	  
participants.	   Whilst	   it	   is	   potentially	   useful	   to	   make	   the	   task	   harder	   for	   some	  
populations	  of	   individuals,	   the	  difficulty	   should	  depend	  on	  exploration	  of	   the	   search	  
space	  rather	  than	  the	  motor	  control	  of	  the	  participant.	  At	  the	  other	  end	  of	  the	  scale,	  
the	   largest	  hotspot	   (0.56%)	  produced	   the	  opposite	  problem,	   resulting	   in	  near	   ceiling	  
levels	   of	   performance.	   Consequently,	   the	   scope	   for	   varying	   task	   difficulty	   by	  
manipulating	  hotspot	  size	  appears	  to	  be	  very	  limited	  with	  this	  paradigm.	  
	  
Experiment	   4:	   between-­‐trial	   repetition	   of	   delayed	  
reinforcement	  
Temporal	  alignment	  and	  the	  eligibility	  period	  	  
In	  chapter	  1,	  the	   idea	  of	  a	  short	   latency	  and	  relatively	   indiscriminate	   learning	  system	  
was	   introduced	   and	   in	   chapter	   2	   the	   temporal	   sensitivity	   of	   such	   a	   system	   was	  
discussed.	   It	  was	  also	  suggested	   in	  chapter	  2	  that	  the	  findings	  cited	  by	  Redgrave	  and	  
Gurney	   (2006)	  as	  possibly	   indicating	   the	  negative	  effects	  of	  delay	  on	  such	  a	   learning	  
system	   did	   not	   perhaps	   demonstrate	   the	   degree	   of	   sensitivity	   that	   their	   theory	  
implied.	  However,	   it	  would	   be	  wrong	   to	   think	   that	   the	   delay	   durations	   employed	   in	  
these	   studies	   were	   especially	   long	   in	   the	   general	   context	   of	   research	   into	  
reinforcement	  learning.	  In	  fact,	  the	  range	  of	  delays	  over	  which	  reinforcement	  learning	  
can	   apparently	   be	   sustained	   is	   surprisingly	   large.	   Several	   studies,	   for	   instance,	   have	  
found	   that	   animals	   are	   capable	   of	   acquiring	   new	   responses,	   such	   as	   lever-­‐press	  
responses,	   with	   reinforcement	   delays	   in	   excess	   of	   10	   s	   (Lattal	   &	   Gleeson,	   1990;	  
Snycerski	   et	   al.,	   2004;	   Snycerski	   et	   al.,	   2005).	   A	   similar	   result	   has	   been	   reported	   for	  





If	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  these	  subjects	  were	  relying	  on	  reinforcement	  learning	  and	  that	  this	  
system	   is	   indiscriminate	   with	   respect	   to	   everything	   but	   the	   temporal	   alignment	   of	  
action,	   outcome	   and	   context,	   then	   the	   apparent	   resistance	   to	   delay	   is	   somewhat	  
surprising.	  As	  discussed	  in	  earlier	  chapters,	  Redgrave	  and	  Gurney	  (2006)	  suggest	  that	  
the	  short	  latency	  phasic	  response	  of	  dopamine	  neurons	  to	  salient	  stimuli	  acts	  as	  a	  time	  
stamp	  that	  reinforces	  and	  promotes	  the	  reselection	  of	  motor	  output	  that	  immediately	  
preceded	  a	  novel	  stimulus	  and	  that	  the	  short	  latency	  nature	  of	  this	  response	  limits	  the	  
quantity	  of	  non-­‐contingent	  motor	  output	  that	  could	  be	  associated	  with	  the	  stimulus.	  
Whilst	  the	  short	  latency	  of	  the	  dopamine	  response	  suggests	  that	  this	  learning	  system	  is	  
likely	  to	  be	  sensitive	  to	  the	  effects	  of	  delay	  (as	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  2),	  the	  limits	  of	  this	  
system’s	   tolerance	   to	   delay	   are	   unclear.	   According	   to	   Redgrave	   and	   Gurney,	   the	  
converging	   input	  of	  sensory,	  motor	  and	  contextual	   information	   in	  the	  striatum	  is	  the	  
target	  with	  which	  the	  phasic	  dopaminergic	  output	   interacts.	  Consequently,	   the	   limits	  
of	  the	  duration	  over	  which	  learning	  in	  such	  a	  system	  could	  occur	  should	  ultimately	  be	  
dictated	   by	   the	   length	   of	   time	   that	   the	   convergent	   signals	   in	   the	   striatum	   remain	  
eligible	  for	  reinforcement.	  
	  
This	   concept	   of	   an	   eligibility	   trace	   has	   proven	   useful	   in	   models	   of	   reinforcement	  
learning	  for	  explaining	  how	  it	  is	  that	  a	  reinforcement	  learning	  mechanism	  might	  cope	  
with	   delays	   of	   reinforcement	   (Singh	   &	   Sutton,	   1996).	   If	   reinforcement	   occurs	  
immediately,	   it	  will	   interact	  with	  a	  trace	  that	  contains	  a	  strong	  representation	  of	  the	  
behaviours	   on	   which	   that	   reinforcement	   was	   contingent;	   however,	   with	   increasing	  
delay	  between	  the	  contingent	  response	  and	  the	  reinforcement,	  the	  representation	  of	  
that	  response	  weakens	  (decays)	  and	  the	  overall	  effect	  on	   learning	   is	   that	   less	  weight	  
will	  be	  placed	  on	  these	  older	  responses	  and	  thus	  more	  repetitions	  would	  be	  required	  
in	  order	  to	   learn	  under	  conditions	  of	   long	  delay	  duration.	  An	  eligibility	  period	  caused	  
by	  the	  gradual	  decay	  of	  behavioural	  representations	  provides	  an	  explanation	  as	  to	  how	  
it	   is	   that	   reinforcement	   learning	   could	   occur	  with	   delays	   in	   excess	   of	   10	   s,	   provided	  
there	   is	   sufficient	   opportunity	   to	   repeat	   the	   behaviour	   many	   times.	   It	   would	   also	  
provide	   an	   explanation	   as	   to	   how	   it	   is	   that	   humans	   and	   animals	   are	   able	   to	   learn	  
sequences	  of	  actions	  that	  take	  place	  over	  many	  seconds	  because	  only	  the	  final	  portion	  
of	  these	  sequences	  would	  be	  temporally	  contiguous	  with	  the	  outcome	  despite	  the	  fact	  




However,	   one	   alternative	   explanation	   is	   that	   the	   eligibility	   period	   concerns	   not	   so	  
much	  the	  length	  of	  time	  that	  has	  elapsed	  but	  the	  number	  of	  task-­‐relevant	  movements	  
that	  have	  occurred	  during	  the	  delay	  period	  between	  a	  contingent	  response	  and	  a	  given	  
outcome.	  This	  is	  conceptually	  similar	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  working	  memory	  (Baddeley,	  2003),	  
with	  the	  learning	  mechanism	  being	  limited	  not	  only	  by	  time	  but	  also	  by	  the	  number	  of	  
units	  of	  relevant	  information	  present	  in	  the	  trace.	  The	  more	  output	  that	  occurs	  during	  
the	   delay	   period,	   the	   more	   potential	   there	   is	   for	   this	   non-­‐contingent	   output	   to	   be	  
assigned	   the	   credit	   of	   having	   caused	   the	   reinforcing	   event.	   By	   extension,	   the	  more	  
similar	  the	  contingent	  and	  non-­‐contingent	  output	  components	  of	  the	  motor	  record	  are	  
to	  one	  another,	  the	  harder	  it	  might	  be	  to	  pick	  out	  the	  signal	  from	  the	  noise.	  If	  this	   is	  
correct,	  then	  the	  sensitivity	  that	  was	  found	  in	  the	  version	  of	  the	  joystick	  task	  detailed	  
in	  chapter	  2	  might	  be	  a	  consequence	  of	   the	   low	  contrast	  between	  task	   relevant	  and	  
task	  irrelevant	  motor	  record	  that	  occurred	  during	  the	  delay	  period.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  
difference	  between	  relevant	  and	   irrelevant	   joystick	  movements	   is	  small	  as	  compared	  
to	  the	  difference	  between	  lever-­‐presses	  and	  cage	  exploration	  behaviour	  (the	  response	  
opportunities	  in	  the	  extended	  delay	  studies	  cited	  above)	  and	  therefore	  non-­‐contingent	  
behaviour	  in	  the	  joystick	  task	  might	  have	  a	  more	  contaminating	  effect	  during	  learning,	  
rendering	  the	  task	  more	  susceptible	  to	  the	  effects	  of	  delay.	  
	  
The	   employment	   of	   within-­‐trial	   repetition	   of	   reinforcement	   in	   the	   experiments	  
described	  in	  chapter	  2	  made	  it	  difficult	  to	  explore	  the	  idea	  of	  contamination.	  In	  theory,	  
learning	   should	   be	   less	   efficient	   if	   more	   movements	   occur	   during	   the	   delay	   period	  
because	   it	   is	   then	  harder	   to	   identify	   the	  portion	  of	  movement	   activity	  on	  which	   the	  
outcome	  was	  dependent;	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  credit	  assignment	  problem	  becomes	  more	  
difficult	   (Redgrave	   et	   al.,	   2008).	   However,	   measuring	   this	   activity	   was	   not	  
straightforward	  because	  each	  trial	  contained	  many	  instances	  of	  delayed	  reinforcement	  
and	   therefore	   many	   separate	   instances	   of	   contaminating	   movement	   activity.	   A	  
solution	  to	  this	   is	   to	  have	  a	  single	   instance	  of	   reinforcement	   in	  each	  trial	  as	  outlined	  
above.	  In	  this	  way,	  for	  any	  given	  trial,	  it	  would	  be	  straightforward	  to	  separate	  the	  task	  
relevant	  portion	  of	   the	  movement	   trace	  versus	   the	  movements	   that	  occurred	  during	  
the	  delay	  period.	  Consequently	  the	  contents	  of	  the	  delay	  period	  can	  be	   investigated,	  
thus	   providing	   insight	   into	   how	   contamination	   might	   work	   to	   impede	   performance	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under	  conditions	  of	  delay.	  	  
	  
The	   problem	  with	   addressing	   this	   research	   question	   experimentally	   is	   that	   it	   would	  
involve	  the	  manipulation	  of	  the	  amount	  of	  activity	  that	  occurs	  during	  the	  delay	  period.	  
This	  could	  potentially	  be	  achieved	  by	  intervening	  in	  ways	  that	  make	  participants	  move	  
the	  joystick	  faster	  or	  in	  more	  complex	  ways.	  However,	  with	  this	  type	  of	  manipulation,	  
there	  is	  no	  obvious	  control	  condition	  that	  could	  tell	  us	  whether	  any	  effect	  was	  due	  to	  
contamination	   per	   se	   or	   whether	   the	   intervention	   had	   simply	   made	   the	   task	   more	  
difficult.	   Consequently,	   one	   of	   the	   aims	   of	   experiment	   4	   was	   to	   use	   the	   natural	  
variation	   in	   the	  movements	   during	   the	   delay	   period	   in	   order	   to	   investigate	  whether	  
contamination	   could	   be	   contributing	   to	   any	   drop	   in	   performance	   caused	   by	  
reinforcement	   delay.	   Specifically,	   if	   contamination	   is	   important,	   the	   complexity	   and	  
overall	  distance	  of	  movement	  during	  the	  delay	  period	  should	  be	  negatively	  correlated	  
with	  performance.	  
	  
The	   second	   aim	   of	   experiment	   4	   was	   to	   determine	   the	   sensitivity	   to	   reinforcement	  
delay	   of	   a	   version	   of	   the	   joystick	   task	   employing	   between-­‐trial	   repetition	   of	  
reinforcement.	   The	   structure	   of	   the	   task	   is	  much	  more	   similar	   to	   that	   of	   traditional	  
reinforcement	   learning	   and	   response	   acquisition	   paradigms.	   Once	   again,	   if	   the	   task	  
relies	  on	  the	   learning	  mechanism	  described	  by	  Redgrave	  and	  Gurney	  (2006)	  then	  we	  
would	  expect	  an	  effect	  of	  delay	  at	  the	  kind	  of	  short	  durations	  found	  in	  experiments	  1	  
and	  2.	  By	  contrast,	  if	  the	  effect	  of	  delay	  is	  primarily	  affected	  by	  specific	  task	  demands	  
then	  we	  would	  expect	  that	  the	  sensitivity	  to	  delay	  should	  lower	  and	  much	  more	  in	  line	  
with	  previous	  experiments	  featuring	  delayed	  reinforcement.	  
	  
Method	  




30	  people	  (25	  female)	  participated	  in	  all	  conditions	  of	  this	  study.	  	  Ages	  ranged	  from	  18	  
to	  22	  years	  with	  a	  mean	  age	  of	  19	  (SD.	  =	  1	  year).	  	  Participants	  were	  all	  undergraduate	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students	   at	   the	   University	   of	   Sheffield	   who	   took	   part	   in	   return	   for	   credits	   in	   the	  





The	   hotspot	   size	   was	   chosen	   based	   on	   the	   results	   from	   experiment	   3.	   The	   0.28%	  
hotspot	  size	  employed	  in	  experiment	  three	  was	  selected	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  the	  possible	  
ceiling	  effects	  associated	  with	  the	  exlarge	  (0.56%)	  condition	  and	  the	  large	  amounts	  of	  
error	   present	   in	   the	   small	   (0.07%)	   condition.	   The	   0.28%	   (large)	   size	  was	   selected	   in	  
preference	   to	   the	   0.14%	   (medium)	   size	   on	   the	   basis	   that	   the	   introduction	   of	   delay	  
would	  increase	  the	  difficulty	  of	  the	  task	  and	  it	  was	  important	  that	  the	  delay	  conditions	  
shouldn’t	   be	   overly	   difficult	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   data	   collection.	   Furthermore,	   the	  
results	  from	  the	  correlations	  in	  experiment	  3	  indicated	  that	  there	  was	  no	  relationship	  
between	  optimum	  and	  irrelevant	  distance	  for	  this	  hotspot	  size	  so	  by	  choosing	  this	  size	  
it	  was	  hoped	  that	  noise	  from	  this	  potential	  source	  of	  variance	  would	  be	  reduced.	  
	  
Delay	  
Just	  as	  with	  experiments	  1	  and	  2,	  delayed	  reinforcement	  was	  achieved	  by	  interposing	  a	  
delay	  between	  the	  point	  at	  which	  the	  joystick	  moved	  into	  the	  hotspot	  and	  the	  point	  at	  
which	  reinforcement	  was	  delivered.	  However,	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  task	  was	  the	  same	  
as	   that	  employed	   in	  experiment	  3	   so	   the	   reinforcement	   stimulus	   (short	  duration	  pip	  
sound)	  also	  signalled	  the	  end	  of	  the	  current	  trial.	  The	  range	  of	  durations	  chosen	  was:	  
0-­‐ms,	  150-­‐ms,	  300-­‐ms	  and	  450-­‐ms.	  These	  durations	  therefore	  covered	  a	  slightly	  larger	  
range	   than	   those	   in	   experiments	   one	   and	   two	   but	   with	   an	   increased	   increment	  
between	  conditions.	  This	  decision	  was	  based	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  paired	  comparisons	  for	  
delays	  in	  excess	  of	  75	  ms	  revealed	  no	  effects	  with	  a	  single	  increment	  in	  delay	  duration	  
in	  experiments	  1	  and	  2;	  furthermore,	  pilot	  tests	  suggested	  that	  the	  task	  was	  much	  less	  
sensitive	   to	   the	  effects	   of	   delay	   so	   increasing	   the	   range	  with	   fewer	  durations	  would	  
provide	   more	   informative	   data.	   Finally,	   it	   was	   important	   that	   at	   least	   one	   of	   the	  
conditions	  was	  close	  to	  the	  0.5	  s	  delay,	  which	  was	  the	  shortest	  effective	  delay	  duration	  





The	   procedure	   was	   identical	   to	   that	   employed	   in	   experiment	   three.	   However,	  
participants	  were	  asked	  an	  additional	  question	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  experiment	  
	  
Design	  
A	  repeated	  measures	  design	  was	  used.	   	  The	   independent	  variable	  was	  reinforcement	  
delay,	  with	  4	  conditions:	  0-­‐ms,	  150-­‐ms,	  300-­‐ms	  and	  450-­‐ms.	  Each	  experimental	  session	  
was	  comprised	  of	  83	  trials,	  the	  first	  3	  of	  which	  were	  practice	  trials	  (involving	  no	  delay)	  
and	  the	  remaining	  80	  were	  experimental	  trials.	  	  The	  trials	  were	  presented	  as	  8	  batches	  
of	  10,	  where	  each	  batch	  represented	  a	  new	  hotspot	  location.	  Each	  delay	  condition	  was	  
experienced	   twice.	   In	  other	  words,	  participants	  experienced	  2	  batches	  of	  10	   trials	  at	  
each	  delay	  condition.	  Batch	  order	  was	  counterbalanced.	  
	  
Results	  
Defining	  pre-­‐discovery	  and	  post-­‐discovery	  periods	  
Figure	  3.7	  displays	  movement	  traces	  that	  depict	  all	  of	  the	  movements	  made	  during	  a	  
10	  trial	  batch	  at	  450-­‐ms	  delay.	  We	  can	  see	  that	  the	  movement	  trace	  doesn’t	  stop	  at	  
the	  hotspot,	  but	   carries	  on	  as	  a	   short	   tail	   representing	   the	  movements	  made	  during	  
the	   delay	   period.	   It	  was	   therefore	   possible,	   for	   all	   trials	   in	  which	   reinforcement	   had	  
been	   delayed,	   to	   distinguish	   between	   the	   pre-­‐discovery	   and	   post-­‐discovery	   periods.	  
Just	   as	  with	   experiments	   1	   and	   2,	   the	   pre-­‐discovery	   period	   included	   all	  movements	  
made	   from	   the	   start	   of	   the	   trial	   to	   the	   point	   at	   which	   the	   joystick	  moved	   into	   the	  
hotspot.	   Figure	   3.8	   depicts	   this	   clearly	   by	   displaying	   only	   those	   movements	   that	  
occurred	   during	   the	   pre-­‐discovery	   period.	   The	   post-­‐discovery	   period	   included	   all	  
movements	  made	  from	  the	  moment	  the	  joystick	  moved	  into	  the	  hotspot	  until	  the	  end	  
of	   the	   trial.	   Figure	   3.9	   depicts	   this	   by	   showing	   only	   those	  movements	   that	   occurred	  
during	  the	  post-­‐discovery	  period.	  Unlike	  experiments	  1	  and	  2,	  both	  the	  pre-­‐discovery	  
and	   post-­‐discovery	   periods	   are	   of	   interest.	   The	   distance	   travelled	   during	   the	   pre-­‐
discovery	  period	  gives	  us	  a	  metric	  of	  performance:	  shorter	  distances	  indicate	  that	  the	  
participant	   has	   learned	   to	   move	   into	   the	   correct	   position	   more	   efficiently.	   The	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behaviour	  during	  the	  post-­‐discovery	  period	  is	  also	  of	   interest	  as	   it	   is	   indicative	  of	  the	  
necessarily	  non-­‐contingent	  behaviour	  that	  occurred	  during	  a	  trial.	  In	  other	  words,	  this	  
design	  allowed	  us	  to	  measure	  a	  participant’s	  performance	  and	  also	  to	  investigate	  how	  




Figure	   3.7	   Movement	   traces	   showing	   all	   movements	   made	   during	   a	   batch	   of	   trials	   under	   the	   450-­‐ms	   delay	  




Figure	  3.8	  Movement	  traces	  showing	  only	  pre-­‐discovery	  movements	  during	  a	  batch	  of	  trials	  under	  the	  450-­‐ms	  delay	  






Figure	   3.9	  Movement	   traces	   showing	   only	   post-­‐discovery	  movements	   during	   a	   batch	   of	   trials	   under	   the	   450-­‐ms	  
delay	  condition.	  The	  black	  dot	  represents	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  search	  space	  and	  starting	  point	  on	  each	  trial.	  The	  red	  
dot	  is	  the	  hotspot.	  
	  
Performance	  and	  pre-­‐discovery	  distance	  
Before	  running	  the	  analysis	  to	  determine	  the	  effect	  of	  delay,	  a	  test	  was	  run	  to	  check	  
for	   a	   relationship	   between	   the	   optimum	   distance	   and	   the	   irrelevant	   pre-­‐discovery	  
distance.	   A	   Pearson	   product-­‐moment	   correlation	   was	   run	   to	   test	   the	   relationship	  
between	   the	   optimum	   distance	   and	   the	   log-­‐transformed	   irrelevant	   distance.	   This	  
revealed	  that	  there	  was	  no	  significant	   (2-­‐tailed)	  correlation	  for	  the	  0-­‐ms	  (r	  =	  0.3,	  n	  =	  
30,	  p	   =	   .11),	   300-­‐ms	   (r	   =	   0.2,	  n	   =	   30,	  p	   =	   .3)	   and	  450-­‐ms	   (r	   =	   -­‐0.01,	  n	   =	   30,	  p	   =	   .95)	  
conditions,	  but	  that	  the	  150-­‐ms	  condition	  did	  display	  a	  positive	  correlation	  (r	  =	  0.55,	  n	  
=	   30,	   p	   <	   .01).	   Longer	   optimal	   distances	   were	   therefore	   correlated	   with	   longer	  
irrelevant	  distances	  in	  1	  of	  the	  4	  conditions.	  Because	  of	  the	  inconsistency	  of	  this	  effect	  
it	  was	  decided	  that	  optimal	  distance	  should	  not	  be	  used	  as	  a	  covariate.	  
	  
The	  effect	  of	  delay	  was	  investigated	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  differences	  in	  the	  mean	  irrelevant	  
pre-­‐discovery	  distance.	  Just	  as	  with	  experiment	  3,	  the	  mean	  was	  taken	  from	  the	  9	  non-­‐
naïve	  trials	  in	  a	  batch	  of	  10.	  Better	  performance	  by	  this	  metric	  would	  be	  indicated	  by	  
shorter	  distances.	  A	  one-­‐way	   repeated-­‐measures	  ANOVA	  was	   conducted.	   	  Mauchly's	  
test	  indicated	  that	  the	  assumption	  of	  sphericity	  had	  been	  violated	  (ϰ²	  (5)	  =	  12.402,	  p	  <	  
.05;	  therefore	  degrees	  of	  freedom	  were	  corrected	  using	  Greenhouse-­‐Geisser	  estimates	  
of	   sphericity	   (ε	   =	   0.802).	   	   The	   results	   show	   that	   there	   was	   a	   significant	   effect	   of	  
reinforcement	   delay	   on	   the	   unnecessary	   distance	   travelled	   during	   the	   pre-­‐discovery	  
period,	   F(2.406,	   69.781)	   =	   5.339,	   p	   =	   .002.	   Figure	   3.10	   shows	   that	   the	   effect	   of	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reinforcement	  delay	  was	  to	   increase	  the	   irrelevant	  distance	  travelled	  during	  the	  pre-­‐
discovery	  period.	  Bonferroni	  corrected	  post	  hoc	  t-­‐tests	  revealed	  that	  the	  unnecessary	  
distance	   travelled	   during	   the	   450-­‐ms	   condition	   differed	   significantly	   from	   the	   0-­‐ms	  




Figure	   3.10	  Mean	   irrelevant	   pre-­‐discovery	   distance	   (and	   standard	   error)	   for	   the	   4	   levels	   of	   reinforcement	   delay.	  
Values	  are	  back-­‐transformed	  from	  the	  log	  transformation.	  
	  
Learning	  
Experiments	  1	  and	  2	  included	  a	  threshold	  to	  determine	  the	  point	  at	  which	  a	  trial	  ended	  
and	   this	   ensured	   that	   a	   trial	   couldn't	   be	   completed	  unless	   learning	  had	   taken	  place.	  
Experiment	  3	  had	  no	  such	  threshold	  so	   it	  was	   important	   to	  check	  that	  at	   least	  some	  
learning	  was	  occurring	   in	  each	  of	  the	  conditions;	  that	   is	  to	  say,	  whether	  the	  distance	  
travelled	  in	  the	  later	  trials	  was	  shorter	  than	  that	  in	  the	  early	  trials.	  A	  learning	  ratio	  was	  
calculated	   by	   dividing	   the	   irrelevant	   pre-­‐discovery	   distance	   in	   trials	   1	   to	   5	   by	   that	  
travelled	  in	  trials	  6	  to	  10	  of	  each	  batch.	  This	  metric	  not	  only	  provided	  a	  way	  to	  check	  
for	   learning	  but	  also	  a	  means	  of	  testing	  whether	  there	  was	  an	  effect	  of	  delay	  on	  the	  
extent	  of	  learning.	  
	  
A	   one-­‐way	   repeated-­‐measures	   ANOVA	  was	   conducted	   on	   the	   log-­‐transformed	   data.	  	  

















improvement	  in	  performance	  from	  early	  to	  late	  trials,	  F(3,	  87)	  =	  0.43,	  p	  =	  .73.	  In	  other	  
words,	   whilst	   delay	   had	   a	   detrimental	   impact	   on	   overall	   performance,	   it	   doesn’t	  
appear	  to	  have	  had	  an	  effect	  on	  the	  relative	  improvement	  in	  performance	  over	  trials,	  
which	  was	  large	  for	  all	  conditions	  (figure	  3.11).	  
	  
	  
Figure	  3.11	  Mean	  performance	   ratio	  of	   early	   to	   late	   trials	   (and	   standard	  error)	   for	   the	  4	   levels	  of	   reinforcement	  
delay.	  Values	  are	  back-­‐transformed	  from	  the	  log	  transformation.	  
	  
To	  test	  for	  differences	  in	  learning	  across	  trials,	  the	  distance	  for	  the	  early	  trials	  (trials	  1	  
to	   5)	   was	   compared	   to	   the	   distance	   for	   the	   late	   trials	   (trials	   6	   to	   10)	   for	   all	   delay	  
conditions.	   A	   two-­‐way	   repeated-­‐measures	   ANOVA	   was	   conducted	   on	   the	   log-­‐
transformed	   data.	   	   The	   results	   show	   that	   there	   was	   a	   significant	   main	   effect	   of	  
reinforcement	   delay	   on	   the	   distance	   travelled,	   F(3,	   87)	   =	   4.88,	  p	   =	   .003;	   figure	   3.12	  
shows	   that	   there	  was	   a	   general	   increase	   in	   the	   distance	   travelled	  with	   longer	   delay	  
durations.	  There	  was	  also	  a	  significant	  main	  effect	  of	  phase	   (early	  or	   late	   trials),	  F(1,	  
29)	  =	  133.21,	  p	  <	  .001;	  figure	  3.12	  clearly	  shows	  that	  the	  distance	  travelled	  in	  the	  late	  
trials	  was	  shorter	  than	  that	  during	  the	  early	  trials.	  However,	   there	  was	  no	  significant	  
delay-­‐phase	   interaction,	   F(3,	   87)	   =	   3.79,	   p	   =	   .13;	   figure	   3.12	   shows	   that	   the	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Figure	   3.12	  Mean	   distance	   for	   early	   and	   late	   trials	   (and	   standard	   error)	   for	   the	   4	   levels	   of	   reinforcement	   delay.	  
Values	  are	  back-­‐transformed	  from	  the	  log	  transformation.	  
	  
Contamination	  
One	   of	   the	   predictions	   for	   a	   learning	   system	  with	   an	   eligibility	   period	   (whether	   it	   is	  
indiscriminate	   or	   sensitive	   to	   the	   contents	   of	   the	   motor	   record)	   is	   that	   delayed	  
reinforcement	  will	  hamper	  learning	  because	  it	  will	  contaminate	  the	  motor	  record	  with	  
non-­‐contingent	   output.	   If	   delayed	   reinforcement	   was	   hampering	   learning	   and	  
performance	  due	  to	  contamination	  of	  the	  motor	  record	  then	  the	  effect	  of	  delay	  should	  
be	   worse	   for	   some	   people	   than	   for	   others.	   Specifically,	   people	   who	   move	   further	  
during	  the	  delay	  period	  will	  create	  more	  non-­‐contingent	  motor	  output	  and	  therefore	  
contaminate	  the	  motor	  record	  more	  than	  others.	  A	  test	  was	  therefore	  carried	  out	   in	  
order	  to	  investigate	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  pre-­‐discovery	  irrelevant	  distance	  and	  
the	  post-­‐discovery	  speed	  for	  the	  450-­‐ms	  delay	  condition.	  
	  
A	   Pearson	   product-­‐moment	   correlation	   was	   carried	   out	   to	   test	   for	   a	   relationship	  
between	   the	   log-­‐transformed	   pre-­‐discovery	   distance	   and	   the	   log-­‐transformed	   post-­‐
discovery	   speed.	   It	   revealed	   that	   there	   was	   no	   correlation	   between	   irrelevant	   pre-­‐
























Figure	  3.13	  The	  relationship	  between	  the	  log	  of	  the	  post-­‐discovery	  speed	  and	  the	  log	  of	  the	  irrelevant	  pre-­‐discovery	  
distance	  for	  the	  450-­‐ms	  delay	  condition.	  
	  
Whilst	   speed	   gives	   an	   indication	   of	   the	   amount	   of	   contaminating	   (non-­‐contingent)	  
output	   that	   was	   occurring,	   it	   gives	   no	   indication	   as	   to	   the	   complexity	   of	   that	  
movement.	  An	  estimate	  of	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  movement	  during	  the	  post-­‐discovery	  
period	  was	  produced	  by	  calculating	   the	  change	   in	   the	  angle	  of	  movement	  over	   time	  
(degrees	   per	   second).	   According	   to	   this	   metric,	   movement	   in	   a	   straight	   line	   would	  
result	   in	   no	   change	   in	   angle	   and	   would	   be	   classed	   as	   a	   low	   complexity	  movement,	  
whereas	  movement	  with	  lots	  of	  changes	  of	  direction	  would	  result	  in	  large	  changes	  in	  
angle	  and	  would	  be	   classed	  as	  high	   complexity	  movement.	   If	   the	   type	  of	  movement	  
during	  the	  delay	  period	  is	  an	  important	  part	  of	  the	  effect	  of	  delay	  because	  of	  how	  this	  
impacts	   on	   contamination	   then	  we	  would	   expect	   large	   changes	   in	   angle	   during	   the	  
post-­‐discovery	  period	  to	  be	  correlated	  with	   longer	   irrelevant	  pre-­‐discovery	  distances.	  
A	   Pearson	   product-­‐moment	   correlation	   was	   carried	   out	   to	   test	   for	   a	   relationship	  
between	  the	  irrelevant	  pre-­‐discovery	  distance	  and	  the	  post-­‐discovery	  change	  in	  angle,	  
it	   revealed	  no	  correlation	  between	  the	  two	  variables	   (r	  =	   -­‐0.03,	  n	  =	  30,	  p	  <	   .43,	  one-­‐

















Figure	   3.14	   The	   relationship	   between	   the	   complexity	   of	   movement	   during	   the	   post-­‐discovery	   period	   and	   the	  
irrelevant	  pre-­‐discovery	  distance	  for	  the	  450-­‐ms	  delay	  condition.	  
	  
Discussion	  
Differing	  sensitivities	  to	  delay	  depending	  on	  type	  of	  motor	  task	  
The	  results	  showed	  that	  the	  effect	  of	  delay	  on	  performance	  was	  limited	  to	  the	  longest	  
duration	   condition	   (450	   ms)	   and	   therefore	   that	   the	   overall	   sensitivity	   to	   delay	   was	  
considerably	  lower	  than	  for	  the	  task	  employed	  in	  experiments	  1	  and	  2	  where	  an	  effect	  
was	   detected	   in	   the	   75-­‐ms	   condition.	   In	   terms	   of	   overall	   sensitivity,	   changing	   the	  
repetition	   of	   reinforcement	   from	  within	   to	   between	   trials	  was	   akin	   to	   changing	   the	  
task	  from	  a	  motor	  control	   (Foulkes	  &	  Miall,	  2000;	  Miall	  &	  Jackson,	  2006;	  Miall	  et	  al.,	  
1985)	   or	   motor	   adaptation	   paradigm	   (Held	   et	   al.,	   1966;	   Kitazawa	   et	   al.	   1995)	   to	   a	  
reinforcement	  learning	  paradigm	  (Elsner	  &	  Hommel,	  2004;	  Hollerman	  &	  Schultz,	  1998;	  
Shanks	  &	  Dickinson,	  1991;	  Shanks	  et	  al.,	  1989).	  And	  yet	  both	  versions	  of	  the	  task	  were	  
designed	  to	  be	  tests	  of	  reinforcement	  learning,	  with	  feedback	  characteristics	  that	  one	  
would	   expect	   to	   find	   in	   such	   tasks	   (Jordan	   &	   Rumelhart,	   1992).	   For	   instance,	   all	  
reinforcement	   signals	   were	   qualitative,	   indicating	   whether	   or	   not	   the	   correct	  
movement	  had	  been	  produced	  but	  providing	  no	   information	  on	   the	   relative	   level	   of	  
performance.	   Reinforcement	  was	   also	   contingent	   on	   behaviour:	   if	   an	   individual	   had	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One	   potential	   explanation	   for	   this	   result	   is	   that	   the	   important	   difference	   between	  
tasks	  that	  target	  supervised	  learning	  mechanisms	  and	  those	  that	  target	  reinforcement	  
learning	   mechanisms	   is	   not	   the	   informational	   content	   of	   the	   feedback	   but	   the	  
frequency	  with	  which	  that	  feedback	  is	  delivered.	  The	  primary	  difference	  between	  the	  
two	   versions	   of	   the	   joystick	   task	   in	   this	   sense	   is	   that	   feedback	   is	   delivered	   whilst	  
movement	  is	  on-­‐going	  in	  one	  case	  (within-­‐trial	  repetition	  of	  reinforcement)	  whereas	  it	  
signals	  the	  successful	  completion	  of	  a	  movement	  in	  the	  other	  (between-­‐trial	  repetition	  
of	   reinforcement).	   From	   the	   individual’s	   perspective,	   the	   within-­‐trial	   repetition	  
experiments	   were	   effectively	   closed-­‐loop	   tasks	   with	   the	   participants	   constantly	  
adjusting	  their	  movements	  based	  on	  external	  feedback.	  In	  some	  ways	  this	  is	  similar	  to	  
the	   situation	   in	   a	   standard	   motor	   control	   task	   (supervised	   learning)	   such	   as	   target	  
pursuit	  (Foulkes	  &	  Miall,	  2000;	  Miall	  &	  Jackson,	  2006;	  Miall	  et	  al.,	  1985).	  By	  contrast,	  
the	  between-­‐trial	  repetition	  experiment	  is	  like	  an	  open	  loop	  task	  with	  the	  participants	  
attempting	   to	   make	   the	   correct	   movement	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   feedback	   and	   on	  
subsequent	  attempts	  adjusting	  the	  movement	  based	  on	  past	  experience.	  
	  
An	   alternative	   explanation	   is	   that	   the	   differences	   between	   the	   two	   tasks	   call	   into	  
question	   the	   distinctions	   that	   are	   sometimes	   drawn	   between	   different	   types	   of	  
learning	   such	   as	   supervised	   and	   reinforcement	   learning	   (Jordan	  &	   Rumelhart,	   1992;	  
Wolpert	  et	  al.,	  2001).	  By	  employing	  a	  rich	   input	  device	   instead	  of	  a	  button-­‐	  or	   lever-­‐
pressing	   response,	   the	   joystick	   task	   removed	   one	   of	   the	   most	   obvious	   distinctions	  
between	   the	   experimental	   approaches	   to	   investigating	   supervised	   versus	  
reinforcement	   learning.	   It	   could	   be	   that	   the	   difference	   in	   effect	   found	   here	   simply	  
highlights	   the	   problems	   associated	   with	   attempting	   to	   investigate	   particular	   neural	  
mechanisms	   at	   the	   behavioural	   level	   (Anderson,	   Fincham	   and	   Douglass,	   1997).	  
Definitions	  based	  on	  theories	  of	  learning	  or	  neuroanatomy	  might	  not	  accord	  well	  with	  
the	  way	  behaviour	  pans	  out	  in	  reality.	  It	  might	  not	  make	  sense	  to	  refer	  to	  some	  types	  
of	   learning	   independently	   of	   one	   another	   because	   they	   simply	   cannot	   operate	  
independently	  in	  a	  normally	  functioning	  organism.	  
	  
In	   terms	   of	   the	   theory	   of	   action	   acquisition	   offered	   by	   Redgrave	   and	  Gurney	   (2006)	  
and	   Redgrave	   et	   al.	   (2008),	   the	   difference	   in	   sensitivity	   between	   the	   two	   different	  
versions	   of	   the	   joystick	   task	   is	   difficult	   to	   interpret.	   It	   could	   indicate	   that	   the	  match	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between	  the	  effective	  delay	  duration	  in	  experiments	  1	  and	  2	  and	  the	  onset	  latency	  of	  
the	   phasic	   activity	   of	   dopamine	   neurons	   is	   purely	   incidental.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	  
experiments	   were	   sensitive	   to	   delay	   for	   reasons	   other	   than	   the	   underlying	   learning	  
mechanism.	  If	  this	   is	  true,	  then	  the	  theory	  needs	  to	  be	  able	  to	  account	  for	  the	  result	  
from	   experiment	   4	   and	   also	   the	   range	   of	   findings	   from	   the	   reinforcement	   learning	  
literature	  with	  which	   this	   result	   is	   in	  accordance.	   In	  other	  words,	   the	  current	   finding	  
does	  not	  necessarily	  contradict	  the	  theory,	  but	  it	  does	  potentially	  call	  into	  question	  the	  
explanation	  that	  the	  learning	  mechanism	  evolved	  to	  be	  short	  latency	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  
non-­‐contingent	   contamination	   of	   the	   motor	   record.	   If	   the	   learning	   mechanism	   has	  
evolved	   to	  work	  at	   such	   short	   latencies	   in	   a	   trade-­‐off	   between	   the	  greater	  depth	  of	  
processing	   that	  would	   come	   from	   a	   few	   hundred	  milliseconds	   of	   further	   processing	  
(Redgrave	   et	   al.,	   2008)	   then	   we	   must	   assume	   that	   the	   detrimental	   impact	   of	  
contamination	  is	  strong	  and	  presumably	  detectable	  at	  the	  experimental	  level.	  
	  
One	  problem	  with	  comparing	  the	  susceptibility	  to	  delay	  in	  the	  two	  tasks	  covered	  here	  
(and	  almost	  any	  two	  tasks	  featuring	  delay)	   is	  that	  they	  are	  not	  calibrated	  in	  terms	  of	  
difficulty.	  Performance	  in	  difficult	  tasks	  is	  likely	  to	  suffer	  more	  when	  reinforcement	  is	  
delayed	   so	   it	   could	   be	   the	   case	   that	   the	   task	   featuring	   within-­‐trial	   repetition	   of	  
reinforcement	   was	   simply	   more	   difficult	   than	   the	   task	   featuring	   between-­‐trial	  
repetition.	  This	  is	  not	  something	  that	  can	  be	  ruled	  out	  in	  the	  present	  case,	  but	  it	  could	  
present	  a	  fruitful	  line	  of	  inquiry	  for	  future	  studies	  seeking	  to	  investigate	  differences	  at	  
the	  methodological	  level	  between	  supervised	  learning	  and	  reinforcement	  learning.	  
	  
Eligibility	  and	  contamination	  
As	   discussed	   in	   the	   introduction,	   the	   ability	   of	   animals	   to	   learn	   in	   the	   presence	   of	  
delayed	   reinforcement	   implies	   the	   existence	   of	   some	   kind	   of	   short	   term	   record	   of	  
movements	  and	  context,	  perhaps	   in	   the	   form	  of	  a	  gradually	  decaying	  eligibility	   trace	  
(Singh	  &	   Sutton,	   1996).	   It	   is	   assumed	   that	   any	   such	   trace	  must	   be	   time	   limited	   and	  
previous	  research	  investigating	  response	  acquisition	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  delay	  indicates	  
that	  the	  length	  of	  the	  trace	  could	  be	  in	  excess	  of	  10	  s	  (Lattal	  &	  Gleeson,	  1990;	  Okouchi,	  
2009;	  Snycerski	  et	  al.,	  2004;	  Snycerski	  et	  al.	  2005).	  However,	  it	  is	  also	  possible	  that	  the	  
number	  and	  type	  of	  actions	  that	  occur	  within	  the	  eligibility	  period	  are	  also	  important,	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producing	  more	  or	   less	  contamination	  depending	  on	   the	   type	  of	  behaviour	   involved.	  
Consequently,	   it	  was	  suggested	  that	  we	  might	  be	  able	  to	  find	  evidence	  of	  movement	  
specific	   contamination	   in	   the	   joystick	   task	   in	   the	   form	   of	   a	   correlation	   between	   the	  
quantity	  or	  complexity	  of	  movement	  during	  the	  delay	  period	  and	  performance.	  	  
	  
The	  results,	  however,	  revealed	  no	  correlation	  between	  performance	  and	  complexity	  or	  
between	  performance	  and	  the	  speed	  of	  movement	  during	  the	  delay	  period	  and	  thus	  
provide	   no	   support	   for	   the	   hypothesis	   that	   the	   amount	   of	  movement	   is	   a	   factor	   in	  
learning	  with	  delayed	  reinforcement	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  delay	  period.	  In	  
a	   sense,	   this	   result	   is	  not	  wholly	  unexpected.	  One	  of	   the	  major	  differences	  between	  
the	  working	  memory	  system	  mentioned	  in	  the	  introduction	  (Baddeley,	  2003)	  and	  the	  
reinforcement	   learning	  process	  under	   investigation	  here	   is	   that	   the	   latter	  works	  at	  a	  
very	   low	   level	   and,	   as	   we	   have	   noted,	   is	   essentially	   indiscriminate	   in	   nature;	   the	  
latency	   at	   which	   phasic	   dopamine	   activity	   occurs	   precludes	   any	   rich	   information	  
processing.	   However,	   the	   idea	   that	   any	   learning	   system	   would	   be	   unaffected	   by	  
information	  load	  is,	  nonetheless,	  surprising.	  
	  
Of	   course,	   it	   is	   possible	   that	   the	   experiment	   simply	   didn’t	   provide	   the	   necessary	  
conditions	  to	  enable	  the	  detection	  of	  an	  effect	  of	  contamination.	  For	  instance,	  longer	  
delay	   durations	   would	   have	   provided	   more	   opportunity	   for	   the	   occurrence	   of	   non-­‐
contingent	  movements	  and	  it	  is	  conceivable	  that	  the	  amount	  of	  movement	  must	  reach	  
some	   kind	   of	   threshold	   before	   it	   exerts	   a	   load	   over	   and	   above	   the	   basic	   effect	   of	   a	  
decaying	  eligibility	  trace.	  Another	  explanation	  is	  that	  the	  effect	  of	  delay	  was	  the	  result	  
of	  an	  entirely	  different	  brain	  process.	  For	  example,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  learning	  might	  
reflect	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  declarative	  guidance	  of	  behaviour.	  Rather	  than	  having	  to	  rely	  
primarily	   on	   the	   reinforcement	   of	   recent	  motor	   output,	   the	   participants	  might	   have	  
been	   choosing	   successful	   shapes	   of	   movement	   or	   spatially	   inferring	   the	   movement	  
they	   were	   required	   to	   make.	   If	   so,	   the	   relative	   complexity	   and	   distance	   of	   the	  
movement	  might	  be	  unimportant	  as	  the	  overall	  trajectory	  would	  be	  object	  of	  learning.	  





The	  influence	  of	  declarative	  processes	  
The	   theme	   across	   all	   the	   experiments	   in	   this	   thesis	   is	   to	   develop	   and	   assess	   an	  
experimental	   paradigm	   designed	   to	   record	   action	   acquisition	   in	   humans.	   Chapter	   2	  
introduced	  the	   joystick	   task	  and	  detailed	   two	  studies	   featuring	  within-­‐trial	   repetition	  
of	  reinforcement	  and	  the	  present	  chapter	  has	  detailed	  a	  variant	  on	  the	  task	  featuring	  
between-­‐trial	  repetition	  of	  reinforcement.	  The	  advantages	  of	  between-­‐trial	  repetition	  
have	   already	   been	  discussed	   and	   certainly,	   the	   emergence	  of	   a	   shape	  of	  movement	  
over	   trials,	  visible	   in	   figures	  3.1	  and	  3.7,	  captures	  an	   intuitive	  sense	  of	  how	   it	   is	   that	  
actions	   are	   learned.	   Indeed,	   it	   is	   possible	   that	   in	   such	   cases,	   the	   trajectory	   of	  
movement	  became	  much	  more	   important	   than	   the	  need	   to	  achieve	  a	  particular	  end	  
point.	  In	  this	  sense,	  at	  least	  some	  participants	  could	  have	  been	  solving	  the	  problem	  of	  
‘what	  movement	  will	   bring	   an	   end	   to	   the	   trial’	   as	   opposed	   to	   ‘where	   in	   the	   search	  
space	   does	   the	   joystick	   need	   to	   be	   in	   order	   to	   bring	   an	   end	   to	   the	   trial’;	   or,	   more	  
simply,	   learning	   ‘what’	   instead	   of	   ‘where’.	   This	   is	   presumably	   similar	   to	   the	   type	   of	  
learning	  that	  is	  involved	  in	  producing	  a	  gesture	  and	  thus	  variations	  on	  the	  current	  task	  
might	  present	  a	  useful	  way	  of	  investigating	  this	  type	  of	  learning	  for	  future	  research.	  	  
	  
However,	  whilst	  many	  of	  the	  trials	  showed	  a	  stable	  progression	  of	  a	  particular	  shape	  of	  
movement,	  a	  substantial	  number	  also	  displayed	  jumps	  in	  performance	  over	  the	  course	  
of	  a	  single	  trial	  and,	  in	  a	  handful	  of	  cases,	  such	  as	  that	  shown	  in	  figure	  3.15,	  seemingly	  
one-­‐shot	   learning.	  One	   reason	   for	  examples	  of	   learning	  such	  as	   this	   is	   that	   the	  basic	  
structure	   of	   the	   task	   –	   location	   finding	   –	   meant	   that	   it	   was	   relatively	   easy	   to	  
accidentally	   produce	  near	   optimal	   performance	  on	   a	   given	   trial.	   In	   other	  words,	   the	  
path	  taken	  from	  the	  central	  starting	  position	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  explore	  the	  search	  space	  
could	   result	   in	   the	   joystick	  moving	   straight	   through	   the	   hotspot.	  Whilst	   it	  would	   be	  
wrong	  to	  conclude	  that	  such	  cases	  definitely	  do	  not	  represent	  the	  kind	  of	  learning	  that	  
the	  task	  was	  meant	  to	  record,	  the	  general	  presence	  of	  rapid	  learning	  in	  the	  experiment	  
raises	  the	  possibility	  that	  performance	  in	  the	  task	  is	  driven	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  by	  learning	  





Figure	  3.15	  Data	  taken	  from	  experiment	  4.	  The	  images	  show	  a	  batch	  of	  trials	  where	  a	  lucky	  first	  trial	  is	  followed	  by	  
near	  perfect	  performance	  in	  all	  subsequent	  trials.	  
	  
Avoiding	   the	   effects	   of	   declarative	   learning	   in	   humans	   is	   extremely	   difficult.	   In	   the	  
experiments	   presented	   so	   far,	   attempts	   were	   made	   to	   reduce	   these	   effects.	   For	  
instance,	   all	   participants	   were	   aware	   that	   the	   task	   was	   to	  move	   the	   joystick	   to	   the	  
correct	  position.	  This	   intervention	  appears	  unusual	  at	   first	  as	   it	  removes	  such	  a	   large	  
portion	   of	  what	   the	   participant	  must	   discover.	   However,	  whereas	   Thorndike	   (1911),	  
for	  example,	  could	  rely	  on	  animals	  not	  to	  make	  a	  leap	  of	  insight;	  human	  participants,	  
by	  contrast,	  can	  be	  relied	  on	  to	  do	  the	  opposite:	   the	  question	   is	  not	  so	  much	   if	   they	  
will	   work	   something	   out	   but	   when.	   By	   giving	   some	   information	   about	   the	   task	  
demands,	   the	   intention	   was	   to	   as	   far	   as	   possible	   avoid	   large	   shifts	   in	   performance	  
caused	  by	  learning	  or	  insight	  at	  a	  declarative	  level.	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  was	  not	  possible	  
for	  a	  participant	  to	  leap	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  the	  task	  was	  to	  search	  for	  a	  particular	  
joystick	  position	  as	  this	  information	  was	  already	  provided.	  
	  
It	  would	  be	  impossible	  to	  create	  a	  version	  of	  the	  joystick	  task	  that	  we	  could	  guarantee	  
had	   excluded	   the	   contribution	   of	   spatial	   memory	   and	   general	   high-­‐level	   cognitive	  
guidance	  of	  behaviour	  (Anderson,	  Fincham	  and	  Douglass,	  1997).	   	  However,	  whilst	  we	  
might	   not	   be	   able	   to	   achieve	   process	   purity	   in	   the	   joystick	   task,	   it	   is,	   nonetheless	  
possible	   to	   change	   the	   balance	   of	   the	   paradigm	   from	   one	   that	   might	   be	   more	  
declarative	  in	  nature	  (i.e.	  involving	  the	  selection	  of	  a	  particular	  reaching	  movement)	  to	  
one	   that	   is	  more	  nondeclarative	   (i.e.	   forcing	   the	  motor	   system	   to	  extract	   contingent	  
motor	   output	   from	   multiple	   samples	   of	   self-­‐generated	   behavioural	   variance).	   A	  
potential	  way	  of	  achieving	  this	  is	  to	  make	  the	  required	  movement	  more	  complex	  and	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therefore	  more	   difficult	   to	   infer	   spatially.	   This	   would	   have	   the	   benefit	   of	   making	   it	  
harder	   to	  accidentally	  produce	  optimal	  performance	  and	  would	  give	  more	   scope	   for	  
learning	  over	  and	  above	  the	  declarative	  guidance	  of	  behaviour.	  To	  this	  end,	  chapter	  4	  
details	  the	  development	  of	  a	  gestural	  version	  of	  the	  joystick	  task	  and	  an	  investigation	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Chapter	   4:	   declarative	   and	   nondeclarative	  
components	  of	  action	  learning.	  
The	   versions	   of	   the	   joystick	   task	   described	   in	   chapters	   2	   and	   3	   provided	   simple	   and	  
flexible	   approaches	   to	   the	   study	  of	   action	   acquisition.	   The	   task	   featuring	  within-­‐trial	  
repetition	   of	   reinforcement	   provided	   a	   particularly	   useful	   approach	   for	   presenting	  
numerous	  new	   learning	   scenarios	  and	  a	  means	  of	  extracting	  a	   low	  variance	   learning	  
metric	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  number	  of	  instances	  of	  reinforcement.	  It	  also	  offered	  a	  way	  
of	  delivering	   large	  numbers	  of	  discrete	  stimulus	  presentations,	   ideal	   for	   investigating	  
the	  effects	  of	  special	  stimulus	  properties	  on	  acquisition.	  The	  task	  featuring	  between-­‐
trial	   repetition	   of	   reinforcement	   provided	   a	   more	   traditional	   method	   of	   delivering	  
reinforcement	  and	  as	   such	   represented	  a	  model	  of	   response	  acquisition	   that	   can	  be	  
reasonably	  compared	  to	  response	  acquisition	  paradigms	  involving	  nonhuman	  animals.	  
It	   also	   offered	   a	  means	   of	   recording	   the	   evolution	   of	   a	  movement	   trace	   over	   time,	  
allowing	  learning	  to	  be	  quantified	  relative	  to	  optimal	  performance	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  finer	  
grained	   than	   would	   be	   possible	   with	   a	   button-­‐push	   paradigm.	   The	   present	   chapter	  
describes	  a	  version	  of	  the	  task	  that	  requires	  the	  participant	  to	  generate	  more	  complex	  
movements,	   the	   aim	   being	   to	   shift	   the	   task	   further	   towards	   the	   low-­‐level	   learning	  
processes	   that	   are	   the	   subject	   of	   the	   current	   research.	   It	   furthermore	   describes	   an	  
attempt	   to	   investigate	   the	   contribution	   of	   high-­‐level	   cognitive	   and	   spatial	   learning	  
systems	  to	  the	  joystick	  task.	  
	  
The	  declarative-­‐nondeclarative	  split	  
There	  is	  a	  tradition	  in	  psychology	  and	  neuroscience	  of	  drawing	  a	  distinction	  between	  
those	   mental	   processes	   that	   are	   described	   as	   flexible,	   insightful	   and	   conscious	   and	  
those	   that	  are	  described	  as	   rigid,	  habitual	  and	  unconscious.	   In	   the	   field	  of	   long-­‐term	  
memory,	  for	  example,	  Squire	  (2004)	  summarises	  memory	  classifications	  with	  one	  main	  
grouping	  criterion:	  a	  distinction	  between	  declarative	  and	  nondeclarative	  memory.	  He	  
describes	  the	  difference	  as	  follows:	  
	  
Declarative	  memory	  is	  representational.	  It	  provides	  a	  way	  to	  model	  the	  
external	  world,	  and	  as	  a	  model	  of	  the	  world	  it	  is	  either	  true	  or	  false.	  In	  
contrast,	   nondeclarative	   memory	   is	   neither	   true	   nor	   false.	   It	   is	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dispositional	   and	   is	   expressed	   through	   performance	   rather	   than	  
recollection.	  (p.173).	  
	  
A	  similar	  distinction	  is	  made	  in	  the	  field	  of	  animal	  learning,	  with	  Balleine	  and	  Dickinson	  
(1998)	  explaining	  that	  their	  “analysis	  of	  instrumental	  learning	  conforms	  to	  the	  popular	  
distinction	   between	   declarative	   and	   procedural	   learning	   with	   contingency	   learning	  
being	   declarative	   in	   nature	   and	   habit	   learning	   procedural	   (p.412)”.	   This	   is	   further	  
echoed	  in	  the	  field	  of	  skill	  learning	  and	  performance:	  
	  
Automatic	  processing	  is	  activation	  of	  a	  learned	  sequence	  of	  elements	  in	  
long-­‐term	   memory	   that	   is	   initiated	   by	   appropriate	   inputs	   and	   then	  
proceeds	  automatically—without	  subject	  control,	  without	  stressing	  the	  
capacity	   limitations	  of	   the	  system,	  and	  without	  necessarily	  demanding	  
attention.	  Controlled	  processing	  is	  a	  temporary	  activation	  of	  a	  sequence	  
of	  elements	  that	  can	  be	  set	  up	  quickly	  and	  easily	  but	  requires	  attention,	  
is	   capacity-­‐limited	   (usually	   serial	   in	   nature),	   and	   is	   controlled	   by	   the	  
subject.	  (Schneider	  &	  Shiffrin,	  1977,	  p.1).	  
	  
In	   other	   words,	   many	   different	   approaches	   to	   the	   study	   of	   learning,	   memory	   and	  
performance	   have	   converged	   on	   this	   compelling	   dichotomy.	   As	   we	   will	   see,	   the	  
distinction	  has	  important	  implications	  for	  the	  study	  of	  action	  acquisition.	  
	  
Perhaps	  the	  most	  convincing	  attempt	  to	  operationalise	  this	  difference	  has	  come	  from	  
research	   into	   instrumental	   learning,	   employing	   techniques	   of	   overtraining	   and	  
reinforcer	  devaluation.	  Adams	  (1982),	  provided	  the	  template	  for	  future	  research	  with	  
a	   series	   of	   experiments	   investigating	   the	   effects	   of	   various	   degrees	   of	   exposure	   to	  
reinforcers	   and	   response	   practice	   on	   the	   tendency	   of	   rats	   to	   behave	   as	   if	   they	  
understand	  the	  consequences	  of	  their	  actions.	  The	  first	  experiment	  saw	  rats	  trained	  to	  
press	  a	   lever	   in	   return	   for	   sucrose	  pellets.	  Half	  of	   the	   rats	   received	  a	   low	  amount	  of	  
training	  and	  the	  other	  half	  received	  a	  relatively	  high	  amount	  of	  training.	  Following	  this,	  
half	  of	  the	  low	  training	  group	  and	  half	  of	  the	  high	  training	  group	  received	  injections	  of	  
lithium	   chloride	   paired	   with	   access	   to	   the	   sucrose	   pellets	   (thus	   devaluing	   the	  
reinforcer)	   whilst	   the	   remaining	   two	   groups	   received	   unpaired	   injections	   (causing	  
sickness	   without	   devaluation).	   All	   of	   the	   rats	   were	   then	   given	   an	   extinction	   session	  
during	  which	  the	  number	  of	  lever	  responses	  was	  recorded.	  Adams	  found	  that	  the	  low	  
training	  devaluation	  group	  had	  a	  lower	  rate	  of	  response	  during	  extinction	  than	  the	  low	  
91 
 
training	   control	   group,	   indicating	   that	   the	   rats	   in	   the	   devaluation	   group	   had	  
understood	  that	  pressing	  the	  lever	  would	  deliver	  food	  that	  was	  no	  longer	  palatable	  to	  
them	  (i.e.	  similar	  to	  Adams	  &	  Dickinson,	  1981).	  By	  contrast,	  no	  difference	  was	  found	  
between	   the	   high	   training	   conditions,	   suggesting	   that	   the	   high	   training	   devaluation	  
group	  had	  not	   integrated	   the	  devaluation	  with	   their	  understanding	  of	   the	   lever-­‐food	  
contingency.	   The	   implication	   of	   this	   finding	   is	   that	   behaviour	   initially	   under	   goal-­‐
directed	   control	   can	   be	   transformed	   into	   a	   habit	   through	   prolonged	   training.	   This	  
experimental	  procedure	  provides	  an	  excellent	  example	  with	  which	  to	  compare	  other	  
examples	  of	  declarative	  or	  nondeclarative	  learning.	  
	  
Adding	   components	   to	   the	   behavioural	   repertoire	   and	  
‘accidental’	  performance	  
Whilst	   Adams	   (1982)	   was	   able	   to	   demonstrate	   a	   convincing	   distinction	   between	  
habitual	   and	   goal-­‐directed	   elicitation	   of	   actions	   from	   the	   behavioural	   repertoire,	   an	  
equivalent	  distinction	  regarding	  the	  different	  brain	  processes	  that	  might	  be	  involved	  in	  
the	  acquisition	  of	  actions	  has	  been	  relatively	  neglected.	  This	  is	  presumably	  due	  in	  part	  
to	  a	  general	  neglect	  of	  research	  into	  action	  acquisition	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  maintenance	  of	  
actions	   (Lattal	   &	   Gleeson,	   1990),	   but	   it	   also	   relates	   to	   methodological	   problems	  
associated	  with	  demonstrating	  that	  nonhuman	  animals	  can	  produce	  not	  only	  the	  kind	  
of	  uninsightful	   learning	   reported	  by	  Thorndike	   (1911),	   but	   also	   the	   kind	  of	   insightful	  
learning	  that	  humans	  are	  capable	  of	  (Bayern,	  Heathcote,	  Rutz	  &	  Kacelnik,	  2009).	  
	  
The	  apparent	  tendency	  of	  animals	  to	  learn	  laboratory	  tasks	  uninsightfully	  has	  allowed	  
researchers	   to	   gain	   some	   understanding	   as	   to	   how	   important	   it	   is	   for	   an	   essentially	  
indiscriminate	  learning	  system	  to	  be	  exposed	  to	  the	  right	  kind	  of	  behavioural	  variance.	  
The	   technique	   of	   shaping	   (see,	   for	   example,	   Petersen,	   2004),	   for	   instance,	   is	   an	  
exercise	   in	   constraining	   the	   behavioural	   variance	   of	   an	   animal	   subject.	   The	  
experimenter	   effectively	   takes	   on	   the	   role	   of	   an	   external	   declarative	   system	   for	   the	  
animal	  by	   identifying	  appropriate	  behavioural	   variance	  and	  ensuring	   that	   the	  animal	  
executes	   the	   desired	   movements	   by	   reinforcing	   successive	   approximations	   of	   the	  
desired	  behaviour.	  At	  the	  other	  end	  of	  the	  spectrum	  is	  the	  kind	  of	  gradual,	  error	  laden	  
learning	   investigated	  by	   Thorndike	   (1911)	   in	  which	   no	   guidance	  of	   behaviour	   occurs	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and,	   still	   more	   extreme,	   the	   phenomenon	   of	   superstitious	   learning	   in	   which	   the	  
animal’s	   learning	   systems	   are	   exposed	   to	   non-­‐contingent	   reinforcement.	   Skinner	  
(1948),	   for	   example,	   describes	   a	   study	   in	   which	   pigeons	   were	   placed	   into	   operant	  
chambers	  and	  given	  access	  to	  a	  food	  hopper	  at	  regular	  intervals,	   irrespective	  of	  their	  
behaviour.	   He	   found	   that	   in	   6	   out	   of	   8	   cases,	   operant	   conditioning	   took	   place:	   the	  
pigeons	  developed	   stereotyped	   responses	   to	   the	  hopper,	   such	  as	  pronounced	  head-­‐
tossing,	  even	  though	  delivery	  of	  food	  was	  not	  contingent	  on	  those	  responses.	  In	  other	  
words,	  Skinner’s	  work	  suggests	  that	  if	  inefficiencies	  are	  sufficiently	  consistent,	  they	  can	  
evolve	   into	   stable,	   and	   yet	   completely	   irrelevant,	   actions	   in	   the	   presence	   of	   non-­‐
contingent	   reinforcement.	   It	   should	   be	   noted,	   however,	   that	   the	   explanation	   of	  
superstitious	  learning	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  reinforcement	  of	  recent	  motor	  output	  has	  been	  
disputed	  (Aeschleman,	  Rosen	  &	  Williams,	  2003;	  Timberlake	  &	  Lucas,	  1985).	  
	  
Finding	   evidence	   of	   such	   nondeclarative	   learning	   is	   notoriously	   difficult	   and	   the	  
interventions	  and	  scenarios	  that	  are	  required	  to	  provide	  convincing	  demonstrations	  of	  
such	   learning	   tend	   to	   be	   extreme.	   Examples	   include	   stochastic	   obscuring	   of	  
associations	  (e.g.	  Knowlton,	  Mangels	  &	  Squire,	  1996),	  dual	  task	  procedures	  (e.g.	  Nissen	  
&	   Bullemer,	   1987),	   implicit	   priming	   (e.g.	   Leiphart,	   Rosenfeld	   &	   Gabrieli,	   1993)	   and	  
lesion	   studies	   (e.g.	   Bayley,	   Frascino	   and	   Squire,	   2005).	   Whilst	   such	   techniques	   are	  
useful	   for	   the	  purpose	  of	  measuring	  nondeclarative	   learning	   in	  general,	   they	  are	  not	  
readily	  compatible	  with	  the	  paradigm	  presented	  here	  for	  the	  general	   investigation	  of	  
action	  acquisition	  in	  healthy	  subjects.	  
	  
What	  characterises	  action	  acquisition	   in	   those	  nonhuman	  animals	   that	  are	  unable	   to	  
learn	  through	  insight	   is	  that	  they	  are	  largely	  at	  the	  mercy	  of	  external	  constraints	  and	  
current	   drives	   for	   the	   behavioural	   variance	   they	   produce	   and	   this	   in	   turn	   influences	  
what	  they	  are	  able	  to	  learn	  and	  how	  fast	  they	  are	  able	  to	  learn	  it.	  The	  consistent	  yet	  
irrelevant	  behaviour	  acquired	  during	  superstitious	  learning	  provides	  a	  caricature	  of	  the	  
type	   of	   situation	   that	   the	   declarative	   guidance	   of	   behaviour	   helps	   humans	   to	   avoid.	  
However,	  it	  also	  points	  to	  a	  possible	  hallmark	  of	  nondeclarative	  action	  acquisition	  that	  
is	  of	  potential	  use	   in	  human	  research.	  Whilst	  pure	  examples	  of	  superstitious	   learning	  
are,	  presumably,	  rare,	  perhaps	  more	  common	  are	  situations	  in	  which	  a	  successful	  task-­‐
relevant	   action	   is	   learnt	   which	   contains	   consistent	   inefficiencies;	   that	   is	   to	   say,	   an	  
93 
 
action	   which	   contains	   movement	   components	   that	   are	   unnecessary	   but	   are	  
nonetheless	  faithfully	  repeated	  each	  time	  the	  action	  is	  produced.	  The	  ability	  to	  identify	  
such	   consistent	   inefficiencies	   in	   the	   joystick	   task	   under	   some	   circumstances	   but	   not	  
others	   would	   provide	   some	   support	   for	   the	   idea	   that	   an	   indiscriminate	   learning	  
mechanism	  is	  capable	  of	  driving	  action	  acquisition.	  
	  
As	   discussed	   in	   chapter	   3,	  we	   have	   thus	   far	   attempted	   to	   reduce	   the	   effects	   of	   the	  
powerful	  declarative	  abilities	   that	  human	  participants	  bring	   to	  all	   tasks,	  by	  disclosing	  
information	   about	   task	   demands	   before	   testing	   commences.	   However,	   whilst	   this	  
intervention	   at	   the	   level	   of	   task	   instructions	   might	   have	   reduced	   the	   number	   of	  
different	  approaches	  that	  were	  taken	  to	  the	  task,	  it	  also	  had	  two	  potential	  limitations.	  
Firstly,	  by	   increasing	  a	  participant’s	  knowledge	  we	  make	  the	  task	  easier	   to	   learn	  and	  
therefore	  decrease	  the	  number	  of	  trials	  over	  which	  learning	  occurs,	  thus	  reducing	  the	  
amount	   of	   effective	   data	   that	   can	   be	   collected.	   Secondly,	   it	   greatly	   reduces	   the	  
likelihood	   of	   learners	   developing	   consistently	   inefficient	   behaviour:	   that	   is	   to	   say,	  
extracting	   a	   suboptimal	   movement	   trace	   from	   their	   own	   behavioural	   variance.	   An	  
alternative	   is	   to	   make	   the	   movement	   on	   which	   reinforcement	   is	   contingent	   more	  
complex.	   In	   this	  way,	   the	   task	   instructions	   can	   remain	  explicit,	  but	  we	  provide	  more	  
scope	  for	  participants	  to	  display	   inefficiencies	  of	  behaviour	  and	   increase	  the	  chances	  
that	  learning	  will	  occur	  over	  a	  greater	  number	  of	  trials.	  
	  
Testing	   the	   contribution	   to	   action	   acquisition	   of	   declarative	   versus	   nondeclarative	  
processes	  
The	   learning	   mechanism	   proposed	   by	   Redgrave	   and	   Gurney	   (2006)	   does	   not	   just	  
concern	   nondeclarative	   learning.	   Indeed,	   it	   is	   part	   of	   their	   position	   that	   this	  
mechanism	  helps	  animals	  to	  determine	  whether	  they	  are	  agents	  of	  events	  as	  well	  as	  
how	   to	   elicit	   those	   events	   by	   time	   stamping	   the	   information	   converging	   on	   the	  
striatum	  at	  the	  moment	  of	  reinforcement	  and	  reselecting	  movements	  (and	  seeking	  out	  
context)	  that	   immediately	  preceded	  the	  reinforcement.	  Under	  normal	  circumstances,	  
it	  is	  assumed	  that	  this	  process	  would	  be	  intricately	  tied	  in	  with	  declarative	  processes.	  
However,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   joystick	   task,	   any	   such	   low-­‐level	  mechanism	   for	   linking	  
events	  with	  behavioural	  output	  would	  manifest	  itself	  in	  behaviour	  that	  has	  competing	  
explanations	  in	  terms	  of	  high	  level	  executive	  systems	  and	  spatial	  learning.	  Specifically,	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the	  ability	   to	  home	   in	  on	  a	  particular	  hotspot	   location	  could	  be	  based	  on	  an	  explicit	  
memory	  of	   the	  hand	  position	  and	   simple	   inference	  of	   the	  path	   required	   to	  move	   to	  
that	  point	  or	  it	  could	  be	  based	  on	  the	  stamping	  in	  of	  recent	  motor	  output.	  
	  
In	  order	  to	  investigate	  the	  contribution	  of	  high-­‐level	  spatially	  guided	  learning	  and	  low-­‐
level	   reinforcement	   learning,	   an	   experiment	  was	   carried	   out	   to	  measure	   acquisition	  
under	   conditions	   featuring	   different	   amounts	   of	   spatial	   information	   and	   different	  
types	  of	  practice.	  Spatial	  knowledge	  of	  the	  task	  was	  manipulated	  by	  either	  providing	  or	  
concealing	  the	  precise	  location	  of	  hotspots	  during	  a	  learning	  phase.	  The	  type	  of	  motor	  
output	   was	   also	   manipulated	   during	   the	   learning	   phase	   by	   varying	   whether	   or	   not	  
participants	  had	  access	  to	  a	  visual	  representation	  of	  the	  current	  location	  of	  the	  joystick	  
relative	  to	  the	  hotspots	  onscreen.	  The	  effect	  was	  measured	  in	  terms	  of	  performance	  in	  
a	   test	  phase	  during	  which	  no	  visual	   information	  was	  provided	  onscreen	  about	  either	  
the	  hotspot	   locations	  or	   joystick	  position	   relative	   to	   these	   locations.	   The	  overall	   aim	  
was	   to	  determine	  how	  readily	   the	   joystick	   task	  –	   in	  many	  ways	  a	   spatial	  paradigm	  –	  
relied	  on	  non-­‐spatial	  processes	  and	  therefore,	  the	  potential	  value	  of	  this	  paradigm	  for	  
widespread	  investigation	  of	  the	  process	  of	  interest.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  aim	  was	  not	  to	  
detect	  nondeclarative	  learning	  at	  all	  costs	  but	  to	  provide	  conditions	  in	  which	  its	  effects	  
could	  show	  through	  in	  spite	  of	  competition	  from	  other	  learning	  processes.	  
	  
The	  first	  question	  addressed	  concerned	  the	   issue	  of	  whether	  action	  acquisition	  relies	  
primarily	   on	   the	   spatial	   guidance	   of	   movements	   when	   full	   information	   is	   available	  
regarding	   the	   specific	   form	   that	   the	   action	   must	   take.	   If	   action	   acquisition	   in	   the	  
joystick	  task	  relies	  primarily	  on	  spatial	  guidance	  rather	  than	  the	  learning	  of	  particular	  
movements,	  then	  performance	  during	  a	  blind	  test	  phase	  should	  not	  differ	  depending	  
on	   the	   type	   of	   behavioural	   variance	   produced	   during	   a	   learning	   phase	   in	   which	  
participants	   have	   the	   same	   access	   to	   information	   about	   the	   locations	   of	   contingent	  
areas	  of	  the	  search	  space.	  By	  contrast,	  if	  performance	  is	  influenced	  by	  the	  movements	  
that	  have	  been	  practiced	  during	  a	  learning	  phase	  (i.e.	  the	  motor	  output	  that	  has	  been	  
reinforced)	  then	  performance	  during	  a	  blind	  test	  phase	  should	  differ	  depending	  on	  the	  
type	  of	  behavioural	  variance	  produced	  during	  the	  learning	  phase.	  	  
	  
The	  second	  question	  concerned	  the	  issue	  of	  whether	  action	  acquisition	  relies	  primarily	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on	   spatial	   information	   when	   the	   task	   is	   demonstrated	   in	   a	   spatial	   way,	   but	   no	  
information	  regarding	  specific	  locations	  is	  provided.	  If	  people	  use	  their	  exploration	  of	  
the	   search	   space	   to	   infer	   the	   location	   of	   contingent	   areas	   such	   that	   they	   can	   guide	  
their	  movements	  using	  a	  spatial	  model	  of	  the	  environment,	  then	  performance	  during	  a	  
blind	   test	   phase	   should	   not	   depend	   on	   whether	   particular	   spatial	   locations	   are	  
provided	   visually	   or	   determined	   through	   exploration	   during	   a	   learning	   phase.	   By	  
contrast,	   if	   learning	   depends	   on	   the	   movements	   that	   have	   been	   practiced,	   then	  
performance	   during	   a	   blind	   test	   phase	   should	   differ	   depending	   on	   how	   the	   target	  
locations	  were	  discovered,	  because	  discovery	  under	  blind	  conditions	  should	   result	   in	  
more	  behavioural	  variance	  than	  when	  the	  positions	  are	  visually	  represented	  onscreen.	  
	  
A	   third	   question	   concerned	   the	   variability	   of	   movements	   relative	   to	   the	   point	   of	  
reinforcement.	   If,	   as	   Redgrave	   and	   Gurney	   (2006)	   suggest,	   the	   system	   controlling	  
learning	   is	   a	   time	   stamp	   that	   reinforces	   motor	   output	   immediately	   preceding	   the	  
moment	  of	  reinforcement,	  then	  we	  might	  expect	  that	  movements	  closest	  to	  the	  point	  
of	   reinforcement	   should	  be	   less	   variable	   than	   those	  more	  distal;	   as	   they	  put	   it,	   “the	  
maximal	   positive/negative	   reinforcing	   effect	   of	   [dopamine]	   would	   be	   directed	   to	  
immediately	   contiguous	  motor	   efference	   copy”	   (p.973).	   Such	   a	   result	   would	   not	   be	  
expected	  if	  the	  correct	  movement	  was	  simply	  inferred	  from	  exploration	  of	  the	  search	  
space	  and	  performed	  based	  on	  a	  spatial	  model	  of	  relevant	  locations.	  
	  
The	   final	   question	   concerns	   the	   issue	   of	   inefficiencies	   in	   the	   movements	   that	   are	  
acquired.	   In	   a	   situation	   where	   participants	   understand	   the	   general	   structure	   of	   the	  
movement	  they	  are	  required	  to	  make	  and	  are	  then	  given	  the	  opportunity	  to	  infer	  the	  
specific	  nature	  of	   this	  movement	  through	  exploration	  of	   the	  search	  space,	  we	  would	  
not	  expect	  them	  to	  develop	  particularly	  inefficient	  movements.	  However,	  if	  learning	  is	  
strongly	  influenced	  by	  the	  reinforcement	  of	  motor	  output	  then	  the	  movements	  learnt	  
will	  be	  more	  dependent	  on	  the	  variance	  of	  the	  exploratory	  behaviour	  and	  more	  likely	  
to	  include	  inefficiencies.	  	  
	  






26	  people	  (20	  female)	  participated	  in	  all	  conditions	  of	  this	  study.	  	  Ages	  ranged	  from	  18	  
to	   20	   years	   with	   a	   mean	   age	   of	   19	   (SD.	   =	   0.6	   years).	   	   Participants	   were	   all	  
undergraduate	   students	   at	   the	  University	   of	   Sheffield	  who	   took	   part	   in	   the	   study	   in	  
return	  for	  credits	  in	  the	  department's	  research	  participation	  scheme.	  	  All	  subjects	  were	  
naive	  to	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  experiment.	  
	  
Defining	  the	  action	  
In	  the	  task	  featuring	  between-­‐trial	   repetition	  of	  reinforcement,	   the	  task	  of	   locating	  a	  
single	   location	   in	  space	  meant	   that	   it	  was	  relatively	  easy	   to	  accidentally	  produce	  the	  
correct	  movement.	  The	  problem	  with	  this	  was	  that,	  on	  such	  occasions,	  the	  amount	  of	  
behavioural	  variance	   from	  which	   the	  correct	  movement	  needed	   to	  be	  extracted	  was	  
extremely	   small	   and	   this	   limited	   the	   value	   of	   the	   data	   that	   could	   be	   obtained.	   A	  
potential	   solution	   to	   this	   problem	   is	   to	   make	   the	   hotspot	   smaller,	   thus	   making	   it	  
harder	   to	   find	   the	   location	   by	   accident	   and	   return	   to	   it	   on	   subsequent	   attempts.	  
However,	  experiment	  3	   indicated	   that,	  whilst	   smaller	   location	   sizes	  did	   indeed	  make	  
the	  task	  more	  difficult	  to	   learn,	  there	  was	  a	   limit	  as	  to	  how	  small	  a	  hotspot	  could	  be	  
made	   and	   still	   result	   in	   useful	   behavioural	   data.	   Very	   small	   hotspots	   introduce	  
unwanted	  experimental	  error	  arising	  from	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  apparatus.	  The	  limited	  
precision	  of	  the	  analogue	  joystick	  mechanism	  meant	  that	  a	  small	  amount	  of	  noise	  was	  
present	  in	  all	  movements.	  In	  essence	  this	  meant	  that	  the	  movement	  recorded	  by	  the	  
apparatus	  was	  potentially	  not	  as	  smooth	  as	  the	  participant’s	  input.	  The	  significance	  of	  
this	   issue	  would	   necessarily	   increase	  with	   smaller	   targets.	   Small	   hotspots	   also	   place	  
too	   much	   emphasis	   on	   fine	   motor	   control	   as	   opposed	   to	   action	   discovery.	  
Consequently,	   a	   different	   type	   of	   action,	   a	   ‘gesture’,	   was	   defined	   for	   the	   current	  
experiment	   which	   would	   increase	   the	   complexity	   of	   the	   required	   action	   without	  
increasing	  the	  precision	  of	  movements	  required	  to	  perform	  it.	  
	  
Whilst	   the	   type	   of	   action	   defined	   in	   this	   experiment	   will	   here	   be	   described	   as	   a	  
gesture,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  explain	  what	  is	  meant	  by	  this	  term	  for	  the	  present	  purposes.	  
In	   cognitive	   psychology	   and	   zoology	   a	   distinction	   is	   made	   between	   egocentric	   and	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allocentric	  representations	  of	  items	  in	  space:	  items	  may	  be	  represented	  relative	  to	  the	  
animal’s	   own	  body	  position	   (egocentric)	   or	   relative	   to	  one	  another	   (allocentric).	   The	  
former	   type	   of	   representation	   is	   the	   kind	   we	   use	   when	   reaching	   and	   manipulating	  
objects	  and	  the	  latter	  is	  the	  kind	  of	  representation	  that	  allows	  us	  to	  navigate	  through	  
an	  environment	  from	  novel	  starting	  positions	  and	  would	  enable	  us	  to	  draw	  a	  birds-­‐eye	  
view	  room	  plan	  (Galati	  et	  al.	  2000;	  Wang	  &	  Spelke	  2000).	  This	  issue	  is	  relevant	  to	  how	  
gestures	   are	  defined	   in	   the	   current	   experiment.	  Gestures	   are	   typically	   thought	  of	   as	  
highly	  practiced	  stereotypical	  responses	  that	  can	  be	  performed	  in	  a	  range	  of	  contexts.	  
In	  order	  to	  demonstrate	  such	  gesture	  learning	  in	  the	  joystick	  task,	  a	  participant	  would	  
need	   to	   learn	   not	   just	   a	   particular	   shape	   of	  movement,	   but	   that	   this	   shape	   can	   be	  
produced	  anywhere	  within	  the	  search	  space	  and	  still	  result	  in	  reinforcement.	  This	  is	  a	  
strong	  definition	  of	  a	  gesture	  and	   it	   is	  not	  how	   the	   term	  will	  be	  used	   in	   the	   current	  
experiment.	  A	  gesture	  in	  the	  current	  experiment	  simply	  refers	  to	  a	  particular	  shape	  of	  
joystick	  movement,	  always	   in	  the	  same	  position	  relative	  to	  the	  central	  starting	  point.	  
The	  required	  movement	  can	  only	  be	  expressed	  through	  the	  joystick	  in	  this	  task	  and,	  to	  
this	   extent,	   the	   required	  movement	   is	   always	   the	   same	   relative	   to	   the	   participant’s	  
body,	   irrespective	   of	   where	   their	   body	   is	   situated	   in	   space.	   From	   a	   purely	   spatial	  
perspective,	  the	  type	  of	  learning	  that	  the	  joystick	  task	  aims	  to	  investigate,	  therefore,	  is	  
egocentric	  rather	  than	  allocentric	  in	  nature.	  
	  
The	   gesture	  was	   defined	   in	   terms	  of	   a	  movement	   through	  3	   hotspots.	   The	  hotspots	  
were	  randomly	  placed	  on	  an	  annulus	  within	  the	  search	  space,	  as	  defined	  in	  chapter	  2,	  
with	  the	  additional	  rule	  that	  they	  could	  not	  overlap	  one	  another.	  The	  aim	  of	  the	  task	  
was	   to	  move	   the	   joystick	   once	   into	   each	   of	   the	   3	   hotspots	   in	   the	   correct	   order,	   as	  
illustrated	  in	  figure	  4.1;	  once	  the	  joystick	  had	  moved	  into	  hotspots	  1,	  2	  and	  3	  (in	  that	  





Figure	  4.1	  Arrangement	  of	  hotspots	  within	  the	  search	  space.	  The	  centre	  of	  each	  hotspot	  is	  placed	  randomly	  on	  the	  
grey	  annulus	  such	  that	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  screen,	  the	  edge	  of	  the	  screen	  and	  other	  hotspots	  are	  never	  overlapped.	  
The	  white	  dotted	  line	  indicates	  a	  path	  that	  could	  be	  taken	  through	  the	  hotspots	  in	  order	  to	  bring	  an	  end	  to	  the	  trial.	  
Hotspots	  are	  drawn	  to	  scale.	  
	  
An	   unavoidable	   consequence	   of	   varying	   the	   quantity	   of	   information	   provided	   to	  
participants	   is	   that	   this	   would	   in	   turn	   affect	   the	   amount	   of	   exploration	   required	   in	  
order	  to	  produce	  a	  successful	  movement.	  Whilst	  exploratory	  behaviour	  is	  informative,	  
it	  is,	  nonetheless,	  desirable	  to	  be	  able	  to	  remove	  this	  behaviour	  from	  analysis	  in	  order	  
to	  better	  focus	  on	  other	  aspects	  of	  performance.	  The	  primary	  reason	  for	  defining	  the	  
gesture	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  movement	  through	  3	  discrete	  areas	  of	  the	  search	  space	  was	  to	  
provide	  a	  way	  of	  splitting	  the	  trace	   into	  separate	  components	  at	   the	  methodological	  
level	  rather	  than	  doing	  so	  post	  hoc.	  Due	  to	  the	  way	  the	  gesture	  was	  defined,	  the	  trial	  
could	   be	   split	   into	   2	   main	   periods	   of	   movement	   (figure	   4.2).	   The	   first	   period	   is	   an	  
‘exploration’	  phase	   including	  all	  movements	   leading	  up	  to	  a	  successful	  entry	   into	  the	  
first	   of	   the	   3	   hotspots.	   The	   second	   period,	   the	   ‘gesture’	   phase,	   is	   the	   period	   that	  
includes	   only	   the	   successful	   movement	   through	   the	   3	   hotspots.	   This	   distinction	   is	  
important	   because	   even	   though	   the	   joystick	   task	   employs	   a	   stable	   central	   starting	  
position,	   the	   successful	   movement	   as	   executed	   on	   a	   given	   trial	   will	   not	   always	  
originate	   from	  this	  central	  point,	  especially	  when	  a	  participant	   is	   required	  to	  actively	  
hunt	   for	   the	   correct	   movement.	   Thus,	   by	   defining	   a	   separate	   gesture	   phase	   it	   is	  
possible	  to	   isolate	  a	  portion	  of	  the	  movement	  trace	  that	  always	  has	  a	  stable	  starting	  
position	   irrespective	  of	  how	  much	  exploratory	  behaviour	   took	  place	   in	  a	   trial;	   this	   is	  





Figure	  4.2	  The	  2	  main	  periods	  of	  movement	  within	  a	  trial.	  The	  exploration	  phase	  includes	  all	  movements	  leading	  up	  
to	  the	  successful	  entry	  into	  the	  first	  hotspot.	  The	  gesture	  phase	  includes	  only	  those	  movements	  following	  successful	  
entry	  into	  the	  first	  hotspot.	  
	  
A	  related	  benefit	  of	  defining	  the	  gesture	  in	  this	  way	  was	  to	  provide	  a	  means	  of	  defining	  
portions	  of	  the	  movement	  trace	  that	  differed	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  proximity	  to	  the	  point	  of	  
reinforcement.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  gesture	  phase	  shown	  in	  figure	  4.2	  can	  be	  split	  into	  
2	  further	  portions	  of	  movement	  (figure	  4.3).	  Phase	  1	  includes	  all	  movements	  from	  the	  
point	  of	  entry	  into	  the	  first	  hotspot	  up	  to	  the	  point	  of	  entry	  into	  the	  second	  hotspot.	  
Phase	  2	  includes	  all	  those	  movements	  from	  the	  point	  of	  entry	  into	  hotspot	  2	  up	  to	  the	  
point	   of	   entry	   into	   the	   third	   (and	   final)	   hotspot.	   Consequently,	   we	   can	   identify	   2	  
portions	   of	   the	   movement	   on	   which	   reinforcement	   is	   contingent	   but	   that	   differ	   in	  
terms	  of	  their	  temporal	  and	  spatial	  proximity	  to	  the	  point	  of	  reinforcement.	  
	  
	  
Figure	  4.3	  The	  gesture	  phase	  of	  the	  movement	  (shown	  in	  figure	  4.2)	  can	  be	  split	  into	  2	  further	  periods	  of	  movement	  
that	   vary	   in	   terms	   of	   their	   proximity	   to	   the	   point	   of	   reinforcement.	   In	   this	   diagram,	   gesture	   phase	   2	   is	   both	  




The	   final	   reason	   for	  defining	  a	  gesture	  using	  separate,	  discrete	   regions	  of	   the	  search	  
space	  was	  to	  reduce	  the	  constraints	  on	  the	  form	  that	  the	  final	  movement	  should	  take.	  
A	   brain	   process	   that	   relies	   on	   the	   reinforcement	   of	   recent	  motor	   output	   could	   only	  
differ	  from	  other	  brain	  processes	   if	  movements	  are	  allowed	  to	  vary	  from	  one	  trial	  to	  
the	   next.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   range	   of	   possible	   movements	   that	   can	   result	   in	  
reinforcement	  must	  be	  large	  enough	  to	  ensure	  that	  trials	  differ	  not	  only	  in	  exploration	  
distance	   but	   also	   in	   gesture	   distance.	   If	   a	   narrow	   channel	   of	   movement	   had	   been	  
defined	   instead,	   then	   all	   participants	  would	   have	   been	   forced	   to	  move	   through	   this	  
channel,	  thus	  restricting	  the	  behavioural	  variance	  that	  could	  be	  generated	  during	  the	  
gesture	  phase	  and,	  consequently,	  reducing	  the	  opportunity	  for	  the	  characteristics	  of	  a	  




The	   hotspot	   size	   chosen	   for	   this	   task	   was	   large	   relative	   to	   the	   size	   of	   the	   hotspots	  
employed	   in	   the	   earlier	   experiments,	   each	   hotspot	   occupying	   8.2%	   of	   the	   search	  
space.	  The	  size	  of	  the	  hotspots	  relative	  to	  the	  search	  space	  is	   illustrated	  by	  all	  of	  the	  
above	   figures	   (e.g.	   figure	   4.1).	   The	   size	   was	   determined	   through	   pilot	   testing	   and	  
chosen	   based	   on	   3	   main	   considerations.	   Firstly,	   the	   task	   could	   not	   be	   too	   difficult	  
because	   there	   was	   a	   need	   to	   ensure	   that	   participants	   of	   different	   abilities	   could	  
complete	   the	   requisite	  number	  of	   trials	  and	  demonstrate	   some	   improvement	  during	  
the	   limited	   learning	   phase,	   regardless	   of	   which	   condition	   they	   were	   performing.	  
Secondly,	   it	   was	   important	   that	   the	   emphasis	   should	   be	   on	   the	   extraction	   of	   a	  
particular	   shape	  of	  movement	  and	  not	  on	  an	   individual’s	  ability	   to	  demonstrate	   fine	  
motor	  control.	  And	  thirdly,	  the	  task	  was	  designed	  so	  that	  it	  was	  possible	  to	  complete	  it	  
spatially	   under	   blind	   conditions.	   It	   is	   conceivable	   that	   the	   use	   of	   extremely	   small	  
hotspots	  might	   force	   people,	   under	   blind	   conditions,	   to	   adopt	   the	   kind	   of	   trial	   and	  
error	   low-­‐level	   learning	   that	   is	   the	   focus	  of	   this	   research;	  however,	   the	   issue	  here	   is	  
not	  whether	  such	  learning	  could	  possibly	  occur,	  but	  whether	  it	  plays	  an	  important	  role	  
in	   learning	   in	   the	   joystick	   because	   of	   the	   way	   the	   feedback	   (reinforcement)	   is	  
presented.	   If	   the	   task	   was	   so	   difficult	   that	   the	   participants	   couldn’t	   work	   out	   the	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locations	  of	  the	  hotspots	  spatially	  from	  their	  behavioural	  variance	  then	  there	  would	  be	  
no	  way	  of	  knowing	  whether	  this	  was	  indicative	  of	  a	  general	  tendency	  to	  perform	  the	  
task	   non-­‐spatially	   or	   whether	   it	   was	   caused	   by	   the	   challenging	   task	   conditions.	   By	  
contrast,	   if	   the	  task	   is	  sufficiently	  easy	  that	   it	  can	  potentially	  be	  completed	  based	  on	  
spatial	   inference,	   then	   this	   provides	   a	   better	   indication	   as	   to	  which	   learning	   system	  
people	  are	  inclined	  to	  rely	  on	  and	  the	  contribution	  that	  the	  learning	  system	  of	  interest	  
is	  likely	  to	  make	  to	  action	  learning	  in	  general.	  
	  
Phases	  and	  trials	  
The	  experiment	  was	  split	  into	  2	  phases:	  a	  learning	  phase	  featuring	  3	  different	  stimulus	  
conditions	   followed	   by	   a	   blind	   test	   phase	   which	   featured	   no	   stimuli	   irrespective	   of	  
what	  was	  experienced	  during	  the	  learning	  phase.	  
	  
The	   number	   of	   instances	   of	   reinforcement	   (trials)	   during	   the	   learning	   phase	   was	  
restricted	  to	  25.	  This	  was	  to	  ensure	  that	  all	  participants	  at	  the	  test	  phase	  had	  received	  
the	  same	  amount	  practice	  on	  a	  particular	  arrangement	  of	  hotspots.	  At	  the	  test	  phase,	  
it	   would	   have	   been	   possible	   to	   assign	   a	   threshold	   along	   with	   a	   requirement	   that	   a	  
minimum	  number	  of	  trials	  be	  completed;	  however,	  the	  methodological	  advantages	  of	  
using	  a	  threshold	  were	  not	  sufficient	  to	  outweigh	  the	  practical	  advantages	  of	  having	  a	  
consistent	   number	   of	   trials	   for	   all	   attempts.	   Whilst	   a	   threshold	   was	   important	   in	  
experiments	  1	  and	  2,	  this	  was	  because	  the	  required	  action	  was	  defined	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  
rate	  at	  which	   reinforcement	  was	   received,	   so	   choosing	  a	   threshold	  was	  necessary	   in	  
order	   to	   be	   able	   to	   compare	   performance	   between	   conditions.	   When	   utilising	  
between-­‐trial	   repetition,	   by	   contrast,	   performance	   can	   be	   considered	   separately	   for	  
each	  instance	  of	  reinforcement	  (e.g.	  distance	  travelled	  during	  a	  given	  trial)	  so	  there	  is	  




The	   independent	   variable	  was	   the	   amount	   of	   location	   specific	   information	   provided	  
during	   the	   learning	   phase	   of	   the	   experiment.	   This	  was	  manipulated	   by	   the	   use	   of	   3	  
stimulus	   conditions	   (figure	   4.4):	   1,	   no	   visual	   information	   provided	   (blind);	   2,	   the	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positions	  of	  the	  hotspots	  shown	  on	  screen	  (half);	  and	  3,	  the	  positions	  of	  the	  hotspots	  
and	   the	  current	   location	  of	   the	   joystick	   relative	   to	   them	  all	   shown	  onscreen	   (full).	   In	  
the	  blind	  condition,	  participants	  would	  be	  forced	  to	  extract	  the	  relevant	  movements	  or	  
infer	   the	   hotspot	   locations	   from	   their	   exploration	   of	   the	   search	   space.	   In	   the	   half	  
condition,	  the	  relevant	  locations	  were	  provided	  directly	  to	  the	  participants,	  so	  all	  that	  
was	  required	  was	  to	  translate	  these	  positions	   into	  correct	  movements	  of	  the	  joystick	  
either	  by	  extracting	  this	  from	  behavioural	  variance	  or	  by	  more	  deliberate	  guidance	  of	  
the	  joystick.	  The	  full	  condition	  required	  nothing	  more	  than	  to	  move	  a	  dot	  representing	  
the	  current	  location	  of	  the	  joystick	  into	  the	  relevant	  hotspot	  positions,	  thus	  there	  was	  
no	   need	   to	   discover	   the	   locations	   or	   how	   to	  move	   the	   joystick	   into	   them	   and	   thus	  
behavioural	   variance	   was	   constrained	   by	   the	   participants	   themselves.	   The	   correct	  
order	  of	  the	  hotspots	  was	  not	  revealed	  in	  any	  of	  the	  3	  conditions.	  In	  the	  full	  and	  the	  
half	   conditions,	   the	  hotspots	  were	  all	  displayed	   in	   the	  same	  colour	   (red)	  and	  had	  no	  
identifying	   features	   so	   there	   was	   no	   way	   of	   determining	   the	   correct	   order	   of	   the	  
hotspots	  without	  exploring	  the	  search	  space	  and	  awaiting	  reinforcement.	  
	  
	  
Figure	   4.4	   Visual	   information	   available	   to	   participants	   during	   the	   learning	   phase	   of	   the	   experiment	   for	   the	   3	  
different	  conditions	  (hotspots	  shown	  in	  red	  and	  drawn	  to	  scale,	  cursor	  shown	  in	  blue).	  
	  
The	   importance	  of	   the	   full	   condition	  was	   to	  help	  determine	   the	  extent	   to	  which	   the	  
half	  condition	  forced	  participants	  to	  learn	  from	  their	  behavioural	  variance,	  if	  at	  all.	  The	  
full	  condition	  provides	  a	  non-­‐intrusive	  manipulation	  of	  behavioural	  variance.	  The	  main	  
way	   in	  which	  the	  half	  and	  full	  conditions	  differ	   is	   in	  terms	  of	  the	  type	  of	  movements	  
they	   cause	   to	  occur.	  During	   the	   learning	  phase,	   the	   full	   condition	  makes	   it	   easier	   to	  
complete	   trials	   in	   a	   very	   direct,	   highly	   efficient	  manner,	   whereas	   the	   half	   condition	  
requires	   a	   certain	   amount	   of	   approximation	   of	   movements,	   consequently,	   the	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conditions	   should	   force	   participants	   to	   practice	   a	   different	   set	   of	  movements	  whilst	  
having	   the	   same	   access	   to	   information	   about	   the	   location	   of	   the	   hotspots.	   If	  
behavioural	  variance	  is	  not	  an	  important	  aspect	  in	  learning	  to	  complete	  the	  trials,	  then	  
performance	   in	  these	  conditions	  should	  not	  differ	  at	  test	  phase	  when	  the	  stimuli	  are	  
no	  longer	  available	  to	  guide	  performance.	  Specifically,	  the	  transition	  from	  the	  learning	  
phase	   to	   the	   blind	   test	   phase	   should	   have	  minimal	   effect	   on	   the	   half	   condition	   but	  
should	   negatively	   impact	   on	   performance	   in	   the	   full	   condition.	   The	   comparison	  
between	  these	  stimulus	  conditions	  also	  allows	  us	  to	  infer	  whether	  or	  not	  there	  was	  a	  
strong	  unintended	  negative	   impact	  during	  the	  transition	  from	  learning	  to	  test	  phase,	  
caused	   simply	   by	   adaptation	   to	   the	   unfamiliar	   conditions.	   	   If	   such	   an	   effect	   was	  
present,	  this	  would	  show	  up	   in	  decreased	  performance	  for	  both	  the	  full	  and	  the	  half	  
conditions.	  
	  
The	   blind	   condition	   provides	   a	   situation	   in	   which	   the	   correct	   movement	   or	   an	  
understanding	  of	  the	  location	  of	  the	  hotspots	  must	  be	  extracted	  from	  the	  participant’s	  
own	  behavioural	  variance.	  Consequently	   it	  differs	  from	  the	  half	  condition	  in	  terms	  of	  
how	   much	   information	   must	   be	   inferred	   or	   reinforced	   by	   practicing	   different	  
movements	  through	  space.	  Performance	  in	  the	  test	  phase	  will	  give	  an	  indication	  as	  to	  
how	  learning	  is	  occurring	  in	  the	  blind	  condition.	  If	  the	  blind	  condition	  results	  in	  similar	  
performance	   at	   test	   phase	   to	   the	   half	   condition	   then	   this	  will	   be	   an	   indication	   that	  
learning	  relies	  less	  on	  what	  was	  practiced	  and	  more	  on	  the	  ability	  to	  infer	  the	  correct	  
movement	  and	  generate	  this	  movement	  in	  a	  spatially	  guided	  fashion.	  	  
	  
Reinforcement	  
The	  reinforcing	  stimulus	  was	  the	  same	  as	  that	  used	  in	  experiments	  3	  and	  4.	  
	  
Instructions	  
As	  discussed	  in	  previous	  chapters,	  there	  are	  good	  reasons	  why	  we	  might	  wish	  to	  keep	  
participants	   naïve	   as	   to	  what	   it	   is	   that	   they	  must	   learn	   during	   the	   task,	   the	   primary	  
reason	  being	  that	  there	  is	  simply	  more	  for	  the	  participant	  to	  discover.	  However,	  once	  
again,	   a	   decision	  was	  made	   to	  provide	   all	   participants	  with	   full	   task	   knowledge.	   The	  
issue	   in	   the	  current	  experiment	   is	   that	   the	   independent	  variable	   (visual	   information)	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also	  influences	  a	  participant’s	  understanding	  of	  the	  task	  requirements.	  This	  means	  that	  
if	  people	  starting	   in	  the	  blind	  condition	  were	  also	  naïve	  regarding	  the	  task	  structure,	  
then	   the	   blind	   and	   the	   half	   conditions	  would	   differ	   not	   only	   in	   terms	   of	   knowledge	  
about	  the	  particular	  locations	  of	  hotspots	  but	  also	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  
task	   requirements.	   Consequently,	   full	   task	   knowledge	   was	   provided	   prior	   to	   the	  
experiment	  so	  as	  to	  reduce	  the	  differences	  between	  the	  blind	  and	  the	  half	  conditions.	  
Prior	  to	  starting	  the	  experiment,	  all	  participants	  received	  three	  practice	  trials	  with	  full	  
visuals	   (cursor	   and	   hotspot	   positions)	   as	   a	   visual	   explanation	   of	   what	   would	   be	  
involved	  in	  the	  task.	  This	  happened	  just	  once	  for	  each	  participant	  and	  the	  arrangement	  
of	   the	  hotspots	   in	   these	   three	  practice	   trials	  was	  always	  different	   to	  any	   they	  would	  
subsequently	  encounter	  in	  the	  experiment.	  In	  other	  words	  the	  blind	  condition	  differed	  
in	  that	  it	  required	  the	  specific	  arrangement	  of	  hotspot	  locations	  to	  be	  learned	  through	  
exploration	  of	  the	  search	  space.	  Once	  again,	  the	  correct	  order	  of	  the	  hotspots	  was	  not	  
revealed	   to	   the	   participants,	   irrespective	   of	   condition,	   so	   even	   in	   the	   full	   visuals	  
condition,	  this	  needed	  to	  be	  learned	  from	  exploration	  of	  the	  search	  space.	  
	  
Procedure	  
The	   participants	  were	   told	   that	   the	   experiment	  was	   designed	   to	   test	   their	   ability	   to	  
learn	   gestures.	   The	   experimental	   program	   was	   started	   and	   they	   were	   asked	   to	  
complete	  the	  3	  practice	  trials,	  which	  featured	  full	  visual	  information:	  hotspots	  and	  the	  
relative	  position	  of	  the	  joystick	  were	  displayed	  onscreen.	  It	  was	  explained	  that	  the	  aim	  
of	  the	  task	  was	  to	  move	  the	  joystick	  into	  the	  3	  hotspots	  in	  the	  correct	  order	  and	  that	  
doing	  so	  would	  result	  in	  the	  end	  of	  the	  trial.	  It	  was	  further	  explained	  that	  they	  would	  
have	  to	  work	  out	  the	  correct	  order	  by	  exploring	  the	  search	  space.	  Once	  the	  3	  practice	  
trials	   were	   completed,	   the	   participants	   were	   told	   that	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   experiment	  
would	  involve	  exactly	  the	  same	  task	  but	  that	  the	  visual	  information	  provided	  and	  the	  
positions	  of	  the	  hotspots	  would	  change	  depending	  on	  the	  condition.	  They	  were	  further	  
informed	   that	   it	  would	   be	  made	   clear	   to	   them	   that	   the	   hotspot	   positions	   had	   been	  
changed.	  It	  was	  explained	  that	  for	  each	  new	  set	  of	  hotspot	  positions,	  they	  would	  have	  
to	   complete	   50	   trials,	   the	   last	   25	   of	   which	   would	   always	   be	   blind.	   Following	   these	  
instructions,	   the	   experimental	   trials	   were	   started.	   The	   participants	   were	   told	   at	   the	  
start	  of	  each	  new	  condition	  that	  the	  arrangement	  of	  hotspots	  had	  been	  changed;	  they	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were	  also	  told	  during	  a	  2	  minute	  interval	  between	  all	  learning	  and	  test	  phases	  that	  the	  
locations	   of	   the	   hotspots	  would	   remain	   the	   same	   once	   the	   trials	   recommenced.	   No	  
onscreen	  instructions	  were	  provided	  other	  than	  text	  to	   indicate	  that	  the	  current	  trial	  
had	  been	  successfully	  completed:	  “You	  produced	  the	  correct	  movement!”.	  A	  summary	  
of	  the	  protocol	  is	  presented	  in	  figure	  4.5;	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  order	  of	  blocks	  1,	  




Figure	   4.5	   Summary	   of	   the	   experimental	   procedure.	   Blocks	   1,	   2	   and	   3	   were	   counterbalanced	   so	   that	   different	  
participants	   experienced	   the	   blocks	   in	   different	   orders.	   Each	   block	   comprised	   25	   learning	   trials	   followed	   by	   a	   2-­‐
minute	  break	  and	  then	  another	  25	  test	  trials.	  
	  
Design	  
All	   participants	   completed	   3	   practice	   trials	   featuring	   full	   information	   regarding	   the	  
hotspot	   locations	  and	  current	  position	  of	  the	  joystick	  onscreen.	  For	  the	  experimental	  
trials,	   each	   learning	  phase	  consisted	  of	  25	   trials,	  during	  which	   the	  positions	  of	   the	  3	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hotspots	  remained	  the	  same.	  Following	  the	  learning	  phase	  there	  was	  a	  2	  minute	  break	  
and	   the	   test	  phase	   commenced,	   also	   comprising	  25	   trials	  with	   the	  hotspot	  positions	  
remaining	  in	  the	  same	  place	  as	  they	  had	  been	  for	  the	  immediately	  preceding	  learning	  
phase.	   The	   experiment	   had	   a	   repeated	   measures	   design,	   with	   all	   participants	  
completing	   3	   learning	   and	   3	   test	   phases	   and	   therefore	   experiencing	   each	   of	   the	   3	  
conditions.	  The	  position	  of	  the	  hotspots	  was	  changed	  at	  the	  start	  of	  each	  new	  learning	  




The	   first	   analysis	  was	   to	   summarise	   the	  basic	  performance	  measure	  –	   the	   irrelevant	  
distance	  travelled	  during	  a	  trial	  –	  for	  each	  of	  the	  conditions	  at	  both	  learning	  and	  test	  
phase.	   A	   two-­‐way	   (2	   x	   3)	   repeated-­‐measures	   ANOVA	   (phase	   by	   stimuli)	   of	   the	   log-­‐
transformed	  data	  revealed	  that	  there	  was	  a	  significant	  main	  effect	  of	  the	  phase	  of	  the	  
experiment	  (F(1,	  25)	  =	  4.47,	  p	  =	  .045)	  and	  of	  stimuli	  (F(2,	  50)	  =	  42.38,	  p	  <	  .001).	  There	  
was	  also	  a	  significant	  interaction	  between	  phase	  and	  stimuli	  (F(2,	  50	  =	  31.4,	  p	  <	  .001).	  
Figure	   4.6	   shows	   that	   the	   stimulus	   manipulation	   greatly	   affected	   the	   distance	  
travelled.	  Bonferroni	  corrected	  post	  hoc	  t-­‐tests	  confirmed	  this,	   revealing	  that,	  during	  
the	   learning	  phase,	  both	  the	  blind	  (t(25)	  =	  3.7,	  p	  <	   .05)	  and	  the	  full	   (t(25)	  =	  7.84,	  p	  <	  
.05)	   stimuli	   conditions	   differed	   significantly	   from	   the	   half	   condition,	   indicating	   that	  
under	   these	   conditions,	   differing	   amounts	   of	   behavioural	   variance	   were	   being	  
produced.	   The	   graph	   also	   shows	   that	   the	  means	   for	   the	   full	   and	   the	   half	   conditions	  
converged	   between	   the	   learning	   and	   the	   test	   phases	   of	   the	   experiment.	   The	   half	  
condition	   showed	   no	   change	   between	   the	   phases	   and	   did	   not	   differ	   from	   the	   full	  
condition	  at	  test	  phase,	  whilst	  performance	  in	  the	  full	  condition	  significantly	  declined	  
(t(25)	  =	  6.72,	  p	  <	  .05)	  across	  the	  phases.	  This	  suggests	  that	  the	  shared	  feature	  of	  these	  
conditions	   –	   knowledge	   of	   the	   hotspot	   locations	   –	   was	   the	   most	   important	  
determinant	   of	   performance	   under	   blind	   conditions,	   notwithstanding	   the	   relatively	  
large	  difference	   in	   the	  amount	  of	  behavioural	  variance	  produced	  during	   the	   learning	  
phase.	  One	  possible	  explanation	  for	  why	  the	  performance	  in	  the	  full	  condition	  declined	  
from	  the	   learning	  to	  the	  test	  phase	   is	  that	  this	  condition	  required	  participants	  to	  get	  
used	  to	  unfamiliar	  (blind)	  stimuli,	  something	  that	  was	  clearly	  not	  the	  case	  in	  the	  blind	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condition	  where	  conditions	  at	   test	  phase	  were	   identical	   to	   those	  during	   the	   learning	  
phase.	   However,	   the	   half	   condition	   also	   resulted	   in	   a	   large	   change	   in	   the	   stimuli	  
provided	  and	  they	  did	  not	  show	  a	  similar	  decline	  in	  performance,	  suggesting	  that	  the	  
performance	  drop	   in	   the	   full	   condition	  was	  not	   due	   to	   the	  unfamiliar	   stimuli	   at	   test	  
phase.	   Figure	   4.6	   also	   shows	   a	   convergence	   between	   the	   blind	   and	   half	   conditions	  
from	  the	  learning	  phase	  to	  the	  test	  phase	  and	  an	  analysis	  confirmed	  that	  the	  distance	  
travelled	   in	   the	   blind	   condition	   significantly	   decreased	   (t(25)	   =	   3.65,	  p	   <	   .05)	   across	  
phases.	  Somewhat	  surprisingly,	  however,	  the	  blind-­‐half	  comparison	  at	  test	  phase	  only	  
approached	   significance	   (t(25)	   =	   2.23,	  p	   >	   .05),	   indicating	   just	   how	   high	   the	   level	   of	  
performance	  was	   in	   the	  blind	  condition,	   in	  spite	  of	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  specific	  hotspot	  
locations	  were	  never	  presented	  at	  learning	  or	  test	  phase.	  
	  
Figure	  4.6	  Mean	  irrelevant	  distance	  travelled	  (and	  standard	  error)	  for	  the	  3	  stimulus	  levels	  at	  both	  learning	  and	  test	  
phases.	  Values	  are	  back-­‐transformed	  from	  the	  log	  transformation.	  
	  
Consistent	  inefficiencies	  
Whilst	  there	  was	  no	  attempt	  in	  the	  present	  study	  to	  investigate	  superstitious	  learning	  
in	  the	  strict	  Skinnerian	  sense	  (that	  is	  to	  say,	  by	  providing	  non-­‐contingent	  outcomes),	  it	  
is	   possible	   to	   investigate	   this	   kind	   of	   learning	   in	   the	   weaker	   sense	   of	   participants	  
learning	   consistent	   but	   inefficient	  movements.	   In	   these	   terms,	   all	  movement	   traces,	  
apart	  from	  the	  optimum	  trace,	  lie	  on	  a	  ‘superstition	  spectrum’,	  containing	  a	  lesser	  or	  
greater	   degree	   of	   unnecessary	   movement.	   In	   order	   to	   investigate	   this	   between	  
conditions,	   an	   analysis	  was	   undertaken	   into	   performance	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   consistent	  















Phase of experiment 




Over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  25	  trials	  during	  the	  test	  phase,	  participants	  produce	  a	  range	  of	  
movements	  and	  often	  make	  missed	  attempts	  at	  the	  movement	  they	  intended,	  perhaps	  
because	  of	  the	  blind	  conditions	  they	  are	  performing	  under.	  Consequently,	  the	  record	  
of	  all	  movement	  traces	  creates	  a	  noisy	  representation	  of	  the	  core	  movement	  that	  the	  
participant	   was	   settling	   on.	   In	   order	   to	   identify	   occasions	   where	   the	   sequence	   of	  
movements	  remained	  stable	  over	  multiple	  trials,	  similar	  to	  that	  illustrated	  in	  figure	  4.7,	  
a	   consistency	   criterion	   was	   applied	   to	   the	   data.	   By	   identifying	   runs	   of	   trials	   during	  
which	   the	   participant	  was	   able	   to	  maintain	   a	   consistent	  movement,	   it	   is	   possible	   to	  
pick	   out	   traces	   that	   better	   represent	   the	  movement	   they	   had	   learnt	   or,	   as	   the	   case	  
may	  be,	  the	  accuracy	  of	  their	  inference	  of	  the	  hotspot	  locations.	  The	  important	  thing	  
about	  these	  traces	  is	  that	  they	  are	  occasions	  in	  which	  the	  participants	  have	  ceased	  to	  
explore	  the	  search	  space	  and	  are	  instead	  performing	  a	  movement	  based	  on	  what	  they	  
have	   learnt	   over	   previous	   trials	   –	   it	   is	   assumed	   that	   if	   the	   participants	   were	   still	  
exploring	  the	  search	  space	  then	  they	  wouldn’t	  be	  able	  to	  achieve	  this	  consistency.	  
	  
	  
Figure	  4.7	  Example	  of	  the	  kind	  of	  attempts	  that	  the	  consistency	  criterion	  was	  designed	  to	  capture.	  The	  3	  attempts	  
depicted	  in	  the	  diagram	  differ	  from	  one	  another	  but	  feature	  a	  consistent	  shape	  of	  movement.	  
	  
Being	   able	   to	   identify	   situations	   in	   which	   performance	   is	   less	   representative	   of	  
exploratory	  behaviour	  is	  important	  when	  making	  comparisons	  between	  the	  blind	  and	  
half	  conditions.	  The	  blind	  condition	  necessarily	  requires	  more	  in	  the	  way	  of	  exploration	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than	   the	   half	   condition	   because	   information	   about	   the	   particular	   arrangement	   of	  
hotspots	  can	  only	  come	  from	  the	  behavioural	  variance	  that	  is	  produced.	  Consequently,	  
for	  any	  given	  trial,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  how	  much	  of	  the	  performance	  in	  the	  blind	  condition	  is	  
due,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  to	  their,	  as	  yet,	  incomplete	  exploration	  of	  the	  search	  space	  and,	  
on	  the	  other,	  to	  genuine	  limitations	  in	  the	  efficiency	  that	  can	  be	  achieved	  through	  the	  
learning	   processes	   in	   operation.	   By	   identifying	   consistent	   trials,	   participants	   in	   both	  
conditions	   can	   be	   compared	   in	   terms	   of	   an	   action	   they	   have	   settled	   on	   and	   the	  
influence	   of	   exploratory	   behaviour	   is	   therefore	   reduced.	   If	   participants	   under	   both	  
conditions	   are	   learning	   the	   movement	   spatially	   by	   simply	   moving	   the	   joystick	   to	  
inferred	  (blind	  condition)	  or	  recalled	  (half	  condition)	  hotspot	  locations	  then	  the	  length	  
of	   the	   consistent	   movement	   traces	   should	   not	   depend	   on	   how	   they	   learnt	   those	  
hotspot	   positions.	   If,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   blind	   condition	   had	   resulted	   in	   the	  
participants	  learning	  a	  particular	  movement	  rather	  than	  inferring	  the	  positions	  of	  the	  
hotspots,	   then	   we	   would	   expect	   to	   see	   less	   efficient	   –	   more	   ‘superstitious’	   –	  
movement	  traces.	  
	  
Trials	   for	   all	   participants	   during	   the	   test	   phase	   were	   assessed	   for	   consistency,	   with	  
‘consistency’	   being	   defined	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   difference	   in	   the	   distance	   travelled	  
between	   2	   given	   trials.	   For	   each	   trial	   (excluding	   trials	   1	   and	   2),	   this	   difference	   was	  
calculated	  by	  comparing	   the	  current	   trial	   (T0)	  with	  each	  of	   the	  2	  preceding	   trials	   (T-­‐1	  
and	  T-­‐2),	  and	  also	  by	  comparing	   those	  preceding	   trials	  with	  one	  another.	  The	  sum	  of	  
these	  differences	  was	  then	  calculated	  in	  order	  to	  generate	  a	  total	  difference	  score.	  A	  
threshold	   was	   set	   at	   0.5	   times	   the	   mean	   trace	   length	   for	   the	   3	   trials;	   if	   the	   total	  
difference	   score	   exceeded	   this	   threshold,	   then	   the	   trials	   were	   not	   classed	   as	   being	  
consistent.	  A	  further	  constraint	  was	  applied	  which	  dictated	  that	  in	  order	  to	  be	  treated	  
as	  consistent,	  trials	  could	  not	  be	  in	  excess	  of	  4	  times	  the	  optimal	  distance;	  this	  was	  to	  
exclude	  occasions	  where	  consistency	  was	  achieved	  by	  virtue	  of	  extremely	   long	   trace	  
lengths.	   For	   some	   individuals,	   the	   threshold	   was	   reached	   more	   than	   once	   within	   a	  
testing	   session;	   in	   such	   situations,	   only	   the	   final	   instance	  was	   submitted	   to	   analysis.	  
The	  data	  for	  5	  participants	  was	  removed	  from	  analysis	  as	  these	  people	  failed	  to	  reach	  
the	   threshold	   in	  at	   least	  one	  of	   the	  3	  conditions.	  Figures	  4.8,	  4.9	  and	  4.10	  show	  the	  




Figure	  4.8	  Combined	  movement	  traces	  for	  the	  3	  consistent	  trials	  at	  test	  phase	  in	  the	  blind	  condition.	  
	  
	  





Figure	  4.10	  Combined	  movement	  traces	  for	  the	  3	  consistent	  trials	  at	  test	  phase	  in	  the	  full	  condition.	  
	  
A	   one-­‐way	   repeated-­‐measures	   ANOVA	   was	   conducted	   to	   investigate	   the	   effect	   of	  
stimulus	  condition	  on	  the	  mean	  irrelevant	  distance	  for	  the	  consistent	  trials	  during	  the	  
test	   phase.	   The	   ANOVA	   of	   the	   log-­‐transformed	   data	   revealed	   that	   there	   was	   a	  
significant	  effect	  of	  stimulus	  condition	  on	  the	  mean	  irrelevant	  distance	  travelled	  during	  
the	   consistent	   trials,	   F(2,	   40)	   =	   5.5,	   p	   =	   .008.	   As	   figure	   4.11	   illustrates,	   there	  was	   a	  
substantial	   difference	   between	   the	   blind	   and	   the	   full	   conditions	   and	   this	   was	  
confirmed	  by	  a	  Bonferroni	  corrected	  post	  hoc	  t-­‐test	   (t(20)	  =	  3.53,	  p	  <	   .05).	  However,	  
the	  more	   relevant	   comparison	   between	   the	   blind	   and	   half	   conditions	   did	   not	   reach	  
significance	   and	   would	   not	   have	   done	   so	   even	   without	   the	   conservative	   post	   hoc	  
correction	  (t(20)	  =	  1.86,	  p	  >	  .05).	  This	  result	  indicates	  that	  the	  blind	  condition	  did	  not	  
force	  participants	   to	   settle	  on	   solutions	   that	  were	   significantly	   less	  optimal	   than	   the	  
half	   condition	   and	   consequently	   gives	   no	   indication	   that	   this	   condition	   caused	   a	  





Figure	  4.11	  Mean	   irrelevant	  distance	  (and	  standard	  error)	   for	  the	  consistent	  trials	  at	  test	  phase.	  Values	  are	  back-­‐
transformed	  from	  the	  log-­‐transformation.	  
	  
Gesture	  phase	  of	  movement	  trace	  
The	  analyses	  described	  so	   far	  show	  that,	  at	   test	  phase,	   the	  blind	  and	  half	  conditions	  
result	   in	   similar	  performance.	  However,	   the	  mean	  values	  appear	   to	   suggest	   that	   the	  
blind	   group	  were	   generally	   less	   efficient	   at	   producing	   the	   required	  movement.	   One	  
possibility	   is	   that	   performance	  was	  more	   similar	   than	   these	  data	   imply	   and	   that	   the	  
results	  described	  so	  far	  largely	  reflect	  differences	  in	  the	  persistent	  need	  to	  explore	  the	  
search	   space	   for	   the	   blind	   group,	   even	   after	   the	   25	   learning	   trials.	   In	   order	   to	  
investigate	  performance	  for	  all	  trials	  with	  less	  emphasis	  on	  exploratory	  behaviour,	  an	  
analysis	  was	  performed	  on	  the	   irrelevant	  distance	  travelled	  during	  the	  gesture	  phase	  
of	  the	  movement	  trace	  (as	  defined	  in	  the	  methods	  section,	  also	  see	  figure	  4.2).	  A	  two-­‐
way	   (2x3)	   repeated	  measures	  ANOVA	   (experiment	  phase	  by	   stimulus	   condition)	  was	  
carried	  out	  on	  the	  log-­‐transformed	  data.	  Mauchly's	  test	  indicated	  that	  the	  assumption	  
of	  sphericity	  had	  been	  violated	  for	  the	  main	  effect	  of	  stimulus	  (ϰ²	  (2)	  =	  7.55,	  p	  <	  .05;	  
therefore	  degrees	  of	  freedom	  were	  corrected	  using	  Greenhouse-­‐Geisser	  estimates	  of	  
sphericity	  (ε	  =	  0.79).	  The	  analysis	  revealed	  that	  there	  was	  no	  main	  effect	  of	  phase	  (F(1,	  
25)	  =	  3.52,	  p	  >	  .05),	  but	  that	  the	  main	  effect	  of	  stimuli	  (F(1.58,	  39.37)	  =	  23.2,	  p	  <	  .001)	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Bonferroni	  corrected	  post	  hoc	  comparisons	  revealed	  that	  the	  irrelevant	  gesture	  length	  
for	   the	   blind	   and	   the	   half	   conditions	   differed	   significantly	   during	   the	   learning	   phase	  
(t(25)	  =	  2.39,	  p	  <	  .05),	  but	  not	  at	  test	  phase	  t(25)	  =	  1.35,	  p	  >	  .05.	  Figure	  4.12	  shows	  the	  
general	   convergence	   in	   gesture	   length	   between	   the	   learning	   and	   test	   phase.	   The	  
greater	  similarity	  in	  the	  results	  at	  test	  phase	  for	  this	  metric	  appears	  to	  support	  the	  idea	  
that	  much	  of	  the	  apparent	  difference	  in	  the	  blind	  condition	  for	  previous	  analyses	  was	  
probably	   due	   to	   differences	   in	   exploratory	   behaviour	   as	   opposed	   to	   the	   action	   that	  
had	  been	  acquired.	  
	  
	  
Figure	  4.12	  Mean	  irrelevant	  distance	  (and	  standard	  error)	  for	  the	  gesture	  phase	  of	  the	  movement	  trace	  only.	  Values	  
are	  back-­‐transformed	  from	  the	  log-­‐transformation.	  
	  
Early	  versus	  late	  phases	  of	  the	  gesture	  period	  
As	   indicated	   in	   the	   introduction,	   a	   possible	   symptom	   of	   learning	   through	   the	  
reinforcement	   of	   motor	   output	   is	   that	   the	   variability	   in	   movements	   might	   differ	  
depending	  on	  their	  proximity	   relative	  to	   the	  point	  of	   reinforcement.	   If	   the	  gesture	   is	  
learnt	   based	   on	   the	   reinforcement	   of	   recent	   motor	   output,	   then	   it	   is	   possible	   that	  
movements	   closest	   to	   the	   point	   of	   reinforcement	   will	   be	   less	   variable	   than	   those	  
situated	  further	  from	  the	  point	  of	  reinforcement.	  If	  the	  gesture	  is	  inferred	  spatially,	  by	  
contrast,	  there	   is	  no	  reason	  to	  expect	  one	  portion	  of	  the	  movement	  to	  vary	  more	  or	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absolute	  distances	  travelled	  and,	  consequently,	  the	  results	  are	  less	  readily	  explained	  in	  
terms	  of,	  for	  example,	  the	  differences	  in	  task	  difficulty	  between	  the	  conditions.	  	  
	  
The	  gesture	  portion	  of	  the	  movement	  trace	  for	  the	  test	  phase	  of	  the	  experiment	  was	  
split	   into	  2	   further	  portions	   (phase	  1	  being	   furthest	   from	  the	  point	  of	   reinforcement	  
and	   phase	   2	   being	   closest)	   as	   detailed	   in	   the	  methods	   section	   (see	   also	   figure	   4.3).	  
Following	  this,	  the	  standard	  deviation	  of	  the	  distances	  for	  both	  portions	  was	  calculated	  
for	   each	   participant	   in	   both	   the	   blind	   and	   the	   half	   conditions	   (i.e.	   the	   standard	  
deviation	  encompassed	  all	  25	  distances	  –	  one	  for	  each	  trial	  –	  in	  the	  test	  phase	  for	  each	  
participant).	  A	  two-­‐way	  (2	  x	  2)	  repeated	  measures	  ANOVA	  (gesture	  phase	  by	  stimuli)	  
was	  performed	  on	  the	  log-­‐transformed	  data.	  The	  analysis	  revealed	  no	  main	  effects	  of	  
phase	   (F(1,	   25)	   =	   2.2,	  p	   >	   .05)	   or	   of	   stimuli	   (F(1,	   25)	   =	   3.68,	  p	   >	   .05)	   and	   no	   phase-­‐
stimuli	   interaction	  (F(1,	  25)	  =	   .000,	  p	  >	   .05).	  Figure	  4.13	  shows	  that	  neither	  condition	  
differed	   across	   the	   phases	   nor	   did	   the	   conditions	   differ	   from	   one	   another.	   In	   other	  
words,	  contrary	  to	  the	  prediction,	  the	  variability	  in	  the	  length	  of	  the	  movement	  trace	  
did	  not	  depend	  on	  its	  proximity	  to	  the	  point	  of	  reinforcement	  for	  either	  condition.	  
	  
	  
Figure	   4.13	  Mean	   trace	   length	   deviation	   (and	   standard	   error)	   for	   the	   two	   phases	   of	   the	   gesture	   portion	   of	   the	  
movement	  trace.	  Phase	  1	   is	   the	  portion	  of	   the	  trace	   furthest	   from	  the	  point	  of	   reinforcement	  and	  phase	  2	   is	   the	  
portion	  that	  is	  closest.	  Values	  are	  back-­‐transformed	  from	  the	  log-­‐transformation.	  
	  
Whilst	  distance	  provides	  a	  good	  overall	  estimate	  of	  performance,	   it	  takes	  no	  account	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It	   is	  always	  possible	  that	  small	  differences	   in	  distance	  represent	  relatively	  substantial	  
differences	  in	  the	  shape	  of	  movement.	  Consequently,	  the	  deviations	  in	  distance	  shown	  
in	   figure	   4.13	   might	   not	   fairly	   represent	   the	   variations	   in	   the	   gesture	   that	   the	  
participants	  were	  attempting	  to	  perform.	   In	  order	  to	  take	   into	  account	  something	  of	  
the	  shape	  of	  the	  movement,	  the	  point	  of	  entry	  into	  the	  first	  and	  the	  final	  hotspots	  was	  
extracted	   from	  the	  data	  and	  the	  deviation	   in	   the	  point	  of	  entry	  was	   then	  calculated.	  
The	  prediction	  is	  the	  same	  as	  for	  the	  2	  portions	  of	  the	  gesture	  period:	  the	  deviation	  for	  
the	   hotspot	   closest	   to	   the	   point	   of	   reinforcement	   will	   be	   lower	   than	   that	   for	   the	  
hotspot	  further	  away.	  There	  is	  also	  the	  further	  possibility	  that	  the	  overall	  variation	  in	  
the	   point	   of	   entry	   for	   the	   blind	   condition	   might	   be	   smaller	   than	   that	   for	   the	   half	  
condition	  irrespective	  of	  the	  proximity	  to	  the	  point	  of	  reinforcement.	  This	  is	  because,	  
gestures	  learnt	  as	  a	  set	  of	  movements	  that	  are	  stable	  relative	  to	  the	  hotspots	  cannot	  
vary	  greatly	  because	  each	  point	  of	  entry	   is	  dependent	  on	  the	   last.	  By	  contrast,	   if	   the	  
position	  of	  the	  hotspots	  is	  spatially	  inferred,	  the	  point	  of	  entry	  into	  a	  given	  hotspot	  is	  
less	  important	  because	  the	  position	  of	  the	  next	  hotspot	  will	  not	  be	  determined	  based	  
on	  previous	  movements.	  
	  
In	  order	   to	  calculate	   the	  deviation	  scores,	  an	  arbitrarily	  determined	  stable	  point	  was	  
first	   set	   on	   the	   perimeter	   of	   each	   hotspot.	   Following	   this,	   a	   deviation	   distance	  was	  
calculated	   by	   determining	   the	   distance	   of	   the	   point	   of	   entry	   from	   the	   stable	   point	  
around	   the	   perimeter	   of	   the	   hotspot.	   The	   circumference	   of	   each	   hotspot	  was	   1037	  
screen	   units	   so	   the	   maximum	   deviation	   distance	   was	   half	   this,	   at	   518.5	   units.	   The	  
standard	  deviation	  of	  all	  deviation	  distances	  was	  then	  calculated	  for	  each	  participant	  in	  
both	   the	   blind	   and	   the	   half	   conditions	   at	   test	   phase	   (i.e.,	   once	   again,	   the	   standard	  
deviation	  described	   the	  variation	  of	  all	  25	  deviation	  distances	   for	  each	  participant	   in	  
both	  conditions).	  These	  variance	  scores	  for	  the	  point	  of	  entry	  were	  then	  submitted	  to	  
analysis.	  
	  
A	   two-­‐way	   (2	   x	   2)	   repeated	   measure	   ANOVA	   (hotspot	   number	   by	   stimuli)	   was	  
conducted	  to	  investigate	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  position	  of	  the	  hotspot	  relative	  to	  the	  point	  
of	  reinforcement	  and	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  stimulus	  condition	  on	  the	  deviation	  in	  point	  of	  
entry.	  The	  analysis	  revealed	  that	  there	  was	  no	  main	  effect	  of	  hotspot	  (F(1,	  25)	  =	  0.04,	  p	  
>	  .05)	  or	  of	  stimuli	  (F(1,	  25)	  =	  0.67,	  p	  >	  .05)	  and	  no	  hotspot-­‐stimuli	  interaction	  (F(1,	  25)	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=	  0.96,	  p	  >	  .05).	  Figure	  4.14	  shows	  that	  the	  consistency	  of	  the	  point	  of	  entry	  into	  the	  
hotspots	   was	   not	   affected	   by	   either	   the	   proximity	   of	   that	   hotspot	   to	   the	   point	   of	  
reinforcement	  or	  the	  stimulus	  conditions	  experienced	  during	  the	  learning	  phase.	  
	  
	  
Figure	  4.14	  Mean	  point	  of	  entry	  deviation	  (and	  standard	  error)	  for	  the	  first	  and	  the	  final	  hotspot	  in	  the	  gesture.	  The	  
maximum	  possible	  deviation	  on	  a	  given	  trial	  is	  518.5	  units.	  
	  
Procrustes	  analysis	  
In	   order	   to	   consider	   the	   shape	   of	   movement	   on	   its	   own,	   a	   Generalised	   Procrustes	  
Analysis	  (GPA;	  Gower,	  1975)	  was	  conducted	  on	  the	  data	  for	  the	  blind	  condition.	  With	  
this	  technique	  it	   is	  possible	  to	  minimise	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  size,	  orientation	  and	  the	  
position	  in	  space	  of	  the	  movement	  trace	  because	  the	  analysis	  first	  scales,	  rotates	  and	  
then	   transforms	   the	   coordinates	   of	   each	   configuration	   such	   that	   they	   are	  
superimposed	  before	  they	  are	  compared.	  All	  data	  were	  first	  resampled	  to	  ensure	  that	  
each	  movement	   trace	   to	   be	   analysed	   consisted	   of	   1000	   landmarks	   (coordinates).	   A	  
mean	   movement	   configuration	   was	   generated	   from	   Procrustes	   adjusted	   movement	  
traces	   for	   all	   trials	   of	   each	   participant’s	   data.	   Following	   this,	   each	   of	   the	   adjusted	  
traces	  was	  compared	  to	  the	  mean	  trace	  for	  that	  participant	  with	  the	  root	  mean	  square	  
residual	  providing	  a	  score	   for	   the	  variability	  of	   the	  trace	   from	  the	  mean	  trace	   (Miall,	  
Leschziner,	  Miall	  &	  Stein,	  1997).	  
	  



















during	   the	   learning	  phase	  with	   the	  mean	  variability	  at	   test	  phase.	  This	   revealed	   that	  
there	  was	  a	  significant	  difference	  in	  the	  variability	  of	  the	  movement	  traces	  produced	  in	  
the	  learning	  and	  test	  phases,	  t(25)	  =	  3.55,	  p	  =	  .002,	  two-­‐tailed.	  Figure	  4.15	  shows	  that	  
there	   was	   a	   substantial	   reduction	   in	   variability	   from	   the	   learning	   to	   the	   test	   phase	  
indicating	  that	  movement	  conformed	  more	  to	  an	  underlying	  shape	  of	  movement	  with	  
practice	  at	  the	  task.	  
	  
	  
Figure	  4.15	  Mean	  GPA	  determined	  variability	  (and	  standard	  error)	  at	  learning	  and	  test	  phase	  for	  the	  blind	  condition.	  
	  
Discussion	  
The	  current	  task	  involved	  the	  learning	  of	  patterns	  of	  movement	  in	  human	  participants	  
under	   different	   stimulus	   conditions.	   Using	   this	   paradigm	   it	  was	   possible	   to	   find	   and	  
document	   evidence	   of	   pattern	   learning	   and	   show	   that	   the	   ability	   to	   generate	   these	  
movements	  with	   no	   visual	   feedback	  was	   similar	   irrespective	   of	   the	   visual	   conditions	  
under	  which	  the	  pattern	  was	  originally	  learned.	  
	  
As	   indicated	   in	   the	   introduction,	   the	   experiment	   was	   designed	   to	   look	   at	   4	   main	  
questions,	  all	  related	  to	  the	  general	  issue	  of	  whether	  action	  acquisition	  is	  influenced	  by	  
the	  reinforcement	  of	  recent	  motor	  output	  when	  an	  alternative	  means	  of	  acquisition	  is	  
available	   in	   the	   former	   of	   high-­‐level	   cognitive/spatial	   guidance	   of	   movements.	  
Comparisons	  between	  the	  full	  and	  the	  half	  conditions	  revealed	  that	  when	  the	  shape	  of	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perform	  that	  gesture	  when	  those	  locations	  are	  subsequently	  hidden.	  Both	  conditions	  
provided	  full	  visual	  information	  about	  the	  positions	  of	  the	  hotspots	  and	  both	  required	  
participants	  to	  discover	  the	  correct	  order	  by	  exploring	  the	  search	  space.	  However,	  the	  
conditions	  differed	  markedly	  in	  the	  amount	  of	  behavioural	  variance	  that	  was	  produced	  
when	   navigating	   between	   these	   hotspots.	   The	   full	   condition	   allowed	   participants	   to	  
move	  between	  hotspots	  in	  a	  near	  optimal	  fashion	  during	  the	  learning	  phase,	  whereas	  
the	   half	   condition	   resulted	   in	   a	   greater	   quantity	   of	   irrelevant	  movements.	   And	   yet,	  
despite	   this,	   performance	   at	   test	   phase	   did	   not	   differ	   between	   the	   2	   conditions,	  
indicating	  that	  the	  different	  movements	  practiced	  had	  little	  impact	  on	  learning.	  
	  
The	   comparisons	   between	   the	   half	   and	   blind	   conditions	   revealed	   that	   when	  
information	  is	  provided	  about	  the	  general	  form	  of	  the	  gesture,	  exploratory	  behaviour	  
results	   in	  no	  differences	   in	   the	  ability	  of	  people	   to	  perform	  that	  gesture	  under	  blind	  
conditions.	  Both	  conditions	  provided	  full	  information	  about	  the	  general	  form	  that	  the	  
gesture	   would	   take.	   However,	   once	   again,	   the	   conditions	   differed	   in	   terms	   of	   the	  
amount	   of	   behavioural	   variance	   that	   was	   produced	   in	   navigating	   between	   these	  
hotspots.	  The	  half	  condition	  provided	   information	  about	   the	  specific	   locations	  of	   the	  
hotspots	  so	  no	  exploratory	  behaviour	  was	  required	  to	  determine	  their	  locations	  during	  
the	   learning	  phase,	  whereas	   the	  blind	  condition	   required	  participants	   to	   learn	  about	  
the	  gesture	  by	  exploring	  the	  search	  space	  resulting	  in	  a	  greater	  quantity	  of	  irrelevant	  
movements	  during	  learning.	  Once	  again,	  performance	  at	  test	  phase	  did	  not	  reflect	  the	  
differences	  in	  the	  movements	  practiced	  during	  the	  learning	  phase.	  
	  
The	  general	  finding	  that	  movements	  produced	  during	  the	  learning	  phase	  resulted	  in	  no	  
differences	  in	  performance	  during	  the	  blind	  test	  phase	  was	  reflected	  in	  further,	  more	  
specific	  analyses.	  The	  blind	  and	  the	  half	  groups	  did	  not	  differ	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  variance	  
in	  movements	  relative	  to	  the	  point	  of	  reinforcement.	  Nor	  did	  these	  conditions	  differ	  in	  
terms	  of	   the	  efficiency	  of	   the	  consistent	  movements	  acquired.	   In	  other	  words,	   these	  
results	   also	   provided	  no	   reason	   to	   believe	   that	   learning	  was	   influenced	   to	   any	   large	  
degree	  by	  the	  movements	  practiced.	  
	  
It	  was,	  however,	  possible	   to	   learn	  whether	  or	  not	   there	  was	  a	  basic	   improvement	   in	  
the	   consistency	   of	   movement	   from	   the	   learning	   to	   the	   test	   phase.	   A	   Procrustes	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analysis	   of	   the	   data	   for	   the	   blind	   condition	   indicated	   that	   there	   was	   a	   significant	  
decrease	  in	  the	  variability	  of	  movement	  traces	  around	  an	  underlying	  mean	  movement	  
trace	  derived	  from	  all	  traces.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  movement	  traces	  were	  more	  similar	  
in	  shape	  to	  one	  another	  during	  the	  test	  phase	  than	  the	  learning	  phase.	  This	  confirms	  a	  
valuable	   feature	  of	   the	  paradigm	  to	  measure	   to	  ability	  of	  people	   to	   learn	  and	   refine	  
self-­‐generated	   patterns	   of	   movement	   without	   the	   ability	   to	   visually	   monitor	  
movements	  relative	  to	  a	  target.	  
	  
The	   Procrustes	   analysis	   also	   proved	   to	   be	   a	   potentially	   better	   way	   of	   detecting	  
improvements	   across	   phases	   than	   the	   other	   performance	   metric	   described	   in	   the	  
results	   section.	  Whilst	   the	  distance	  during	   the	  gesture	  period	   for	   the	  blind	  condition	  
was	   found	   to	   decrease	   (indicating	   better	   performance)	   across	   phases	   of	   the	  
experiment	   (t(25)	   =	   2.81,	   p	   =	   .01),	   the	   same	   comparison	   based	   on	   the	   Procrustes	  
derived	  metric	  of	   variability	  proved	  marginally	  more	   sensitive	   to	   the	   change	   (t(25)	  =	  
3.55,	  p	  =	  .002).	  In	  general	  the	  Procrustes	  analysis	  probably	  offers	  a	  better	  description	  
of	   performance	  because	  performance	   is	   defined	   in	   terms	  of	   consistency	   rather	   than	  
how	  close	  the	  distance	  travelled	  is	  to	  the	  optimum	  distance.	  This	  is	  important	  because	  
the	   optimum	   route	   between	   hotspots	   is	   unlikely	   to	   align	   well	   with	   the	   natural	  
dynamics	  of	  movements	  that	  follow	  a	  more	  rounded	  path.	  	  
	  
The	   theory	   of	   action	   acquisition	   proposed	   by	   Redgrave	   and	   Gurney	   (2006)	   and	  
Redgrave	   et	   al.	   (2008)	   differs	   from	   some	   traditional	   accounts	   of	   skill	   and	   action	  
acquisition.	   Their	   proposal	   is	   that	   circuitry	   in	   the	   midbrain	   and	   basal	   ganglia	   are	  
actively	  involved	  in	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  action	  acquisition	  from	  the	  detection	  of	  agency	  
to	   the	   reselection	   of	   temporally	   contiguous	   motor	   output	   and	   the	   filtering	   of	   task	  
relevant	  features	  from	  behavioural	  variance.	  This	  view	  is	  in	  line	  with	  a	  large	  amount	  of	  
evidence	  that	  the	  basal	  ganglia	  are	  contribute	  heavily	  during	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  action	  
acquisition	   (Brasted	   &	  Wise,	   2004;	   Costa,	   2007;	   Costa,	   Cohen,	   Nicolelis	   &	   Carolina,	  
2004;	  Ungerleider,	  2002).	  The	  perspective	  differs	  from	  some	  existing	  accounts	  in	  that	  
it	   is	  generally	  assumed	  that	  these	  areas	  of	  the	  brain,	  and	   indiscriminate	  processes	  of	  
reinforcement	   in	   general,	   are	   associated	   with	   more	   gradual	   and	   habitual	   learning	  
(Bayley	   et	   al.,	   2005;	   Buffalo,	   Stefanacci,	   Squire	   &	   Zola,	   1998;	   Squire,	   2004).	   In	  
traditional	   accounts	   of	   skill	   acquisition	   this	   amounts	   to	   the	   gradual	   automatisation	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phase,	   characteristic	   of	   the	   final	   stages	   of	   skill	   learning	   in	   humans	   (Anderson,	   1982;	  
Fitts	  &	  Posner,	  1967;	  Newell	  &	  Rosenbloom,	  1981).	  
	  
In	   the	   context	   of	   the	   current	   experiment	   these	   different	   perspectives	   on	   action	  
acquisition	   call	   for	   different	   interpretations	   of	   the	   findings.	   The	   traditional	   account	  
describes	  the	   learning	  process	  as	  going	  through	  a	  series	  of	  stages	  that	  start	  with	  the	  
initially	   rapid	   improvement	   in	  performance	   typical	  of	  a	  declarative	  phase	  of	   learning	  
(Anderson,	   1982).	   From	   this	   point	   of	   view,	   the	   learning	   phase	   in	   the	   current	  
experiment	   (i.e.	   the	   first	   25	   trials)	   would	   be	   part	   of	   the	   rapid	   declarative	   phase	   of	  
learning	   and	   there	   would	   be	   no	   reason	   to	   expect	   much	   contribution	   from	   the	  
reinforcement	   of	   motor	   output;	   such	   low-­‐level	   effects	   would	   be	   expected	   further	  
down	   the	   line,	   once	   the	  action	  had	  been	   repeated	   sufficiently	  often	   that	   it	   starts	   to	  
become	  automatic.	  Consequently,	  the	  finding	  that,	  for	  example,	  the	  ‘full’	  condition	  in	  
the	   current	   experiment	   showed	   a	   decline	   in	   performance	   between	   the	   learning	   and	  
test	  phase	  would	  support	  the	  idea	  that	  performance	  was	  being	  guided	  at	  a	  declarative	  
level.	  According	  to	  Redgrave	  and	  Gurney’s	  account,	  by	  contrast,	  we	  would	  expect	  the	  
learning	  mechanism	   to	   influence	  mostly	   the	   early	   phase	   of	   action	   acquisition,	  when	  
the	   link	   between	   the	   movements,	   context	   and	   reinforcing	   stimulus	   remains	   novel.	  
According	   to	   this	   account,	   it	   is	   somewhat	   surprising	   that	   the	   highly	   efficient	  
movements	  produced	  during	  the	  learning	  phase	  in	  the	  full	  condition	  did	  not	  transfer	  to	  
the	  test	  phase.	  
	  
In	  fact,	  Redgrave	  and	  Gurney	  (2006)	  allude	  to	  a	  transition	  between	  learning	  mediated	  
by	   the	   phasic	   activity	   of	   dopamine	   neurons,	   that	   results	   in	   the	   discovery	   of	   novel	  
actions,	   and	   learning	   that	   arises	   from	   the	   repetition	  of	   the	  newly	  discovered	  action,	  
through	   “traditional	   reinforcement	   learning	   mechanisms”	   (p.972).	   It	   is	   possible,	  
therefore,	  that	  there	  is	  a	  major	  distinction	  between	  these	  two	  types	  of	  reinforcement	  
learning,	  with	  the	  former	  causing	  a	  tendency	  simply	  to	  reselect	  and	  repeat	  important	  
recent	  motor	  output	   and	   the	   latter	  playing	  more	  of	   a	   role	   in	   the	   reinforcement	  and	  
storage	  of	  that	  motor	  output.	  Such	  a	  distinction	  would	  have	  important	  implications	  for	  
how	  we	  view	  the	  joystick	  task	  in	  general	  and	  the	  results	  of	  the	  experiments	  in	  chapters	  




The	   findings	   from	   the	   current	   experiment	   suggest	   that	   we	   cannot	   assume	   that	  
reinforcement	   learning	   is	   responsible	   for	   the	   effects	   uncovered	   in	   the	   previous	  
experiments	  based	  solely	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  feedback	  was	  presented	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	   in	  
accordance	   with	   this	   type	   of	   learning.	   Indeed,	   there	   were	   indications	   from	   the	  
experiment	   featuring	   between-­‐trial	   repetition	   of	   reinforcement	   (experiment	   4)	   that	  
learning	  may	  have	  been	  under	   the	   influence	  of	  higher-­‐level	  declarative	  systems.	  The	  
effect	  of	  delay,	  therefore,	  could	  have	  been	  due	  to	  the	  declarative	  system	  being	  fooled	  
by	   the	   different	   positions	   in	   space	   that	   resulted	   from	   delayed	   reinforcement	   as	  
opposed	   to	   a	   low	   level	   learning	   mechanism	   stamping	   in	   non-­‐contingent,	   yet	  
contiguous,	   motor	   output.	   The	   effect	   of	   delay	   in	   experiment	   4	   was	   similar	   to	   that	  
found	   in	   other	   investigations	   of	   reinforcement	   learning	   (e.g.	   Shanks	   et	   al.,	   1989;	  
Shanks	  &	  Dickinson,	  1991),	  though	  very	  different	  to	  the	  effect	  found	  in	  experiments	  1	  
and	  2	  and	  this	  difference	  was	  interpreted	  as	  possibly	  being	  caused	  by	  the	  rate	  at	  which	  
reinforcement	  was	  delivered.	  However,	  an	  explanation	   in	   terms	  of	  different	   learning	  
systems	  might	  make	  more	  sense.	  Buehner	  and	  May	  (2004)	  were	  able	  to	  demonstrate,	  
for	  example,	  that	  the	  results	  concerning	  delay	  reported	  by	  Shanks	  et	  al.	  (1989)	  could	  
be	  abolished	  by	  a	  small	  change	  in	  the	  task	  instructions.	  This	  finding	  therefore	  implies	  
that	   the	   results	   concerning	  delay	   in	   the	  Shanks	   study	  may	  have	   little	   to	  do	  with	   the	  
operation	   of	   simple	   associative	   learning	   mechanisms	   and	   much	   more	   to	   do	   with	  
participants	  being	  fooled	  at	  a	  declarative	  level.	  
	  
The	   sensitivity	   to	   delay	   found	   in	   experiments	   1	   and	   2	   is	   not	   so	   readily	   explained	   in	  
terms	  of	  learning	  at	  the	  declarative	  level.	  As	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  2,	  the	  sensitivity	  was	  
in	  line	  with	  what	  we	  would	  expect	  based	  on	  Redgrave	  and	  Gurney’s	  (2006)	  theory	  of	  
the	  function	  of	  the	  phasic	  activity	  of	  dopamine	  neurons.	  This	  interpretation	  is	  further	  
supported	   by	   the	   finding	   that	   the	   basal	   ganglia	   are	   much	   faster	   to	   respond	   to	  
reinforcement	  contingencies	  than	  the	  prefrontal	  cortex	  (Pasupathy	  &	  Miller,	  2005)	  and	  
furthermore	  that	  prefrontal	  systems	  and	  model	  based	  learning	  in	  general	  require	  more	  
time	  to	  operate	  due	  to	  a	  greater	  level	  of	  computational	  complexity	  (Bogacz,	  McClure,	  
Li,	   Cohen	  &	  Montague,	   2007;	  Daw,	  Niv	  &	  Dayan,	   2005).	   It	   is	   therefore	  possible	   that	  
participants	   in	   experiments	   1	   and	   2	   were	   forced	   to	   rely	   on	   lower	   level	   learning	  
mechanisms	  because	  the	  time	  between	  instances	  of	  reinforcement	  and	  adjustments	  of	  
hand	   position	   didn’t	   afford	   them	   the	   opportunity	   to	   process	   their	   responses	   using	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more	   computationally	   sophisticated	   brain	   processes.	   By	   contrast,	   experiment	   4	  
allowed	  participants	  a	  period	  of	  approximately	  5	  s	  between	  one	  attempt	  and	  the	  next	  
and	  thus	  gave	  them	  time	  to	  make	  the	  subsequent	  response	  based	  on	  a	  deeper	  level	  of	  
information	  processing.	  The	  emphasis	  that	  the	  task	  in	  experiments	  1	  and	  2	  placed	  on	  
the	   reselection	   and	   repetition	   of	   movements	   rather	   than	   on	   the	   more	   gradual	  
refinement	  of	  behavioural	  variance,	  might	  therefore	  make	  it	  a	  more	  effective	  means	  of	  
investigating	  the	  mechanism	  of	  action	  acquisition	  described	  by	  Redgrave	  and	  Gurney.	  
	  
Results	  are	  in	  line	  with	  previous	  evidence	  showing	  that	  humans	  
find	  it	  hard	  to	  use	  their	  nondeclarative	  systems	  
The	  opportunity	  for	  participants	  to	  demonstrate	  declarative	  learning	  was	  deliberately	  
left	   open	   in	   the	   experiment	   5	   in	   order	   to	   test	   the	   general	   tendency	   of	   people	   to	  
reinforce	   the	   movements	   they	   make	   rather	   than	   simply	   infer	   correct	   movements.	  
However,	   it	   is	   possible	   that	   even	   if	   the	   crucial	   aspects	   of	   the	   task	   had	   been	   made	  
opaque	   to	   higher-­‐level	   processes,	   the	   task	  may	   have	   uncovered	   little	   in	   the	  way	   of	  
nondeclarative	  learning	  (i.e.	  just	  an	  overall	  decline	  in	  learning).	  
	  
The	  best	  evidence	  on	  this	  issue,	  either	  way,	  is	  to	  be	  found	  in	  situations	  where	  people	  
are	  forced	  to	  rely	  on	  nondeclarative	  systems	  as	  is	  sometimes	  the	  case	  with	  instances	  
of	  brain	  damage	  and,	  here,	   the	  evidence	   is	  mixed.	  Buffalo	  et	  al.	   (1998),	   for	   instance,	  
have	   found	  that	  medial	   temporal	   lobe	   lesions	   (lesions	  designed	  to	   impair	  declarative	  
memory)	   have	   no	   effect	   on	   the	   ability	   of	   macaques	   to	   learn	   a	   concurrent	  
discrimination	   task:	   the	  monkeys	   learn	   this	   task	   gradually	   and	   apparently	   habitually	  
whether	  they	  are	   lesioned	  or	  not.	  Similar	  brain	  damage	   in	  humans	  has	  a	  devastating	  
impact	   on	   learning,	   but	   some	   capacity	   for	   learning	   is	   retained	   and,	   importantly,	   the	  
rate	  of	  acquisition	  is	  comparable	  to	  the	  gradual	  habitual	  acquisition	  that	  is	  the	  norm	  in	  
monkeys	  (Bayley	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  Furthermore	  the	  brain	  damaged	  participants	  are	  able	  to	  
demonstrate	  none	  of	   the	   flexibility	   that	  one	  would	  expect	  had	  they	   learned	  the	  task	  
declaratively,	   indicating	  that	  they	  had	   instead	   learnt	  the	  task	  habitually	  and	   in	  a	  way	  
very	   similar	   to	   the	   monkeys.	   In	   other	   words,	   Bayley	   et	   al.	   (2005)	   were	   able	   find	  
evidence	   of	   nondeclarative	   memory	   in	   humans	   and	   a	   similar	   propensity	   to	   learn	  




A	   somewhat	   different	   pattern	   of	   results	   is	   found	   in	   blindsight	   research.	   Following	  
damage	  to	  the	  primary	  visual	  cortex,	  both	  humans	  and	  monkeys	  can	  be	  prompted	  to	  
use	   their	   preserved	   visual	   abilities	   in	   laboratory	   tests,	   and	   the	   performance	   of	   both	  
improves	  over	  time.	  However,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  both	  humans	  and	  monkeys	  display	  
evidence	  of	  unconscious	  perception,	  monkeys	  appear	  better	  able	  to	  make	  use	  of	  their	  
preserved	  abilities	  outside	  of	  heavily	   cued	   testing	   sessions,	  where	   responses	  are	  not	  
prompted	   and	   behaviour	   is	   more	   naturalistic	   (Allen-­‐Hermanson,	   2010;	   Humphrey,	  
1995;	   Humphrey,	   2000;	   Stoerig	   &	   Cowey,	   1997).	   In	   other	   words,	   when	   it	   comes	   to	  
having	  the	  confidence	  to	  rely	  on	  nondeclarative	  processes	  to	  navigate	  and	  respond	  to	  
the	  environment,	  monkeys,	  in	  spite	  of	  their	  very	  similar	  visual	  systems,	  are	  apparently	  
better	   able	   to	   rely	   on	  nondeclarative	   processing.	   Though,	   it	   is	   clearly	   true	   that	   such	  
differences	  are	  marginal	  and	  only	   likely	   to	  appear	  under	   special	   circumstances.	  Both	  
humans	   and	   nonhuman	   animals	   are	   adept	   at	   utilising	   nondeclarative	   learning	   and	  
control	  across	  all	  areas	  of	  control.	  
	  
Not	   only	   do	   humans	   have	   a	   highly	   developed	   ability	   to	   process	   information	  
declaratively	   and,	   arguably,	   a	   greater	   tendency	   to	   rely	   on	   this	   type	   of	   information	  
processing,	   but	   the	   range	   of	   behaviour	   that	   is	  monitored	   at	   the	   declarative	   level	   is	  
surprising	  large.	  The	  Chevreul	  Pendulum	  Illusion	  (Easton	  and	  Shor,	  1975),	  for	  example,	  
is	  a	  situation	  where	  human	  participants	  are	  fooled	  by	  an	  apparent	  inability	  to	  monitor	  
movements	   consciously.	   The	   illusion	   is	   created	   by	   asking	   a	   participant	   to	   use	   their	  
hand	  to	  suspend	  an	  object,	   such	  as	  a	  wedding	  ring,	  on	  the	  end	  of	  a	  piece	  of	   thread.	  
When	  participants	  are	  then	  asked	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  object,	  the	  object	  will	  often	  begin	  to	  
oscillate	   despite	   the	   participant	   having	   no	   sensation	   that	   they	   are	   causing	   the	  
movements.	  The	  muscle	  movements	  powering	  the	  pendulum	  are	  apparently	  so	  small	  
that	  they	  are	  simply	  not	  registered	  and	  thus	  the	  participant	  is	   left	  with	  the	  sensation	  
that	  the	  pendulum	  is	  powered	  through	  some	  external	  means.	  What	  is	  surprising	  about	  
this	   illusion	   is	   that	   it	   suggests	   that	   the	   judgements	   of	   causality	   necessary	   to	   ascribe	  
agency	   to	   oneself	   are	   heavily	   reliant	   on	   conscious	   awareness	   and,	   to	   some	   extent,	  
external	   monitoring	   of	   muscle	   movements.	   Split	   brain	   animals	   and	   patients	   also	  
demonstrate	  how	  important	  the	  external	  monitoring	  of	  behaviour	  can	  be	  in	  the	  form	  
of	   cross-­‐cueing	   integration	   of	   information	   between	   the	   hemispheres	   (Jakobson,	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Servos,	  Goodale	  &	  Lassonde,	  1994;	  Levy,	  Trevarthen	  &	  Sperry,	  1972;	  Savaki,	  Kennedy,	  
Sokoloff	  &	  Mishkin,	  1993).	  Put	  simply,	  one	  side	  of	  the	  brain	  finds	  out	  what	  the	  other	  
side	  is	  doing	  or	  thinking	  by	  witnessing	  the	  body	  movements	  it	  produces	  or	  by	  listening	  
to	  the	  verbalisation	  of	  behaviour.	  This	  process	  of	  monitoring	  is	  so	  efficient	  that	  in	  spite	  
of	   the	   severing	   of	   the	   corpus	   callosum,	   it	   is	   possible	   for	   humans	   and	   monkeys	   to	  
behave	   in	   a	   way	   that,	   outside	   of	   the	   laboratory,	   is	   almost	   indistinguishable	   from	  
normal	  behaviour.	  In	  other	  words,	  there	  are	  signs	  that	  the	  declarative	  monitoring	  and	  
guidance	   of	   behaviour	   is	   more	   than	   just	   a	   computationally	   expensive	   veneer	  
overlaying	   a	   largely	   nondeclarative	   and	   computationally	   cheap	   set	   of	   learning	   and	  
control	   processes.	   Rather,	   we	   might	   be	   incorrigibly	   reliant	   on	   declarative	   level	  
processing,	   in	   spite	   of	   our	   limited	   attentional	   resources	   even	   for	   relatively	   simple	  
guidance	  of	  motor	  behaviour.	  
	  
The	  declarative	  threshold	  
Pursuing	   the	   issue	   of	   reselection	   and	   repetition	   of	   responses	   in	   isolation	   to	  
reinforcement	   is	   one	   possible	   future	   avenue	   for	   research,	   especially	   as	   regards	  
Redgrave	   and	   Gurney’s	   (2006)	   theory.	   However,	   the	   nondeclarative	   acquisition	   of	  
actions	  through	  the	  reinforcement	  of	  motor	  output	  is,	  nonetheless,	  still	  an	  important	  
issue.	  If	  action	  acquisition	  is	  dependent	  on	  the	  neural	  learning	  mechanism	  detailed	  by	  
Redgrave	  and	  Gurney	  (2006),	  then	  we	  must	  assume	  that	  the	  type	  of	  learning	  displayed	  
by	   the	   animals	   in	   Thorndike’s	   (1911)	   original	   studies	   was	   largely	   a	   product	   of	   this	  
mechanism.	  Indeed,	  the	  data	  and	  descriptions	  of	  behaviour	  provided	  by	  Thorndike	  are	  
in	  line	  with	  what	  one	  would	  expect	  from	  an	  indiscriminate	  learning	  mechanism	  with	  no	  
additional	   declarative	   guidance.	   On	   the	   first	   trial	   inside	   a	   puzzle	   box,	   a	   cat’s	  
performance	  of	  the	  required	  action	  is	  an	  incidental	  consequence	  of	  the	  general	  escape	  
behaviour	  it	  produces	  on	  being	  place	  in	  the	  enclosure.	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  performs	  the	  
behaviour	  by	  accident.	  But,	  unlike	  the	  participants	  in	  the	  current	  study,	  so	  too	  does	  it	  
complete	   the	   second	   trial	   by	   accident:	   perhaps	   slower,	   perhaps	  quicker,	   but	   the	   cat	  
remains	  apparently	  clueless	  as	  to	  what	  needs	  to	  be	  done.	  The	  process	  continues	  and	  
the	   trend	   is	   towards	   more	   efficient	   performance	   of	   the	   necessary	   action	   over	  
subsequent	   trials	   and	   yet	   the	   cat	   remains	   in	   the	   dark	   as	   to	   how	   it	   is	   achieving	   the	  
desired	   outcome.	   Thorndike	   persuades	   us	   of	   this	   by	   observing	   that	   trained	   cats	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displayed	   irrelevant	   behaviour	   such	   as	   trying	   to	   perform	   the	   required	   action	   even	  
when	   the	   door	   to	   the	   puzzle	   box	   was	   open	   or	   performing	   the	   action	   when	   the	  
operandum	  had	  been	   removed.	  Attempts	   to	   teach	   the	   cats	   or	   allowing	   them	   to	   see	  
other	   animals	   completing	   the	   action	  had	  no	  effect	   on	  performance.	   Furthermore,	   in	  
most	   of	   the	   puzzle	   boxes,	   learning	   did	   not	   shift	   abruptly	   from	  poor	   performance	   to	  
efficient	   performance;	   rather	   there	   was	   a	   gradual	   trend	   towards	   an	   increase	   in	  
efficiency.	   As	   Thorndike	   notes,	   this	   was	   never	   a	   smooth	   curve	   and	   there	   was	   no	  
guarantee	   that	   a	   given	   trial	   would	   be	   completed	   more	   quickly	   than	   the	   trial	   that	  
preceded	  it.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  cats	  displayed	  behaviour	  with	  none	  of	  the	  properties	  
of	   insightful	   learning	  (Bayern	  et	  al.,	  2009).	   In	  a	  sense	  then,	   it	  was	  as	   if	   the	  cats	  were	  
escaping	  from	  the	  puzzle	  box	  by	  accident	  on	  the	  first	  attempt	  and	  escaping	  by	  accident	  
on	  the	   final	  attempt,	   the	  only	   thing	  that	  had	  changed	  was	  the	  speed	  with	  which	  the	  
accident	  was	  performed.	  
	  
The	   question	   Thorndike’s	   (1911)	   study	   raises	   for	   the	   future	   of	   research	   into	   action	  
acquisition	   in	  humans	   is	  whether	   there	  might	  be	  any	  conditions	  under	  which	  people	  
acquire	  actions	   in	  a	   similar	  way	   to	  Thorndike’s	  nonhuman	  animal	   subjects.	  Dekeyser	  
(2007)	  raises	  the	   interesting	  concept	  of	  a	  declarative	  threshold	  that	  must	  be	  crossed	  
during	  the	  process	  of	  acquiring	  a	  new	  skill.	  Most	  skills,	  Dekeyser	  observes,	  are	   learnt	  
with	  a	  distinctive	  rate	  of	  acquisition,	  described	  by	  a	  power	  law	  learning	  curve:	  initially	  
performance	  improves	  rapidly,	  but	  the	  rate	  of	  improvement	  then	  declines	  and	  follows	  
a	  shallow	  slope	  of	   improvement	  for	  all	  subsequent	  practice.	  Dekeyser	  notes	  that	  the	  
two	   distinct	   portions	   of	   the	   learning	   curve,	   as	   defined	   by	   their	   different	   slopes,	   are	  
generally	  thought	  to	  represent	  the	  different	  processes	  that	  are	  contributing	  to	  learning	  
at	   different	   points	   during	   skill	   acquisition.	   Early	   on,	   the	   skill	   is	   approached	  
declaratively,	   with	   the	   learner	   developing	   a	   structural	   understanding	   of	   the	   task	  
requirements.	  Once	  this	  phase	  is	  over,	  the	  learner	  has,	  in	  Dekeyser’s	  words,	  crossed	  a	  
declarative	  threshold	  and	  learning	  continues	  through	  a	  ‘automatisation’	  phase	  during	  
which	  the	  rate	  of	  improvement	  is	  lower	  and	  the	  contribution	  of	  declarative	  processes	  
is	  diminished.	  
	  
Dekeyser’s	   use	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   a	   declarative	   threshold	   is	   potentially	   useful	   for	  
identifying	   situations	   in	  which	   learning	   occurs	   nondeclaratively.	   However,	   his	   use	   of	  
126 
 
the	  term	  is	  not	  how	  we	  would	  normally	  understand	  a	  threshold	  to	  work:	  in	  Dekeyser’s	  
sense,	  learning	  ceases	  to	  be	  declarative	  when	  the	  threshold	  is	  exceeded.	  If	  we	  instead	  
consider	  this	  concept	  from	  the	  opposite	  point	  of	  view,	  it	  becomes	  much	  more	  useful	  to	  
the	  present	  purposes.	  Exceeding	  the	  declarative	  threshold	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  current	  
research	  might	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  any	  instance	  in	  which	  an	  aspect	  of	  learning	  becomes	  
available	  to	  awareness	  and	  therefore	  to	  the	  powerful	  higher	  level	  cognitive	  processing	  
abilities	   of	   the	   human	   participant.	   The	   question	   is:	   can	   we	   identify,	   or	   contrive	   to	  
produce,	  any	  instances	  of	  action	  acquisition	  that	  do	  not	  exceed	  this	  revised	  definition	  
of	   the	   declarative	   threshold?	   Doing	   so	   would	   provide	   a	   potential	   means	   of	  
investigating	  the	  low	  level	  learning	  processes	  central	  to	  the	  current	  research.	  
	  
The	  role	  that	  a	  tutor	  can	  play	  in	  helping	  people	  to	  learn	  skills	  such	  as	  juggling,	  gives	  us	  
a	  clue	  as	  to	  how	  far	  declarative	  learning	  processes	  can	  take	  us	  in	  learning	  to	  perform	  
such	  actions.	  The	  aspects	   that	  a	   tutor	  cannot	  convey	  –	   the	  components	  of	  an	  action	  
that	  only	   come	   from	  practice	  –	  are,	  by	   contrast,	   good	  candidates	   for	  nondeclarative	  
learning.	   Juggling	   is	   an	   excellent	   example	   of	   an	   action	  with	   the	   frustrating	   property	  
that	  when	  one	  follows	  the	  guidance,	  it	  still	  seems	  like	  there	  is	  an	  instruction	  missing.	  	  
The	  basic	  combination	  of	  actions	  required	   is	  simple	  and	  yet,	   in	  spite	  of	   the	  apparent	  
simplicity	  of	  the	  required	  sequence	  of	  movements,	  there	  is	  a	  component	  of	  the	  action	  
that	  one	  cannot	  execute	  through	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  task	  structure	  alone.	  Some	  
aspects	  of	  such	  skills	  are	  presumably,	  too	  fast,	  too	  fine	  or	  simply	  too	  far	  outside	  of	  our	  
frame	  of	  reference	  to	  be	  perceived	  and/or	  executed	  declaratively.	   Instead,	  one	  must	  
simply	   practice	   the	   skill	   and	   generate	   the	   behavioural	   variance	   from	   which	   the	  
important	   aspects	   of	   that	   variance	   can	   be	   gradually	   extracted.	   This	   frustrating	  
component	  of	  skill	  learning	  is	  popularly	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  ‘knack’	  of	  the	  skill	  and	  such	  
knacks	   might	   provide	   a	   way	   of	   investigating	   the	   contribution	   of	   low-­‐level,	  
nondeclarative	  learning	  mechanisms	  to	  the	  process	  of	  action	  acquisition.	  
	  
	   	  
127 
 
Chapter	  5:	  summary	  and	  going	  forward	  
There	   is	   currently	   no	   methodological	   standard	   for	   the	   investigation	   of	   action	  
acquisition	   in	   humans	   in	   the	   way	   as	   there	   is,	   for	   example,	   for	   the	   investigation	   of	  
reward	   learning	   in	  nonhuman	  animals.	  For	  many	  reasons,	   this	  situation	   is	  unlikely	   to	  
change	   any	   time	   soon.	   The	   scope	   of	   the	   subject	   of	   action	   acquisition	   is	   extremely	  
broad,	  encompassing	  multiple	   learning	  processes	  and	  types	  of	   feedback.	  The	  current	  
work	   has	   described	   the	   development	   of	   a	   novel	   behavioural	   paradigm	   for	   the	  
investigation	  of	   action	   acquisition	   in	   humans.	   From	   the	  outset,	   the	   aim	  has	   been	   to	  
constrain	  this	  broad	  research	  question	  by	  focusing	  the	  theoretical	  emphasis	  on	  a	  low-­‐
level	  learning	  mechanism	  detailed	  by	  Redgrave	  and	  Gurney	  (2006)	  and	  Redgrave	  et	  al.	  
(2008).	   However,	   even	   thus	   constrained,	   the	   development	   was	   far	   from	  
straightforward.	  
	  
The	  prospects	   for	   the	   joystick	   task	  as	  a	  means	  of	   investigating	  action	  acquisition	  are	  
mixed.	  It	  provides	  many	  methodological	  advantages	  over	  button-­‐press	  reinforcement	  
learning	   paradigms;	   however,	   it	   suffers,	   as	   do	   so	   many	   other	   methodological	  
techniques,	  in	  that	  it	  is	  not	  straightforward	  to	  separate	  the	  effects	  of	  declarative	  level	  
processing	  from	  low-­‐level	  reinforcement	  learning	  mechanisms.	  What	  is	  perhaps	  most	  
important	  is	  that	  it	  proved	  extremely	  difficult	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  specific	  influence	  of	  
behavioural	   variance	  on	   learning	  –	  a	  key	  element	  of	   the	   theory	  of	  action	  acquisition	  
under	  investigation.	  
	  
However,	   whilst	   the	   reinforcement	   of	   behavioural	   variance	   remains	   a	   difficult	  
phenomenon	  to	  investigate	  with	  the	  joystick	  task,	  as	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  4,	   it	  seems	  
likely	   that	   this	   means	   of	   measuring	   the	   influence	   of	   Redgrave	   and	   Gurney’s	   action	  
acquisition	  mechanism	  may	  not	  ultimately	  prove	  to	  be	  the	  most	  efficient	  approach.	  By	  
focussing	   our	   intention	   instead	   on	   the	   repetition	   and	   reselection	   as	   opposed	   to	   the	  
reinforcement	  of	  motor	  output,	  we	  may	  be	  able	  to	  gain	  more	  insight	  into	  how	  such	  a	  
mechanism	  might	  contribute	  to	  the	  earliest	  stages	  of	  action	  acquisition.	  In	  this	  regard,	  
the	  version	  of	  the	  task	  described	  in	  chapter	  2	  is	  likely	  to	  provide	  a	  useful	  starting	  point	  




Going	  forward,	  there	  are	  countless	  areas	  of	  research	  open	  to	  investigation.	  Here,	  two	  
areas	  of	  potential	   inquiry	   are	   identified.	   The	   first	   concerns	  another	   test	  of	  Redgrave	  
and	  Gurney’s	  (2006)	  theory	  in	  a	  patient	  population	  and	  potentially	  utilising	  the	  joystick	  
task	  paradigm.	  The	  second	  concerns	  behavioural	  variance	  and	  would	  likely	  require	  an	  
alternative	  methodological	  approach.	  
	  
Parkinson’s	  disease	  
As	   already	   discussed,	   Redgrave	   and	   Gurney’s	   (2006)	   theory	   of	   action	   acquisition	  
concerns	  the	  activity	  of	  neurons	  in	  the	  ventral	  midbrain,	  including	  the	  substantia	  nigra.	  
Parkinson’s	  disease	  is	  characterised	  by	  a	  loss	  of	  cells	  in	  the	  substantia	  nigra	  (Pavese	  &	  
Brooks,	  2009),	  which	  is	  a	  major	  site	  of	  dopamine	  neuron	  cell	  bodies	  (Schultz,	  1998).	  An	  
idea	  put	  forward	  by	  Redgrave	  and	  Gurney	  within	  this	  author’s	  research	  group,	  is	  that	  
this	  implies	  that	  people	  suffering	  from	  Parkinson’s	  disease	  should	  be	  less	  able	  to	  learn	  
associations	  between	  novel	   stimuli	   and	   their	   own	  motor	  output.	   Consequently,	   they	  
should	   find	   it	  particularly	  difficult	   to	  add	  new	  actions	   to	   their	  behavioural	   repertoire	  
(Redgrave	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Redgrave,	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  Interestingly,	  another	  prediction	  arising	  
from	  the	  theory	  is	  that	  for	  patients	  who	  are	  being	  treated	  with	  dopamine	  agonists,	  the	  
general	  therapeutic	  effect	  of	  the	  medication	  should	  not	  include	  an	  improvement	  in	  the	  
ability	   to	   learn	   novel	   actions.	   This	   is	   because	   the	   phasic	   release	   of	   dopamine	   (as	  
opposed	  to	  the	  tonic	  levels)	  would	  be	  relatively	  unaffected	  by	  the	  treatment	  and	  it	  is	  
the	  phasic	  release	  of	  dopamine	  that	   is	   thought	  to	  have	  the	  time-­‐stamp	  effect	   that	   is	  
crucial	  to	  learning.	  
	  
In	  order	  to	  test	  the	  potential	  of	  the	  joystick	  task	  as	  a	  means	  of	  investigating	  a	  deficit	  in	  
action	  acquisition	   in	  this	  population,	  a	  pilot	  study	  was	  run	  on	  one	  male	  (66	  year-­‐old)	  
participant	  suffering	  from	  Parkinson’s	  disease	  (fully	  medicated	  at	  the	  time	  of	  testing).	  
The	   task	   employed	   was	   a	   modified	   version	   of	   experiment	   3	   and	   it	   was	   carried	   out	  
mainly	  to	  assess	  the	  ability	  Parkinson’s	  disease	  sufferers	  to	  perform	  the	  joystick	  task.	  
Somewhat	   surprisingly,	   given	   the	   prediction,	   performance	   on	   the	   task	  was	   excellent	  
for	  hotspot	  sizes	  up	  to	  the	  smallest	  tested	  –	  0.48%	  of	  the	  search	  space	  –	  and	  certainly	  
in	   the	   general	   range	   found	   for	   undergraduate	   participants	   in	   experiment	   3	   (M	   =	  
1838.61,	  SD	  =	  1659.60,	  values	  in	  untransformed	  screen	  units).	  Going	  forward,	  there	  is	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value	   in	   running	   further	  experiments	  with	  people	  suffering	   from	  Parkinson’s	  disease,	  
using	  different	  versions	  of	  the	  joystick	  task.	  Such	  investigations	  would	  not	  only	  enable	  
the	  testing	  of	  the	  general	  hypothesis	  outlined	  above	  but	  may	  also	  prove	  informative	  of	  
the	  paradigm	  itself.	  
	  	  
Imitation	   learning	   and	   the	   generation	   of	   behavioural	  
variance	  
The	   emphasis	   of	   Thorndike’s	   (1911)	   research	  was	   very	  much	   on	   the	   nondeclarative	  
end	   of	   the	   learning	   spectrum:	   on	   the	   accidental	   nature	   of	   learning.	   In	   his	   view,	   the	  
animals	   in	  the	  puzzle-­‐boxes	  were	  utterly	  at	  the	  mercy	  of	  the	  environment	  they	  were	  
placed	   into:	   “If	   all	   cats,	   when	   hungry	   and	   in	   a	   small	   box,	   will	   accidentally	   push	   the	  
button	   that	   holds	   the	   door,	   an	   occasional	   cat	   in	   a	   large	   room	  may	   very	  well	   do	   the	  
same”	  (p.73).	  Given	  a	  similar	  puzzle-­‐box	  task	  to	  Thorndike’s	  cats,	  humans	  could	  bring	  a	  
powerful	  declarative	  learning	  system	  to	  bear	  on	  the	  problem	  and,	  provided	  they	  could	  
locate	  an	  operandum,	  would	  not	  be	  unduly	  affected	  by	  parameters	  such	  as	  the	  size	  of	  
the	  room	  they	  were	  placed	  in.	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  there	  can	  be	  no	  room	  
for	   indiscriminate	   behaviour,	   even	   in	   the	   sophisticated	   learning	   of	   humans.	   As	   has	  
already	  been	  argued,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  knacks,	  exposing	  our	  learning	  system	  to	  samples	  of	  
essentially	  accidental	  behavioural	  variance	  might	  be	  the	  only	  way	  that	  we	  can	  learn	  to	  
reliably	  elicit	  a	  desired	  outcome	  because	  we	  are	  forced	  by	  our	  very	   ignorance	  of	  the	  
paradigm	  to	  explore	  portions	  of	  movement	  space	  we	  have	  no	  good	  reason	  to	  think	  will	  
be	  of	  use.	  
	  
We	  might	  accept	  that	  there	  are	  advantages	  to	  be	  gained	  from	  indiscriminate	  learning;	  
however,	   this	   raises	   the	  question	  of	   how	  a	   learning	   agent	   can	   generate	   behavioural	  
variance	  from	  which	  commonalities	  can	  be	  drawn	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  Given	  that	  we	  are	  
not	   prone	   to	  motor	   babbling	   outside	   of	   the	   first	   few	  months	   of	   life	   and	   that	   knack	  
learning	  makes	  up	   just	  a	  small	  proportion	  of	  most	  of	   the	   learning	  we	  produce,	   there	  
doesn’t	  seem	  to	  be	  much	  scope	  for	  producing	  behaviour	  which	  doesn’t	  have	  a	  direct	  
purpose.	  	  However,	  the	  question	  of	  the	  origins	  of	  behavioural	  variance	  is	  an	  important	  




It	   is	   something	   of	   a	   historical	   curiosity	   that	   almost	   all	   operant-­‐
conditioning	  research	  has	  been	  focused	  on	  the	  strengthening	  effect	  of	  
reinforcement	  and	  almost	  none	  on	   the	  question	  of	  origins,	  where	   the	  
behavior	   comes	   from	   in	   the	   first	   place,	   the	   problem	   of	   behavioral	  
variation,	  to	  pursue	  the	  Darwinian	  analogy.	  
	  
One	   possible	   source	   of	   behavioural	   variation	   in	   humans,	   which	   is	   more	   naturalistic	  
than	  the	  kind	  of	   forced	  behavioural	  variance	  produced	  during	  the	  exploratory	  period	  
of	   the	   joystick	   task,	   is	   imitation.	   In	   spite	   of	   the	   obvious	   constraints	   that	   imitation	  
implies,	   it	  can	  result	   in	  the	  generation	  of	  behaviour	  that	   is	  at	  odds	  with	  anything	  we	  
might	   produce	   with	   a	   strict	   goal-­‐directed	   approach	   to	   the	   situation.	   There	   is	  
considerable	  evidence	  that	  both	  children	  and	  adult	  humans	  imitate	  causally	  irrelevant	  
aspects	   of	   behaviour	   (Lyons,	   Young,	   &	   Keil,	   2007;	   McGuigan,	   Makinson	   &	   Whiten,	  
2011;	  McGuigan,	  Whiten,	   Flynn,	  &	  Horner,	   2007),	   even	   behaviour	   that	   chimpanzees	  
will	  not	  imitate	  (Horner	  &	  Whiten,	  2005).	  A	  potential	  advantage	  of	  imitating	  aspects	  of	  
behaviour	   that	   are	   apparently	   causally	   irrelevant	   (and	   potentially	   inefficient)	   is	   the	  
possibility	   that	   these	   components	   of	   the	   behaviour	   have	   some	   hidden	   value.	   For	  
example,	   by	   copying	   the	   style	   of	   a	   particular	   tennis	   player,	   a	   novice	   is	   likely	   to	   gain	  
substantial	   advantages	   from	  principles	  of	  body-­‐shape,	   follow-­‐through	  and	   small-­‐step	  
movements	   without	   necessarily	   understanding	   the	   relevance	   of	   these	   behaviours.	  
Imitation	  learning	  is	  therefore	  a	  potentially	  fruitful	  avenue	  of	  research	  for	  investigating	  
how	  learning	  is	  derived	  from	  behavioural	  variance	  under	  normal	  circumstances.	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Onscreen	   instructions	   for	   experiment	  1	   (within-­‐trial	   repetition	  
of	  audio	  reinforcement)	  
1. Welcome	  to	  the	  Joystick	  Task.	  Please	  read	  the	  instructions	  using	  the	  space	  bar	  
to	  move	  from	  page	  to	  page.	  
2. You	  will	  start	  with	  a	  practice	  session	  composed	  of	  3	  trials	  to	  get	  you	  limbered	  
up.	  
3. The	   task	   is	   to	   find	   the	   correct	  position	   to	  place	   the	   joystick	   in.	   Finding	   it	  will	  
result	  in	  a	  "pip"	  sound.	  
4. Keep	   the	   joystick	   in	   the	   position	   where	   you	   found	   the	   pip	   until	   you	   hear	  
another	  sound	  indicating	  success.	  
5. Trials	  will	  end	  automatically	  and	  move	  on	  to	  the	  next	  one	  after	  a	  short	  delay.	  
6. The	   first	   trial	   will	   start	   when	   you	   press	   "Space	   bar";	   thereafter	   trials	   start	  
automatically.	  	  Trials	  are	  counted	  in	  by	  3	  beeps.	  
7. Press	  the	  "Space	  bar"	  to	  start	  the	  practice	  session.	  
8. You	  found	  the	  correct	  position!	  	  Get	  ready	  for	  trial	  (...)	  of	  3.	  
9. You	  found	  the	  correct	  position!	  
10. Practice	  session	  over;	  time	  for	  the	  real	  thing.	  	  There	  are	  18	  trials	  in	  total.	  
11. Please	  complete	   trials	  as	  quickly	  as	  possible;	   some	  will	  be	  more	  difficult	   than	  
others.	  
12. Press	  "Space	  bar"	  to	  start.	  
13. You	  found	  the	  correct	  position!	  	  Get	  ready	  for	  trial	  (...)	  of	  18	  
14. You	  found	  the	  correct	  position	  and	  that	  was	  the	  last	  one.	  	  Phew!	  
15. The	  experiment	  is	  now	  over.	  Thanks	  for	  participating!	  
	  




Onscreen	   instructions	   for	   experiment	  2	   (within-­‐trial	   repetition	  
of	  visual	  reinforcement)	  
1. If	  you	  suffer	  from	  epilepsy	  DO	  NOT	  continue	  with	  the	  task	  as	  screen	  flashes	  
could	  potentially	  induce	  a	  seizure.	  
2. Welcome	  to	  the	  Joystick	  Task.	  Please	  read	  the	  instructions	  using	  the	  space	  
bar	  to	  move	  from	  page	  to	  page.	  
3. You	   will	   start	   with	   a	   practice	   session	   composed	   of	   3	   trials	   to	   get	   you	  
limbered	  up.	  
4. The	  task	  is	  to	  find	  the	  correct	  position	  to	  hold	  the	  joystick	  in.	  Finding	  it	  will	  
result	  in	  a	  screen	  flash.	  
5. Keep	  the	  joystick	  in	  the	  position	  where	  you	  found	  the	  screen	  flash	  until	  you	  
hear	  a	  sound	  indicating	  success.	  
6. Trials	   will	   end	   automatically	   and	   move	   on	   to	   the	   next	   one	   after	   a	   short	  
delay.	  
7. The	   first	   trial	  will	   start	  when	  you	  press	   "Space	  bar";	   thereafter	   trials	   start	  
automatically.	  	  Trials	  are	  counted	  in	  by	  3	  beeps.	  
8. If	  you	  have	  any	  problems	  or	  queries	  please	  tell	  Tom	  and	  he	  will	  be	  happy	  to	  
assist	  you.	  
9. Press	  the	  "Space	  bar"	  to	  start	  the	  practice	  session.	  
10. You	  found	  the	  correct	  position!	  	  Get	  ready	  for	  trial	  of	  (...)	  of	  3.	  
11. You	  found	  the	  correct	  position!	  
12. Practice	  session	  over;	  time	  for	  the	  real	  thing.	  	  There	  are	  18	  trials	  in	  total.	  
13. Please	   complete	   trials	   as	   quickly	   as	   possible;	   some	   will	   be	   more	   difficult	  
than	  others.	  
14. Press	  "Space	  bar"	  to	  start.	  
15. You	  found	  the	  correct	  position!	  	  Get	  ready	  for	  trial	  (...)	  of	  18	  
16. You	  found	  the	  correct	  position	  and	  that	  was	  the	  last	  one.	  	  Phew!	  
17. The	  experiment	  is	  now	  over.	  Thanks	  for	  participating!	  
	  




Onscreen	   instructions	   for	   experiment	   3	   (between-­‐trial	  
repetition	  of	  audio	  reinforcement)	  
1. Welcome	   to	   the	   Joystick	   Task.	   	   Please	   read	   the	   instructions	   using	   "Space	  
bar"	  to	  move	  from	  page	  to	  page.	  
2. You	   will	   start	   with	   a	   practice	   session	   composed	   of	   3	   trials	   to	   get	   you	  
limbered	  up.	  
3. The	   task	   is	   to	   find	   the	   correct	   area	   to	   put	   the	   joystick	   in	   as	   quickly	   as	  
possible.	  As	  soon	  as	  you	  find	  the	  correct	  area	  the	  trial	  will	  end.	  
4. The	  next	   trial	  will	  begin	  automatically	  after	  a	  short	  delay.	  When	   it	  begins,	  
you	  need	  to	  search	  for	  the	  same	  area	  again.	  
5. The	   first	   trial	  will	   start	  when	   you	   press	   "Space	   bar"	   thereafter	   trials	   start	  
automatically.	  	  All	  trials	  are	  counted	  in	  by	  3	  beeps.	  
6. If	  you	  have	  any	  problems	  or	  queries	  please	  tell	  Tom	  and	  he	  will	  be	  happy	  to	  
assist	  you.	  
7. Press	  the	  "Space	  bar"	  to	  start	  the	  practice	  session.	  
8. You	  found	  the	  correct	  position!	  	  Get	  ready	  for	  the	  next	  trial...	  
9. You	  found	  the	  correct	  position!	  
10. Practice	   session	   over	   time	   for	   the	   real	   thing.	   	   Press	   "space	   bar"	   to	  move	  
through	  these	  instructions.	  
11. There	  are	  4	  sets	  of	  10	  trials:	  i.e.	  40	  trials	  in	  total.	  
12. Within	  a	  set	  of	  6	  trials	  the	  correct	  area	  to	  move	  the	  joystick	  to	  remains	  the	  
same.	  
13. When	  you	  complete	  a	  set	  of	  10	  trials,	   the	  position	  of	   the	  area	  changes	  to	  
another,	   randomly	   determined,	   location	   and	   you	   have	   to	   start	   searching	  
afresh.	  
14. Please	   complete	   trials	   as	   quickly	   as	   possible;	   some	   will	   be	   more	   difficult	  
than	  others.	  
15. Press	  "Space	  bar"	  to	  start.	  
16. You	  found	  the	  correct	  position!	  	  Get	  ready	  for	  the	  next	  trial...	  
17. You	  found	  the	  correct	  position	  and	  have	  finished	  set	  1	  of	  4!	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18. Remember,	   the	   correct	   area	   has	   now	   been	  moved,	   at	   random,	   to	   a	   new	  
location.	  Press	  space	  bar	  when	  ready	  to	  start	  the	  second	  set	  of	  trials.	  
19. You	  found	  the	  correct	  position	  and	  have	  finished	  set	  2	  of	  4!	  
20. Remember,	   the	   correct	   area	   has	   now	   been	  moved,	   at	   random,	   to	   a	   new	  
location.	  Press	  space	  bar	  when	  ready	  to	  start	  the	  third	  set	  of	  trials.	  
21. You	  found	  the	  correct	  position	  and	  have	  finished	  set	  3	  of	  4!	  
22. Remember,	   the	   correct	   area	   has	   now	   been	  moved,	   at	   random,	   to	   a	   new	  
location.	  Press	  space	  bar	  when	  ready	  to	  start	  the	  final	  set	  of	  trials.	  
23. You	  found	  the	  correct	  position	  and	  that	  was	  the	  last	  one.	  	  Phew!	  
24. The	  experiment	  is	  now	  over.	  Thanks	  for	  participating!	  




Onscreen	   instructions	   for	   experiment	   4	   (between-­‐trial	  
repetition	  with	  delayed	  reinforcement)	  
1. Welcome	  to	  the	  Joystick	  Task.	  	  Please	  read	  the	  instructions	  using	  "Space	  bar"	  to	  
move	  from	  page	  to	  page.	  
2. You	  will	  start	  with	  a	  practice	  session	  composed	  of	  (_)trials	  to	  get	  you	  limbered	  
up.	  
3. The	  task	  is	  to	  find	  the	  correct	  area	  to	  put	  the	  joystick	  in	  as	  quickly	  as	  possible.	  
As	  soon	  as	  you	  find	  the	  correct	  area	  the	  trial	  will	  end.	  
4. The	  next	  trial	  will	  begin	  automatically	  after	  a	  short	  delay.	  When	  it	  begins,	  you	  
need	  to	  search	  for	  the	  same	  area	  again.	  
5. The	   first	   trial	   will	   start	   when	   you	   press	   "Space	   bar";	   thereafter	   trials	   start	  
automatically.	  	  All	  trials	  are	  counted	  in	  by	  3	  beeps.	  
6. If	   you	  have	  any	  problems	  or	  queries	  please	   tell	   Tom	  and	  he	  will	  be	  happy	   to	  
assist	  you.	  
7. Press	  the	  "Space	  bar"	  to	  start	  the	  practice	  session.	  
8. Practice	   session	   over;	   time	   for	   the	   real	   thing.	   	   Press	   "space	   bar"	   to	   move	  
through	  these	  instructions.	  
9. There	  are	  8	  sets	  of	  10	  trials:	  i.e.	  80	  trials	  in	  total.	  
10. Within	  a	   set	  of	  10	   trials	   the	  correct	  area	   to	  move	   the	   joystick	   to	   remains	   the	  
same.	  
11. When	   you	   complete	   a	   set	   of	   10	   trials,	   the	   position	   of	   the	   area	   changes	   to	  
another,	  randomly	  determined,	  location	  and	  you	  have	  to	  start	  searching	  afresh.	  
12. Please	  complete	   trials	  as	  quickly	  as	  possible;	   some	  will	  be	  more	  difficult	   than	  
others.	  
13. Press	  "Space	  bar"	  to	  start.	  
14. Found	  it!	  	  Get	  ready	  for	  the	  next	  trial...	  
15. You	  found	  the	  correct	  position	  and	  that	  was	  the	  last	  one.	  	  Phew!	  
16. The	  experiment	  is	  now	  over.	  Thanks	  for	  participating!	  
	  
